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A B S T F R A C n r
The d is s e r ta t io n  Is d iv id ed  In th ree  p a rts :
P art I: I t  Is suggested th a t  Thucydides* H is to ry  p rovides u se fu l
In s ig h ts  In to  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  the o ry  In so fa r  as the  lin k  between 
g lo ry , fe a r, and c o n f l ic t  p o s tu la te d  by Thucydides a ffo rd s  a deeper 
understanding o f  the  ro le  o f  g lo ry  and fe a r In Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l
co n s tru c t. In p a r t ic u la r ,  i t  Is suggested th a t the  d is t in c t io n  between 
u lt im a te  and proxim ate causes o f  the  Peloponnesian War underly ing  
Thucydides' argument Is used by Hobbes In a l l  t h r e e ^ i s  p o l i t ic a l  /  
works In o rde r to  exp la in  c o n f l ic t  In the  s ta te  o f  na tu re .
P art I I : The meaning o f  ‘G lo ry ’ In Elements o f  Law, De Cive, and 
Levia than  Is examined In d e ta i l  and I t  is  argued th a t, in  s p ite  o f  
some changes In Hobbes's ph ilosophy o f  man, the  ro le  assigned by 
Hobbes to  g lo ry  In both p re -p o ll t le a l and p o l i t ic a l  assoc ia tions  Is 
Id e n tic a l In a l l  th ree  works. The s ig n ific a n c e  o f  G lo ry  Is emphasised 
and I ts  ro le  In Hobbes's the o ry  Is de fined  and exp la ined  In re la t io n  
to  o th e r key elements o f  h is  p o l i t ic a l  d iscourse , such as s e l f -  
p rese rva tion , r a t io n a l i ty ,  f e l ic i t y ,  p r o f i t ,  power, e tc . I t  Is a lso  
s tre ssed  th a t Hobbes's d e f in it io n  o f  g lo ry  makes I t  com patib le  w ith  a 
concern fo r  s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  and thus d i f fe r s  from  the cu rre n t
meaning o f  g lo ry  ( th a t a llow s  one to  speak o f  ‘g lo r io u s  death ’ ).
P art I I I :  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  theo ry  Is axlom atlsed as a model re s tin g  
on a sm all se t o f  assum ptions common to  a l l  th re e  works. C ontrary to  
cu rre n t views. I t  Is argued th a t g lo ry , and no t the  concern fo r  s e l f -  
p rese rva tion , Is the  p iv o ta l assum ption o f  Hobbes's the o ry  and th a t 
Indeed the  assumption o f  an o v e r - r id in g  concern fo r  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  
Is lo g ic a lly  redundant to  d e rive  the s ta te  o f  war and the  cond itions  
fo r  peace as described  by Hobbes. F in a lly  I t  I t  suggested th a t
Hobbes's model can be In te rp re te d  as Im plying the  In c o m p a tib ility  
w ith in  a s ta te -o f-n a tu re  approach o f  g lo ry -se ek ing  behaviour and a 
r ic h  se t o f  p o l i t ic a l  r ig h ts  and thus can be used to  expose a
problem o f  consistency In some lib e ra l the o rie s  o f  the  S tate .
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There Is a s to ry  about a B r it is h  economist who had been given a te x t 
o f  m athem atical economics fo r  a review . She opened and closed the 
book In a m a tte r o f  seconds, saying th a t she was no t prepared to  
rev iew  ye t ano ther tome o f  conse rva tive  views. The review s e d ito r  
wondered how she cou ld  have reached her (co rrec t, as I t  happens) 
v e rd ic t  on a h ig h ly  te ch n ica l work In such a sh o rt tim e. The rev iew er 
m odestly po in ted  to  the  preface, where the w r i te r  thanked h is  w ife  
fo r  her “ Inva luab le  suppo rt over the  years" and fo r  her “ help  o f  a 
deeper s o rt" .
W ith the  B r it is h  economist I agree a t least In one respect; prefaces 
t e l l  us much about w r i te rs  and can d iscourage p o te n tia l readers. Over 
the past years I have read many p re faces to  books on Hobbes and none 
seemed appealing. Th is  Is one reason why I f e l t  th a t I should  w r ite  a 
preface m yself, and add a th e s is  to  I t .
What I ob jec t to  In p re faces to  books on Hobbes Is no t the  va in  g lo ry  
o f  the  authors, s ince  I m yse lf have much In common w ith  the 
Hobbes Ian f l y  s i t t in g  on the  ax le  tre e  and p rocla im ing “ what a dust 
do I ra ise ". Thus, a lthough  on ly  m ild ly  In te res ted  In knowing th a t 
Jean Hampton's husband Is a lso  her best fr ie n d , th a t a l l  Hobbes's 
In te rp re te rs  are  hap p ily  m arried, have w onderfu l parents, p a tie n t 
ch ild ren , and ded ica ted  se c re ta r ie s , I am t r u ly  sym pathetic w ith  th e ir  
need to  d iv u lg a te  th e ir  p r iv a te  l i f e  and admire th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  
convince th e ir  sponsors th a t no se rio u s  book on Hobbes can ever be 
w r it te n  w ith o u t a p ilg rim ag e  to  the  ra re  books room o f  the  U n iv e rs ity
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o f  Cambridge L ib ra ry .
What does I r r i t a t e  me In many p re faces o f  books on Hobbes, though, Is 
th e ir  lack o f  passion. I d is l ik e  the  p a tro n is in g  a t t i tu d e  o f  many 
In te rp re te rs , the  m a je s tic  way In which they concede th a t  Hobbes has 
s t i l l  something to  t e l l  us, the  detachment and p ro fess iona lism  In 
ju s t i f y in g  the fa c t  th a t  they have w r it te n  a book about him. I f  one 
were to  judge from  the  p re faces to  th e ir  books, one would have to  
conclude th a t I f  Hobbes's In te rp re te rs  had not had p la toons o f  
sp u rr in g  fr ie n d s , u rg in g  p ub lish e rs , and magnanimous sponsors, a l l  
anxious to  read, comment, d iscuss, and learn from  them, they would 
have never dreamt o f  devo ting  th e ir  p rec ious tim e to  understanding 
Hobbes.
My case Is d if fe re n t .  The o r ig in  o f  the presen t d is s e r ta t io n  lie s  
e n t ir e ly  w ith  my passions. Nobody sponsored me. Nobody In s is te d  th a t 
I should s tudy Hobbes. Nobody urged me to  w r ite  a th e s is  about him. 
Nobody re lie v e d  me o f  my o th e r commitments so th a t I could  th in k  and 
w r ite  a t ease. My whole research proceeded from  my uneasiness and 
apprehension tow ards people In power, cu lm in a ting  In my deep-rooted 
fe a r o f  the S tate .
A lthough I have no personal reasons fo r  fe e lin g  th rea tened  by Police, 
M ag is tra tes , P rison O ffic e rs , and the  Army, I have always been a fra id  
o f  them and f e l t  o fte n  sym pathe tic  w ith  those groups and In d iv id u a ls  
In so c ie ty  who c la im  th a t, w ith o u t any fa u l t  o f  th e ir  own, they are 
s y s te m a tic a lly  wronged by people In power. Such groups and 
In d iv id u a ls  seem to  e x is t  under a l l  form s o f  government. In lib e ra l 
s ta te s  and s o c ia l is t  co u n trie s  a lik e . In B r ita in ,  fo r  example, 
sec tions  o f  the  black community and homosexuals fe e l vu lnerab le  to
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Police, M a g is tra tes , and Prison O ffic e rs ; In the  S ov ie t Union, desp ite
p e res tro ika , homosexuals and Jews fe e l vu lnerab le ; and the  l i s t  could
continue. I f  the  above groups are s ince re  In saying th a t, In s p ite  o f
th e ir  posing no th re a t to  the  S ta te , they do no t enjoy the  r ig h ts  o f
everybody e lse  and In p a r t ic u la r  s u f fe r  more In tru s io n  In th e ir
p r iv a te  l i f e  than Is u s u a lly  experienced and accepted, on what 
ground can anybody assume th a t the  same trea tm en t w i l l  not be meted 
ou t to  her In the  fu tu re  ?
To some th is  ques tion  m ight sound preposterous; however I f  we
be lieve  th a t the  com pla in ts vo iced by some m in o r it ie s  are grounded, 
then what Is p reposterous Is any debate, not uncommon among lib e ra ls , 
on the  de te rm ina tion  o f  the  e x te n t o f  the  p r iv a te  sphere o f  
In d iv id u a ls , or, more p re c ise ly , on the p o in t where the  b a r r ie r  
between p u b lic  a u th o r ity  and p r iv a te  l ib e r ty  should  be erected. Could 
I t  not be the case, In fa c t,  th a t the  very Idea o f  an In v io la b le
p r iv a te  sphere o f  the  In d iv id u a l aga ins t the  S ta te  be m erely a
figm ent o f  l ib e ra l Im agination ?
Th is problem o r ig in a te d  my In te re s t In Hobbes, who, o f  course, th in ks  
th a t the re  can be no such th in g  as a p ro te c te d  domain. He fe e ls
s tro n g ly  th a t In p o l i t ic a l  assoc ia tions , whereas we have r ig h ts  In 
re la t io n  to  o th e r c it iz e n s , we have no r ig h ts  a g a in s t the  S ta te . Even 
s e lf-p re s e rv a t Ion, he argues. Is no t s t r i c t l y  speaking a r ig h t ,  In so |
i
fa r  as we can be pu t to  death w ith o u t any reason whatsoever. Hobbes 
acknowledges th a t we can b rin g  to  co u rt co rru p te d  judges o r
policemen. But th is ,  he adds, shou ld  no t be taken to  Imply th a t we 
have r ig h ts  a g a in s t the  S tate. I t  means m erely th a t  the  S ta te  Is so 
pow erfu l th a t I t  can a ffo rd  to  be magnanimous. Hobbes, however.
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th in ks  th a t the S ta te  Is u n l ik e ly  to  be s y s te m a tic a lly  In iq u ito u s , 
because he fe e ls  th a t  In so doing the sovere ign power would go 
aga ins t the  n a tu ra l laws g iven by God and a ga ins t h is  own In te re s ts  
th a t depend on the  w e ll-b e in g  o f  h is  c it iz e n s . Th is argument, however, 
g ives me hard ly  any reassurance, f i r s t l y  because people In power are 
l ik e ly  to  d is re g a rd  d iv in e  In ju n c tio n s  , and secondly because to  I l l -  
t re a t  m in o r it ie s  Is n o t n ece ssa rily  damaging to  the  ru lin g  class, 
bu t on the co n tra ry  can be a means to  captu re  the  favo u r o f  the 
m a jo rity . Thus I f e l t  th a t  I f  Hobbes were c o rre c t In saying th a t In 
p r in c ip le  we cannot have any p ro te c te d  sphere aga in s t the  S tate , then 
In p r in c ip le  w ith in  any S ta te  a m in o r ity  Is In e v ita b ly  very 
vu lnerab le . I f  th is  were so, cons ide ring  th a t each o f  us (being s h o rt­
s igh ted , o r t a l l ,  o r f a t )  Is the  p o te n tia l member o f  a m in o rity , my 
fe a r o f  the S ta te  would be w e ll grounded.
Thus, I concentra ted  my a tte n tio n  on Hobbes's con ten tion  o f  the
Im p o s s ib ility  o f  a p ro te c te d  sphere o f  c it iz e n s  aga in s t the  S ta te  and 
proceeded backwards to  h is  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the  s ta te  o f  na ture , and 
hence to  h is  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  human nature. I found th a t h is  argument 
o f  the In a d m is s ib il ity  o f  a p r iv a te  domain de rives  from  h is
d e sc r ip tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  war, and th a t th is  In tu rn  Is a lo g ica l 
conclusion o f  a number o f  assum ptions made about man, on h is
re la t io n  to  o th e r men and to  the environm ent. O f a l l  these 
assumptions I found th a t  one was p e cu lia r to  Hobbes (and not to  be 
found In the  w r it in g s  o f  the  fa th e r  o f  B r it is h  L ibe ra lism , I.e. Locke) 
and thus I decided to  focus on I t  — the assumption th a t some men are 
g lo ry -seeke rs , namely consider s u p e r io r i ty  to  o th e rs  as the  g re a te s t 
o f  a l l  p leasures. And th is  f in a l ly  exp la ins  my In te re s t In the
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Hobbes Ian concept o f  “ g lo ry ” and why I decided to  w r ite  a 
d is s e r ta t io n  about I t .  The f in a l  re s u lt  o f  my In q u iry  Is th a t u n t i l  
lib e ra ls  address the  problem posed by Hobbes In h is  own terms and 
argue th a t e ith e r  the  s ta te -o f-n a tu re  approach Is Inco rrec t or 
Hobbes's assum ption on g lo ry  Is untenable  (or bo th ) and th a t h is  
f in a l  conc lus ion  Is th e re fo re  In co rre c t, then the re  are  good reasons 
fo r  each o f  us (as p o te n t ia l members o f  a m in o r ity )  to  be fe a r fu l o f  
the  S tate .
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I rvJ-TRODLJCT I orvi
P ro fessor M ichael Oakeshott once sa id  th a t he re a liz e d  th a t he was 
not a ph ilosopher whenever reading P la to ; In my case, I re a liz e  th a t I 
am not a ph ilosopher whenever reading my own w r it in g s . As I see I t ,  
ph ilosophers produce Ideas and the o rie s  th a t have many depths and 
face ts , th a t have an Independent l i f e  o f  th e ir  own, th a t can be read 
and apprec ia ted  e ith e r  cons ide ring  o r a b s tra c tin g  from  the h is to r ic a l 
circum stances In which they were w r itte n , th a t  express what 
ph ilosophers themselves had thought, and more beside. In my view th is  
exp la ins  why the  work o f  ph ilosophers Is an Ine xhaus tib le  source o f  
new In te rp re ta tio n s , each o f  which can cla im  to  be grounded In the 
te x t.
A lthough the above c r i te r io n  taken on I ts  own is  in s u f f ic ie n t  to  
cha rac te rize  a p h ilo so p h ica l work, and some may even f in d  I t  
questionab le , I have s ta te d  my co n v ic tio n  th a t p h ilo so p h ica l w r it in g s  
are amenable to  d if fe re n t  In te rp re ta t io n s  because I t  may be u se fu l 
to  appraise the  cla im s made In the present d is s e rta t io n .
On the one hand, I c la im  th a t the  In te rp ré tâ t Ion o f  Hobbes's 
p o l i t ic a l  theo ry  o ffe re d  In th is  d is s e r ta t io n  Is based e n t ir e ly  on a 
c a re fu l reading o f  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  works; more s p e c if ic a lly ,  my 
th e s is  Is th a t In Elements o f  Law, De Cive, and Levia than  one can f in d  
a common model th a t can be used to  exp la in  why c it iz e n s  have the 
o b lig a tio n  o f  obedience to  the  S ta te , co n d itio n a l e x c lu s iv e ly  on the 
p rese rva tion  o f  th e ir  live s . Th is model Is based on a sm a ll number o f
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assum ptions, a l l  bu t one o f  which Hobbes shares w ith  those lib e ra l 
th in k e rs  (e.g. Locke) who are  prepared to  deploy a s ta te -o f-n a tu re  
approach to  the  ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  r ig h ts .  The s p e c if ic a lly  Hobbes Ian 
assum ption Is the  Idea th a t  some people may seek “ g lo ry ” , I.e., the 
p leasure  o f  dom inion o th e rs . I argue th a t Hobbes's b e l ie f  th a t a l l  
men a tta c h  an o v e r - r id in g  p r io r i t y  to  th e ir  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n . Is 
redundant to  h is  argument fo r  u n l-c o n d lt lo n a l obedience. Th is model 
Is examined In P art I I I  o f  the  d is s e rta t io n , which closes w ith  some
suggestions fo r  the  research agenda o f  some l ib e ra l th e o r is ts .
Whereas P art I I I  pu ts  fo rw a rd  an In te rp re ta t io n  o f  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l 
theo ry  w ith  the  aim o f  p ro v id in g  a h e u r is t ic  to o l to  understand some 
contem porary problems o f  ju s t ic e .  P art I I  Is meant to  be a d e ta ile d  
exam ination o f  the  meaning o f  “ g lo ry ” In Elements o f  Law, De Cive, 
and Leviathan, In re la t io n  to  o th e r key Hobbes Ian concepts, such as 
honour, power, f e l i c i t y ,  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , r a t io n a li ty ,  scarce 
resources, e tc . In th is  p a r t o f  the  d is s e r ta t io n  I have t r ie d  to  keep 
q u ite  d is t in c t  what Hobbes says from my own exp lana tions o r
In te rp ré tâ t  Ions. When, In the  course o f  my ana lys is , I have brought to
the l ig h t  some problems In h is  argument, I have sometimes re fra in e d
from  a tte m p tin g  to  p rov ide  my own s o lu tio n  o r exp lana tion . A case In 
p o in t Is my tre a tm e n t o f  the  problem o f  the m in o r ity  o f  non-g lo ry -  
seekers In Elem ents o f  Law and De Cive. An Instance In P art II  where
Instead I h ig h lig h t  an apparent c o n tra d ic tio n  In Hobbes's works and
t r y  to  pu t fo rw a rd  my own exp lana tion  fo r  I t  Is when I deal w ith
Hobbes's argum ent on the  d iffe re n c e s  between apian and human
a ssoc ia tio n s  and compare I t  w ith  h is  account o f  the s ta te  o f  nature . 
In th is  case, I argue, a c a re fu l exam ination o f  Thucydides' H is to ry
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may o f fe r  the key to  so lve  the  Inco n g ru ity  In Hobbes's te x t.  I t  w i l l  
be n o ticed  th a t my Thucydidean In te rp re ta t io n  o f  Hobbes, a lthough not 
a suppo rting  p i l la r  o f  my th e s is  In so fa r  as the  la t te r  stands even 
I f  the  v a l id i t y  o f  the  form er Is denied, p rovides neverthe less a 
u n ify in g  Idea o f  the  whole d is s e rta t io n . In fa c t. I t  u nd e rlie s  both 
p a rt I I I ,  In so fa r  as I t  p rovides the reader w ith  a to o l to  
understand the dynamics o f  the s ta te  o f  war and P art I, where I t r y  
to  show the  s t r ik in g  s im i la r i t y  between Thucydides' and Hobbes's 
works In s in g lin g  ou t fe a r and g lo ry  as the main m o tiva tion s  o f  
people and In conside ring  fe a r as the  p i l la r  o f  s o c ia l o rder and 
am bition , o r g lo ry , as the  o r ig in  o f  I ts  co rros ion . In Part I I t  Is 
a lso  claim ed th a t Thucydides poses p o l i t ic a l  philosophy two dilemmas 
and th a t Hobbes's work can be seen as the a ttem p t to  so lve  them.
On the  o th e r hand, a lthough In my view the In te rp re ta t io n  pu t fo rw ard  
In th is  d is s e r ta t io n  can be f i rm ly  traced  back to  Hobbes's w r it in g s , 
no cla im  Is made th a t the  present work o f fe rs  a reading o f  Hobbes's 
theo ry  th a t Is somehow more c o rre c t than th a t put fo rw a rd  by o the r 
Hobbes's readers. I am aware th a t, as seen from  d if fe re n t  v iew po in ts , 
Hobbes's theo ry  conveys d if fe re n t  messages from  the  one h ig h lig h te d  
here. Indeed, as I po in ted  ou t In the preface, the m o tiva tio n  behind 
th is  th e s is  Is no t to  challenge the scho la rsh ip  on Hobbes, but to  t r y  
to  argue th a t Hobbes’s theo ry  can help understand ing a problem o f  
ju s t ic e  e x is t in g  In our so c ie ty .
Because o f  my s p e c if ic  In te re s t In Hobbes's ph ilosophy , the 
scho la rsh ip  on Hobbes has a low p ro f i le  In th is  th e s is . Th is has 
advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage Is th a t  in so doing
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I managed to  avo id  the  c r i t ic is m  le ve lle d  some tim e ago by P ro fessor 
B arry aga in s t au thors  from  departm ents o f  P o lit ic s  , i.e. th a t they 
are prone to  padding. The disadvantage Is th a t I have been unable to  
s te e r c le a r o f  the  m istake th a t In h is  view  Is common among authors 
from  departm ents o f  Philosophy, namely to  fo rg e t the  background. 
Indeed a look a t th is  d is s e r ta t io n  and a t the re ferences m ight g ive  
the Impression th a t I do not be lieve  th a t before me th e re  had been a 
p re h is to ry . A lthough th is  Is no t the  case, I must accept th a t my work 
Is In th is  respect open to  c r it ic is m . An idea l d is s e rta t io n , o f  course, 
would have t r ie d  to  place my c o n tr ib u tio n  to  the  understanding o f  the 
Hobbes Ian concept o f  g lo ry  In the  con tex t o f  the  e x is t in g  scho la rsh ip  
on Hobbes. I have two reasons fo r  solace fo r  having fa i le d  to  do so, 
one fo r  my th ree  readers, the  o th e r fo r  m yself. The conso la tion  fo r  
my readers Is th a t such an “ Idea l”  d is s e r ta t io n  would have been 200 
pages longer and perhaps more than tw ice  as ted ious to  read; my own 
conso la tion  Is th a t a d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the  ro u te  I fo llo w ed  to  reach my 
sm all detached co ttage  In the coun trys ide , d e ta il in g  how I walked 
along S trauss S trasse, tu rned  r ig h t  a t Macpherson Junction , passed 
by Oakeshott Park, crossed Watkins Lane, c a re fu lly  avoided M cN ellly 
cu l-d e -sac , and s y s te m a tic a lly  Ignored G auth ier one-way s igns would 
have le f t  no marks on the  landscape o f  the h is to ry  o f  p o l i t ic a l  
thought.
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A NOTE ON TEXTS
In th is  d is s e r ta t io n  the  fo llo w in g  n o ta tio n  Is used to  re fe r  to
Hobbes’s te x ts :
Leviathan ; vo l. I l l  o f  The English Works o f  Thomas Hobbes, e d ite d  by 
W illiam  Molesworth, London, John Bohn, 1839.
De Cive : vo l. I l l  o f  the  Clarendon E d itio n  o f  the P h ilosoph ica l Works
o f  Thomas Hobbes, De Cive. The English Version e n tit le d  in 
the f i r s t  ed ition  Ffiilosophicall Rudiments Concerning 
Government and Society, ed ite d  by H. Warrender, Oxford, 
C larendon Press, 1983
Elements o f  Law : The Elements o f  Law Natural and P o litic , e d ite d  by 
F. Tbnnles, 2nd ed., London, F. Cass, 1969.
Elements o f  Philosophy : vo l. I o f  The English Works o f  Thomas
Hobbes, e d ite d  by W illiam  Molesworth, 
London, John Bohn, 1839.
Behemoth : Behemoth o r the Lang Parliament, e d ite d  by F. Tttnnies, 2nd
ed., London, F. Cass, 1969.
Anti-W hite : Thomas White*s De Mundo Examined, tra n s la te d  from the 
L a tin  and e d ite d  by H. Whitmore Jones, B radford  
U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1976.
History I : The H istory  o f  the Grecian War w ritten  by Thucydides and 
transla ted  by Thomas Hobbes, vo l. V I II  o f  The English 
Works o f  Thomas Hot>bes, e d ite d  by W illiam  Molesworth, 
London, John Bohn, 1843.
History I I  : The H istory  o f  the Grecian War w ritten  by Thucydides and
transla ted  by Thomas Hobtjes, vo l. XI o f  The English 
Works o f  Thomas Hot>tfes, ed ite d  by W illiam  Molesworth, 
London, John Bohn, 1843.
Human Nature : De Homine, In Man and Citizen, e d ite d  by B. Gert, New
York, Doubleday, 1972.
A lso re fe rre d  to  In the  te x t  is  the  fo llo w in g  work:
“L e tte rs  and O ther P ieces’’, vo l. V II o f  The English Works o f  Thomas 
Hobbes, e d ite d  by W illiam  Molesworth, London, John Bohn, 1845.
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The two chapters fo rm ing  th is  p a r t o f  the  d is s e rta t io n , a lthough 
dea ling  w ith  d if fe re n t  su b je c t-m a tte rs , serve the  same purpose, 
namely th a t o f  in tro du c in g  the a n a lys is  on g lo ry  c a rr ie d  ou t in Part
II.
In p a r t ic u la r .  Chapter I aims a t e xp la in in g  the  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  fe a r 
and am bition  in Thucydides' H is to ry  and suggests th a t in  h is  p o l i t ic a l  
w r it in g s  Hobbes endorses and develops Thucydides' in s ig h ts  on the 
fu n c tio n  o f  g lo ry  and fe a r in p o l i t ic a l  a ssoc ia tions  and on the 
re la t io n s h ip  between des ire  o f  power and concern fo r  s e l f -  
p re se rva tio n  in the  dynamics o f  war.
Chapter I I  o f fe rs  a b r ie f  account o f  Hobbes's conception o f  man, thus 
p ro v id ing  the  background in which g lo ry  as a human passion can be 
understood.
“ 1 7 “ -
THUCYDIDES' H I S T O R Y  AN INTRODUCTION
TO HOBBES'S POLITICAL WORKS
1.1 INTRODUCTION; 1.2 THE THREE GREATEST THINGS; 1.3 ON FEAR: 1.3.1. 
Fear and U n ce rta in ty ; 1.3.2 Fear and A n tic ip a tio n ; 1.3.3 Fear and 
D e lib e ra tio n ; 1.3.4- Fear and S oc ia l Order; 1.4 ON HONOUR: 1.4.1 Human 
n a tu re  and am b ition  to  ru le ; 1.4.2 Am bition to  ru le  and p o l i t ic a l 
assoc ia tio n s ; 1.5 ON PROFIT; 1.6 CONCLUSION.
1.1 im-RODUCTION
In recen t years th e re  seems to  have been a re v iv a l o f  In te re s t In the  
s im i la r i t ie s  between Thucydides' and Hobbes's thought. In 1987, fo r  
example, Brown <1 ) h ig h lig h te d  a s ig n if ic a n t  convergence o f  Ideas 
between the  two a u th o rs  on an ex trem ely  wide range o f  top ics ; In 
1988 Orwln (2) po in ted  to  some s t r ik in g  p a ra lle ls  between Thucydides' 
s ta s is  and Hobbes's s ta te  o f  n a tu re  and In 1989 Brown (3) urged 
scho la rs  to  regard  Hobbes's tra n s la t io n  o f  Thucydides as “ an In te g ra l 
p a rt o f  h is  o ffe r in g s  to  the  p u b lic  on the na tu re  o f  man and 
so c ie ty " .
In th is  chap ter I s h a ll show th a t  Thucydides' work prov ides an
(1 ) C l i f f o r d  W. Brown, ‘Thucydides, Hobbes, and the  D e riva tio n  o f
Anarchy’ , H is to ry  o f  P o l i t ic a l Thought, vo l. V I I I  (1), Spring 1987, 
pp. 33-62.
(2) C l i f fo r d  Orwln, ‘S tas is  and Plague: Thucydides on the  D isso lu tio n  
o f  Society*, Journa l o f  P o lit ic s ,  vo l. 50(4), Nov. 1988, pp. 831-47.
(3) C l i f fo r d  W. Brown, ‘Thucydides, Hobbes and the  L inea r Causal
P e rspec tive ’ , H is to ry  o f  P o l i t ic a l  Thought, vo l. X(2), Summer 1989,
pp. 215-56.
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Inva luab le  s ta r t in g -p o in t  to  examine Hobbes's theo ry  and to  assess 
the  fundam ental ro le  o f  fe a r  and g lo ry  w ith in  I t .  In p a r t ic u la r ,  I 
s h a ll suggest th a t Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  theory  develops some o f 
Thucydides' In s ig h ts  on the  fu n c tio n  o f  fe a r and the  e ffe c t  o f 
am b ition  on p o l i t ic a l  a sso c ia tio n s  and provides an escape from  the 
dilemmas ra ise d  by Thucydides on the  co nd itions  under which fe a r and 
am b ition  can e ith e r  promote o r su b ve rt c iv i l is a t io n .
1.2 THE THREE GREATEST THINGS
In the  e a r ly  stages o f  the  Peloponnesian war, Athens' ambassadors are 
repo rted  In Thucydides' H is to ry  (4) to  have ju s t i f ie d  th e ir  
expans Ion 1st Ic p o lic y  In th e ir  o ra tio n  to  the  C o rin th ian s  In the 
fo llo w in g  terms:
». we were fo rced  to  advance our dominion to  what I t  Is, ou t o f  the 
na tu re  o f  the  th in g  I t s e l f ;  as c h ie f ly  fo r  fea r, next fo r  honour and 
la s t ly  fo r  p r o f i t .  (5)
They Imputed th e ir  behaviour to  the  ve ry essence o f  human nature, 
thus suggesting  th a t the re  was no need fo r  excusing I t .
We read:
(4) A l l  re ferences are to  Hobbes's own tra n s la t io n  o f  the  H isto ry ,
the  reason why I s h a ll re fe r  n e ith e r to  more accura te  recent 
tra n s la t io n s  nor to  the  o r ig in a l Greek te x t  Is th a t my main 
concern Is to  examine Hobbes's understanding o f  Thucydides, 
ra th e r than an assessment o f  the  H is to ry  In genera l. Moreover, I t  
seems to  mee th a t none o f  the  passages examined o r quoted In
th is  Chapter Is c o n tro v e rs ia l (w ith  perhaps one exception, noted 
la te r  In sec. 1.4.2). I t  can be s a fe ly  assumed th a t on the 
sub jec ts  o f  fe a r, honour, and p r o f i t  we are dea ling  w ith  a
tra n s la t io n  and not a m is in te rp re ta t io n  o f  Thucydides' views.
(5) H is to ry , I, p. 81.
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So th a t, though overcome by th re e  the g re a te s t th in g s , honour, fe a r 
and p r o f i t ,  we have th e re in  done noth ing  to  be wondered a t nor 
besides the  manner o f  men. Nor have we been the f i r s t  In th is  kind, 
but I t  hath been ever a th in g  fixe d , fo r  the weaker to  be kept 
under by the  s tro n g e r. (6)
In the  H is to ry  the  re fe rence  to  honour, fea r, and p r o f i t  Is
no t In c id e n ta l, nor are the  A thenians the on ly  ones who consider them 
as the  “ th ree  g re a te s t th in g s ’* th a t  m o tiva te  human behaviour. Indeed, 
I t  can be argued th a t  Thucydides h im s e lf deploys these th ree  
fundam ental concepts to  exp la in  the  mechanics and the  dynamics o f  
the  whole Peloponnesian war.
D ire c t re ferences to  fe a r, power, dominion, and re p u ta tio n  occur a t 
le a s t once In alm ost every page o f  the  f i r s t  tw e n ty th re e  paragraphs 
o f  the F ir s t  Book o f  the  H is to ry  where Thucydides t r ie s  to  e s ta b lish  
the  tru e  causes o f  the  war, as opposed to  the p re te x t th a t sparked 
o f f  the  c o n f l ic t .  He concludes th a t  In the  la s t a n a lys is  the war
arose c h ie f ly  because o f  the  Lacedœmon Ians' fe a r  o f  Athens'
Increasing  power and d es ire  to  ru le  and th a t a l l  the  o the r
p a rte c lp a n ts  formed a llia n c e s  e ith e r  fo r  fe a r o r fo r  hope o f  p r o f i t .  
The causes why they brake the  same [ league], and th e ir  q ua rre ls , I 
have th e re fo re  se t down f i r s t  , because no man should  be to  seek 
from  what ground so g re a t a war amongst the Grecians could  a rise . 
And the  t ru e s t  q u a rre l, though leas t In speech, I conceive to  be 
the growth o f  the  A thenian power; which p u tt in g  the  Lacedœmon Ians 
In to  fe a r n ecess ita ted  the  war. (7)
(6) Ib id., p. 82.
(7) Ib id., p. 27.
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No s tud e n t o f  Hobbes can f a i l  to  no tice  the s t r ik in g  s im i la r i ty  
between the th ree  m o tiva tio n s  th a t according to  Thucydides brought 
the  anc ien t w orld  to  i t s  g re a te s t and longest war and the th ree  
causes o f  c o n f l ic t  described by Hobbes in Chapter 13 o f  Leviathan:
So th a t in the n a tu re  o f  man, we f in d  th ree  p r in c ip a l causes o f  
q u a rre l The f i r s t ,  maketh men invade fo r  gain; the  second, fo r  
s a fe ty ; and the th ird ,  fo r  re p u ta tio n . (8)
Hobbes's concept o f  gain reminds us o f  Thucydides' p r o f i t ;  s a fe ty  
re c a lls  fea r; honour, re p u ta tio n . A lthough these p a ra lle ls  have not 
been Ignored by Hobbes's commentators <9), to  my knowledge the re  is 
no d e ta ile d  a na lys is  o f  the  s im i la r i t ie s  and d iffe re n c e s  between
Thucydides' and Hobbes's views on fe a r, g lo ry , and p r o f i t .
The purpose o f  th is  chapter Is to  o f fe r  such a comparison and to  
argue th a t an understanding o f  Thucydides' views on human psychology 
p rov ides u s e fu l in s ig h ts  in to  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l thought.
The s im i la r i t ie s  examined in what fo llo w s  can be grouped in to  th ree  
broad ca tegories :
( I )  in  many cases the  a f f in i t y  o f  views is  so s t r ik in g  th a t i t
extends to  te x tu a l concordance;
< ii)  in o th e r instances a minimum o f  ph ilosoph ica l a na lys is  reveals
th a t Thucydides' p o s itio n  on human passions f in d s  an
unm lstakeable echo In Hobbes's works;
( i l l )  f in a l ly ,  the common concerns o f  the two au thors  on the  top ics  
o f  fe a r, g lo ry , and p r o f i t  in e v ita b ly  generate s im i la r i t ie s
(8) Leviathan^ p .112.
(9) See, fo r  example, C l i f fo r d  W. Brown, ‘Thucydides, Hobbes, and the 
D e riva tio n  o f  Anarchy', c it .
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th a t are not s p e c if ic  to  Hobbes and Thucydides, bu t can a lso  be 
found In many o th e r w r i te rs  on p o l i t ic a l  and h is to r ic a l 
m atte rs .
I t  shou ld  be s tre ssed  th a t the  aim o f  the present chapter Is not th a t 
o f  e s ta b lis h in g  by means o f  h is to r ic a l comparative a n a lys is  to  what 
e x te n t and depth Hobbes's works can be sa id  to  resonate o f  the 
Thucydidean legacy, nor Is th a t  o f  m erely adding another vo ice to  the 
chorus o f  Hobbes's readers th a t  have been puzzled and Impressed by 
the  s im i la r i t ie s  between the  two w r ite rs  and cannot he lp  fe e lin g  th a t 
Hobbes, who spent much tim e  and labour to  produce h is  b r i l l ia n t  
t ra n s la t io n  o f  Thucydides' work, must have found In the  way o f  
th in k in g  o f  the  “ most p o l i t ic  h is to r io g ra p h e r th a t ever w r i t "  a 
pow erfu l In s p ira t io n  fo r  h is  own thought, a t a tim e — the 1620s — 
when h is  a tte n tio n  was tu rn in g  to  p o l i t ic a l  philosophy, (10)
The deeper purpose o f  th is  chapter Is  to  argue th a t by examining In 
some d e ta il Thucydides's views on “ the  th ree  g re a te s t th in g s " one can 
lay the  groundwork fo r  an In te rp ré tâ t  Ion o f  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  theory  
th a t on the  one hand develops some o f  Thucydides' In s ig h ts  on the 
fu n c tio n  o f  fe a r and the  e f fe c t  o f  am bition  on the p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  
and on the o th e r hand p rov ides a s o lu tio n  to  the problems ra ised  and 
le f t  open by Thucydides on the co nd itio n s  under which fe a r and 
am b ition  can e ith e r  promote o r h inder c iv i l is a t io n .
(10) On the  h is to r ic a l circum stances surround ing  Hobbes's 
tra n s la t io n  o f  Thucydides' H is to ry , see A rnold A. Rogow, Thomas 
Hobbes, Radical in the S erv ice  o f  Reaction, New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1986, chap ter 4.
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1.3 ON FEAR
In th is  se c tion  I s h a ll argue th a t  Hobbes's and Thucydides' analyses
o f  fe a r share two fundam ental aspects:
( I )  on the  one hand they p rovide  a rem arkably s im ila r
characte r Iza t Ion o f  fe a r, both v iew ing I t  as d e r iv in g  from 
u n c e rta in ty , re s u lt in g  In a n tic ip a tio n , and a f fe c t in g  human 
judgment In a e ith e r  b e n e fic ia l o r d e tr im e n ta l way depending on 
I ts  tlm e -ho rlzon ;
( I I )  on the  o th e r hand, they both assign to  fe a r  the  ro le  o f
cornerstone o f  p o l i t ic a l  o rder.
1.3.1 Fear and U n ce rta in ty
In Thucydides' H is to ry  fe a r Is no t on ly  one o f  the key concepts th a t 
e xp la in  the  causes and the dynamics o f  the  Peloponnesian war, but 
a lso  the  passion th a t permeated a l l  ancien t Greece befo re  I t  grew 
“ c iv i l " .  The account o f  anc ien t Greece given by Thucydides and the 
d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the  n a tu ra l co nd itio n s  o f  mankind made by Hobbes In 
Elements o f  Law and Levia than  have one fundamental common fe a tu re  — 
they both d ep ic t a w o rld  dominated by fe a r, a lthough In Thucydides' 
case what Is described Is a h is to r ic a l period  and In Hobbes's a 
h yp o th e tic a l s i tu a t io n . (11)
In h is  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  anc ien t Greece Thucydides lin k s  fe a r to
(11) On the  Hobbes Ian s ta te  o f  n a tu re  as a h y p o th e tica l w orld, see 
Chapter 6.
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u n c e rta in ty . He suggests th a t In the  o ld  days people were In a 
constant s ta te  o f  a n x ie ty  and apprehension because they could have 
no f irm  expec ta tions  on the  behaviour o f  o th e rs  and thus could make 
no long-te rm  plans about the fu tu re . He w rite s :
». w h ils t  t r a f f i c  was not, nor m utua l In te rcou rse  bu t w ith  fea r. 
n e ith e r  by sea nor land; and every man so husbanded the ground as 
b u t ba re ly  to  l iv e  upon I t ,  w ith o u t any s tock  o f  riches, and p lanted 
no th ing ; (because I t  was u n ce rta in  when another should  Invade them 
and c a rry  a l l  away, e s p e c ia lly  no t having the  defence o f  w a lls ); but 
made account to  be masters, In any place, o f  such necessary 
sustenance as m ight serve them from  day to  day. (12)
Both the  main Idea and the s p e c if ic  d e ta ils  o f  the  above q uo ta tio n
remind one o f  a w ell-know n passage o f  Leviathan^ In which Hobbes
describes the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  :
In such co nd itio n , the re  Is no place fo r  Indus try ; because the f r u i t
th e re o f Is u n c e rta in ; and consequently no C u ltu re  o f  the Earth; no 
nav iga tio n , nor use o f  the  commodities th a t  may be Imported by sea; 
no commodious b u ild in g ; no Instrum ents o f  moving ,and removing,such 
th in g s  as re q u ire  much force;no knowledge o f  the face o f  the  earth ; 
no account o f  tim e; no a r ts ; no le t te rs ;  no so c ie ty ; and which Is 
w ors t o f  a l l  c o n tin u a l fe a r . (13)
L ike  Thucydides, Hobbes too  e s ta b lish e s  a c le a r connection between 
fe a r and u n c e rta in ty ; the  people o f  anc ien t Greece and the Hobbes Ian 
In d iv id u a ls  o f  the s ta te  o f  na tu re  liv e  In fe a r because they do not
(12) H is to ry , I, p. 2; emphasis added.
(13) Leviathan, p. 113; emphasis added.
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know what to  expect from  o the rs . They do not know who the  o the rs  
are and what they want and I f  they want the same th in g s  from one 
day to  the  next. Th is complete Ignorance about the  w orld  In which 
they Live p reven ts everyone, as ra t io n a l being, from  s e tt in g  and 
pursu ing  h is  own o b je c tive s . Under cond itions  o f  complete u n ce rta in ty , 
each in d iv id u a l Is deprived  o f  h is  In t r in s ic a l ly  human a b i l i t y  and 
need to  plan h is  own fu tu re  and Is compelled Instead to  liv e  In, and 
fo r ,  the  present. The outcome Is th a t the l i f e  o f  people becomes 
In d is tin g u is h a b le  from  th a t  o f  beasts. Only when u n c e rta in ty  Is 
lim ite d  and c ircum scribed . I.e. w ith in  the framework o f  so c ia l 
conventions crea ted  In the  c i v i l  s ta te , w i l l  the  A thenians ( f i r s t  
among a l l  Greeks) be ab le  to  concentra te  on those th in g s  th a t 
d is t in g u is h  human beings from  anim als and w i l l  the  Hobbes Ian people 
be able  to  liv e  a w o rth w h ile  l i f e .
1.3.2 Fear and A n tic ip a tio n
In Thucydides' n a rra tio n  the  lin k  between fe a r and u n c e rta in ty  Is not 
confined  to  the  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the  people who live d  In the  murderous 
anc ien t w o rld  but app lies  to , and Indeed exp la ins, the  re la tio n s h ip s  
between c i t ie s  a f te r  they have grown " c iv i l" .
In desc rib ing  the  causes o f  the  war Thucydides s tre sse s  the  p o in t 
th a t  I t  had been fe a r generated by u n c e rta in ty  about the  In te n tio n s  
o f  a s tro ng  Athens what had d rive n  weaker c i t ie s  to  u n ite  aga ins t 
her and a n tic ip a te  her a tta ck .
Thus Ale lb lades:
.« when one Is grown m ig h tie r  than the  re s t, men use no t on ly  to
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defend themselves a g a in s t him when he s h a ll Invade, but to  
a n tic ip a te  him, th a t he Invade no t a t a l l  (14)
U n ce rta in ty  about the  In te n tio n  o f  o thers, and fe a r th a t they may 
a tta ck  are In Thucydides' argument the founda tions o f  h is  concept 
o f  a n t ic ip a t io n  and f i r s t  s t r ik e .  Thus In the  H is to ry  w h ile  
u n c e rta in ty  can be seen as the main cause o f  fe a r, a n t ic ip a t io n  Is 
I ts  most Im portant outcome.
On th is  p o in t, too, Hobbes can be seen to  fo llo w  Thucydides' steps. In 
chapter 13 o f  Levia than  he develops an argument In which a n tic ip a tio n  
Is construed as the  re s u lt  o f  d iffid e n c e , which In tu rn  Is derived  
from  fe a r and u n c e rta in ty .
We read:
And from  th is  d if f id e n c e  o f  one another, the re  Is no way fo r  any 
man to  secure h im se lf, so reasonable as a n tic ip a tio n . (15)
M. fe a r o f  oppression d lspose th  a man to  a n tic ip a te . (16)
A lthough the In te rm ed ia te  s tep  — I.e., d iff id e n c e  — Is m issing In
Thucydides' reasoning, the  lo g ic  o f  the argument th a t s ta r ts  from  
fe a r and u n c e rta in ty  and ends w ith  a n tic ip a tio n  and preem ptive s t r ik e  
Is e s s e n t ia lly  the same as Hobbes's.
1.3.3 Fear and D e lib e ra tio n
In a d d itio n  to  th e ir  shared views on the connection between fea r, 
u n ce rta in ty , and a n tic ip a tio n , Thucydides' and Hobbes's arguments
(14) History^  I I, pp. 133-4; emphasis added.
(15) Leviathan^ p. I l l ;  emphasis added.
(16) Ib id ., p. 88; emphasis added.
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conta in  another conspicuous a f f in i t y :  they both ascribe  to  fe a r e ith e r 
a p o s it iv e  o r a nega tive  e f fe c t  on human d e lib e ra tio n , depending on 
I ts  tlm e-d lm enslon.
In Thucydides' H is to ry , the  fe a r f e l t  by the  In d iv id u a l tow ards fu tu re  
e n te rp ris e s  Is a p o s it iv e  passion, In the sense th a t I t  engenders 
b e n e fic ia l e f fe c ts  — I t  a le r ts  the  mind to  the  problems ahead and 
d riv e s  people to  d e lib e ra te  p ru d e n tly  and w ise ly . Thus we f in d  the 
genera ls o f  d if fe re n t  c i t ie s  u rg ing  th e ir  troups  no t to  undervalue 
e ith e r  the  enemy o r the  circum stances, but to  prepare themselves to  
face g re a t dangers, s ince  th is  is  the  on ly way to  prepare ra t io n a lly  
fo r  v ic to ry .
Conversely, fe a r as a passion th a t dominates the  In d iv id u a l In the 
p resent p lays a nega tive  and d e s tru c tiv e  ro le  In Thucydides' 
n a rra tio n . Indeed, as soon as the  h o s t i l i t ie s  have commenced, 
s o ld ie rs  are urged to  a tta ck  w ith o u t fea r, s ince the  key to  v ic to ry  
lie s  In th e ir  courage. Fear In the  present b rings  people to  de fea t, I t  
makes them overes tim a te  the d i f f i c u l t ie s  and overva lue  the  enemy, I t  
leads to  rushed and I r ra t io n a l dec Is lon-mak Ing.
Hermocrates speaks thus to  the  Syracuslans:
and every man to  remember, th a t though to  show contempt o f  the 
enemy be best In the  heat o f  f ig h t ,  ye t those p re pa ra tio ns  are the 
su re s t, th a t are made w ith  fe a r and op in ion o f  danger (17)
And Arch Idamus says to  the  Lacedœmon Ians:
». though the s o ld ie rs  ought a lways to  have bold hea rts , ye t fo r  
a c tio n  they ought to  make th e ir  p repa ra tions as I f  they  were
(17) H is to ry , I I ,  p. 152.
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a fra id . (18)
In a passage o f  h is  "O f the  L ife  and H is to ry  o f  Thucydides" th a t 
precedes h is  t ra n s la t io n  o f  the  H is to ry , Hobbes echoes the view th a t 
fe a r has e ith e r  a p o s it iv e  o r nega tive  e f fe c t  depending on I ts  
tem poral dimension;
w. fe a r (which fo r  the most p a rt adv lse th  w e ll, though I t  execute 
no t so). (19)
In h is  la te r  p o l i t ic a l  works Hobbes e labora tes  a f u l l y  developed 
conception o f  fe a r th a t encompasses the  Thucydldean view on the 
ambiguous e f fe c ts  o f  th a t passion on human behaviour, depending on 
whether I t  In sp ires  d e lib e ra tio n s  regard ing  the  fu tu re  o r the 
present.
Leaving a d e ta ile d  a n a lys is  o f  th is  to p ic  to  la te r  chapters, here I t  
s u ff ic e s  to  a n tic ip a te  th a t under the e ffe c ts  o f  Immediate fe a r 
HobbesIan people In the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  re s o rt to  k i l l in g ,  w ith o u t 
re a lis in g  th a t In the long run In a b a t t le  between equals, nobody Is 
going to  be safe.
In o th e r words, dec Is lon-mak Ing under cond itions  o f  Immediate fe a r 
leads to  an outcome — to  t r y  to  k i l l  a l l  o the rs  — th a t Is aga ins t 
reason ( fo r  "equal powers opposed d es tro y  one another" (20)). 
Conversely, fe a r o f  fu tu re  dangers Is the f i r s t  passion mentioned by 
Hobbes as respons ib le  fo r  making people understand the  necess ity  to  
escape from  the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  and thus decide to  c rea te  a p o l i t ic a l  
s ta te . In h is  words:
(18) H is to ry , I, p. 165.
(19) Ib id ., p. XVI.
(20) Elements o f  Law, p. 34.
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The passions th a t In c lin e  men to  peace are fe a r o f  death; des ire  o f 
such th in g s  as are  necessary to  commodious liv in g ; and a hope by 
th e ir  Ind u s try  to  o b ta in  them. (21)
1.3.4- Fear and s o c ia l o rder
F in a lly  the re  Is a deeper a f f in i t y  between Hobbes's and Thucydides' 
views on fe a r which does no t re s t on mere te x tu a l s im i la r i t y  but 
res ides In the  ve ry  ro le  p layed by fe a r in the two a u th o rs ' works.
The ro le  played by fe a r In Thucydides' H is to ry  can be apprecia ted  In 
a l l  I ts  Im p lica tion s  by exam ining In some d e ta il h is  account o f  the 
plague th a t had g ripped  Athens s ince the second year o f  the  war.
In a n a rra tio n  th a t has become deserved ly a c la ss ic , Thucydides 
h ig h lig h ts  the te r r i f y in g  e ffe c ts  brought about by a complete lack o f  
fea r.
People who know th a t  are going to  d ie  do not show fe a r, bu t react 
instead  w ith  u t te r  d e je c tio n  and despera tion . People who liv e  w ith  
the  on ly  c e r ta in ty  th a t, be they honest o r not, p ious o r not, imminent 
death aw a its  them cannot be re s tra in e d  by e ith e r  human o r d iv in e  
punishment from  behaving In whichever way they wish.
Thucydides s tre sses  re pea ted ly  th a t the  c e r ta in ty  o f  Impending death 
fre e s  to t a l ly  In d iv id u a ls  from  any fe a r o f  e ith e r  gods o r men and 
p re c ip ita te s  a s o c ia l o rg a n iz a tio n  In to  a s ta te  o f  complete s o c ia l 
chaos. When the n a tu ra l r e s t ra in t  p rovided by fe a r Is removed, the 
fundam ental b ind ing  element o f  s o c ia l o rder Is lo s t and w ith  I t  a l l
(21) Leviathan, p. 116.
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laws, conventions, customs, and ru le s  s im p ly  crumble away. (22)
In Thucydides' words, as b r i l l i a n t l y  rendered by Hobbes:
And the  g re a t licen tiousness , which a lso  In o the r k inds was used In 
the  c ity ,  began a t f i r s t  from  th is  disease. For th a t  which a man 
be fo re  would dissemble, and no t acknowledge to  be done fo r  
voluptuousness, he d u rs t now do fre e ly ;  seeing befo re  h is  eyes such 
qu ick re v o lu tio n , o f  the r ic h  dying, and men w orth  noth ing  
In h e r it in g  th e ir  e s ta tes . Insomuch as they ju s t i f ie d  a speedy 
f r u i t io n  o f  th e ir  goods, even fo r  th e ir  p leasure; as men th a t 
thought they held  th e ir  liv e s  bu t by the day. As fo r  pains, no man 
was fo rw a rd  In any a c tio n  o f  honour to  take any; because they 
though t I t  u n ce rta in  whether they should d ie  o r no t be fo re  they 
achieved I t .  But what any man knew to  be d e l ig h t fu l ,  and to  be 
p ro f i ta b le  to  p leasure, th a t was made both p ro f i ta b le  and 
honourable. N e ithe r the  fe a r o f  the  gods, nor laws o f  men, awed anv 
man; no t the form er, because they concluded i t  was a lik e  to  worship 
o r no t worship, from  seeing th a t a lik e  they a l l  perished: nor the 
la t te r ,  because no man expected th a t liv e s  would la s t t i l l  he 
rece ived  punishment o f  h is  crim es by judgment. But they thought, 
the re  was now over th e ir  heads some fa r  g re a te r judgment decreed 
a ga ins t them; befo re  which f e l l ,  they thought to  en joy some l i t t l e  
p a rt o f  th e ir  live s . <23)
(22) For an a n a lys is  o f  the plague and s ta s is , see C l i f fo r d  Orwln,
‘S tas is  and Plague: Thucydides on the D isso lu tio n  o f  S oc ie ty ',
c it .
(23) H is to ry , I, pp. 208-9; emphasis added. “A l l  s u p p lic a tio n s  to  the
gods, and e n q u ir ie s  to  o rac les , and whatsoever o th e r means they
used o f  th a t kind, proved a l l  u n p ro fita b le ; Insomuch as subdued 
w ith  the greatness o f  the e v i l ,  they gave them a l l  over", ib id .,
p. 202.
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From Thucydides' account o f  the  plague In Athens I t  emerges c le a r ly  
th a t  the fu n c tio n  o f  fe a r w ith in  a p o l i t ic a l o rg a n iza tio n  Is to  
p rov ide  a pow erfu l r e s t ra in t  to  the  behaviour o f  the  In d iv id u a l.
By keeping In mind the  Thucydldean equation between lack o f  fe a r and 
s o c ia l chaos, we can understand more f u l l y  why In h is  p o l i t ic a l  
w r it in g s  Hobbes s tre sses  the paramount Importance o f  fea r. From h is  
t ra n s la t io n  o f  Thucydides' d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the plague, undertaken a t a 
tim e — the 1620s — when he was beginning to  tu rn  h is  a tte n tio n  to  
p o l i t ic a l  m a tte rs , Hobbes must have learned th a t In a w orld  w ith o u t 
fe a r the re  can be no Leviathan, no law and order, no peace. And thus 
In De Cive he p o in ts  to  fe a r no t on ly  as the o r ig in  o f  s o c ie tie s  but 
a lso  as the  basis o f  “ la s tin g  S o c ie tie s ” (24), the  unrenounceable 
c o n d itio n  o f  s o c ia l s ta b i l i t y .
In a l l  h is  p o l i t ic a l  works Hobbes s tre sses  repea ted ly  the  Idea th a t 
“ the re  Is In every man a c e rta in  high degree o f  fe a r ” (25): h is
Ins is tence  th a t  fe a r Is a c o n s titu e n t p a rt o f  our psychology Is not 
to  be taken as a m erely In c id e n ta l re ference, bu t ra th e r as 
u nde rly ing  the fa c t  th a t the assum ption o f  fe a r Is a fundamental 
p rov iso  o f  h is  whole p o l i t ic a l  co n s tru c t.
Indeed I t  could  be argued th a t no t on ly  Hobbes, bu t most p o l i t ic a l  
ph ilosophers In the Western t r a d i t io n  would have no advice to  o f fe r  
th a t would be re le va n t to  a w o rld  w ith o u t fea r, such as the l lm lt -  
case o f  the plague o f  Athens. However, I t  may be surm ised th a t the 
reason why Hobbes Is so e x tra o rd in a r ily  aware both o f  the  c ru c ia l 
fu n c tio n  o f  fe a r In p o l i t ic a l  a ssoc ia tio n s  and o f  the  v a l id i t y  o f  h is
(24) De Cive, p. 44.
(25) Ib id ., p. 58.
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whole p o l i t ic a l  the o ry  being dependent on the  assumption o f  fe a r-
Insp lred  behaviour, may be due to  h is  c a re fu l t ra n s la t io n  o f  the 
H is to ry , th a t a le r te d  him to  the  s tro ng  connection between lack o f
fe a r and s o c ia l chaos.
However, the fu n c tio n  o f  fe a r In p o l i t ic a l  a ssoc ia tions  Is not the 
on ly  In s ig h t th a t Hobbes learned from  Thucydides. Thucydides' tw in  
d e s c r ip tio n s  o f  anc ien t Greece and o f  the plague In Athens Im p lic it ly  
se t p o l i t ic a l  philosophy the task o f  so lv in g  the fo llo w in g  dilemma: 
given th a t a w o rld  where fe a r Is the  overwhelming passion (as In 
anc ien t Greece) Is as unbearable and as ungovernable as a w orld  
w ith o u t fe a r a lto g e th e r (such as Athens du ring  the  plague), how Is 
fe a r to  be channelled so as to  re s u lt  In a s ta b le  s o c ia l o rder ?
In h is  p o l i t ic a l  works Hobbes provides an answer to  the  above 
question. He s in g le s  ou t In a s tro ng  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  the  Instrum ent 
whereby u n c e rta in ty  can be c o n tro lle d , thus removing a major source 
o f  fe a r. In fa c t,  w ith in  a s tro ng  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te , people can form  
f irm  expec ta tions  on the behaviour o f  o thers, fo r  fe a r o f  punishment 
channels people 's a c tion s  In to  d e f in ite  and s ta b le  p a tte rn s , thus 
rendering  In d iv id u a ls ' behaviour p re d ic ta b le . As a re s u lt ,  both
a n t ic ip a t io n  and rushed d e lib e ra t io n  are no longer Ine v ita b le .
Through the  a r t i f ic e  o f  the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  people are able to  
c ircum scribe  fe a r by means o f  fe a r I t s e l f  (In  the form  o f  fe a r o f  
punishment).
O f course, the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  envisaged by Hobbes can on ly  remove 
the  u n c e rta in ty  (and thus the fe a r)  generated by the lack o f
conventions and ru le s  (as In the s ta te  o f  na tu re ) o r caused by th e ir  
u n r e l ia b i l i t y  (as under a weak p o l i t ic a l  arrangement) bu t cannot cope
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w ith  the  s o c ia l chaos d e r iv in g  from  major n a tu ra l o r a r t i f i c ia l  
d is a s te rs  ( l ik e  the  plague o f  A thens) when the  fe a r o f  punishment 
vanishes In everyone.
To summarize: In th is  se c tio n  I t  has been argued th a t Hobbes's and 
Thucydides' arguments on fe a r  share fo u r fundam ental po in ts : both ( I)  
connect fe a r to  u n c e rta ln tv . ( I I )  p o in t to  a n t ic ip a t io n  and f i r s t  
s t r ik e  as the n a tu ra l outcome o f  fe a r, ( I I I )  e s ta b lis h  a re la t io n s h ip  
between fe a r and d e lib e ra tio n , and most Im portan tly , ( Iv )  s in g le  out 
fe a r as the  necessary c o n d itio n  fo r  a s ta b le  s o c ia l order.
1.4 ON HONOUR
In th is  se c tion  I s h a ll argue th a t Thucydides and Hobbes, apa rt from  
sharing  the view th a t In n a tu ra l cond itio n s  (such as e x is t  between 
In d iv id u a ls  be fo re  the  es tab lishm en t o f  the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  o r 
between s ta te s  a t a l l  tim es) most In d iv id u a ls  have a re s t le s s  des ire  
o f  power and th a t moderate people are compelled to  jo in  the  power 
s tru g g le  fo r  the  sake o f  th e ir  s u rv iv a l,  agree in another c ru c ia l 
respect, namely In p o in tin g  to  am b ition  as the core o f  any se d itio n , 
the  dormant cancer o f  p o l i t ic a l  s o c ie tie s .
A f te r  some p re lim in a ry  te rm in o lo g ic a l remarks, I s h a ll consider th e ir  
p a ra lle l arguments on am b ition  and human na tu re  and then move on to  
the  su b s ta n tive  Issue o f  the e f fe c t  o f  am b ition  on p o l i t ic a l  
assoc ia tions.
W hile re fe r r in g  to  chapters I I I ,  IV, and V fo r  an exhaustive  a na lys is  
o f  g lo ry /honour/pow er In Hobbes's theory . I t  may be u s e fu l to  sketch 
here the re la tio n s h ip s  between these key terms. For Hobbes “ honour”
-  33  -
Is bu t the p u b lic  re c o g n itio n  o f  one's s u p e r io r ity ;  “ g lo ry ” Is both 
the  d e s ire  and the  p leasure  o f  ach ieving  one's s u p e r io r ity ;  “ power” Is 
the  basic Ing re d ie n t o f  s u p e r io r i ty  and g lo ry .
U n like  Hobbes, Thucydides o f  course does not p rov ide  the  reader w ith  
a d e f in it io n  o f  the  words th a t  he uses. However, g Iven th e ir  key ro le  
and frequency In the H istory^  I t  Is easy to  work o u t th a t, as In 
Hobbes, g lo ry  and honour are  re s p e c tiv e ly  the  response o f  the 
In d iv id u a l tow ards h is  own achievements and the re a c tio n  by o the rs  to  
the  achievements o f  the  In d iv id u a l. Again as In Hobbes, Thucydides 
sees g lo ry  and honour as d e r iv in g  m ain ly from  the a b i l i t y  o f  the 
In d iv id u a l (o r c i t y )  to  e xe rc ise  h is  own power and Impose h is  ru le  on 
o th e rs  and are  considered the  main d riv e  behind the ac tions 
(p o lic ie s )  o f  most In d iv id u a ls  (c it ie s ) .
1.4.1 Human na tu re  and am b ition  to  ru le
In the  con tex t o f  th e ir  ch a rac te r Iza t Ion o f  human nature , the 
correspondence between Hobbes's and Thucydides' views on power, g lo ry  
and honour ranges from  shared fundam ental b e lie fs  to  m a tte rs  o f  
d e ta il.  E spe c ia lly  re le va n t to  our argument are  th e ir  remarks on the 
res tlessness  and Inner In s a t ia b i l i t y  o f  Ind iv idu a ls .
Through the words o f  C o rin th 's  ambassadors, Thucydides o f fe rs  to  the 
reader the fo llo w in g  p o r t r a i t  o f  h is  own fe llo w  c it iz e n s  ;
What they have, they have no le isu re  to  enjoy, fo r  co n tin u a l 
g e tt in g  o f  more: nor h o lida y  esteem they any, bu t whereon they 
e f fe c t  some m a tte r p ro f i ta b le ;  nor th in k  they ease w ith  noth ing  to  
do, a less torm ent than labou rlous business. So th a t. In a word, to
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say they are men born n e ith e r to  re s t themselves, nor s u ffe r  
o the rs , Is to  say the  t ru th .  (26)
The compulsion to  ac t and res tlessness  o f  the A thenian people are 
shared by the Hobbes Ian In d iv id u a l fo r  whom " to  have no des ire  Is to  
be dead" (27) and fo r  whom f e l i c i t y  never lie s  In re s t in g  but In 
c o n tin u a lly  proceeding. (28)
I t  should  be noted here th a t  the tru e  ob jec t o f  the  A thenians' desire  
Is no t the  a c q u is it io n  o f  rich e s  fo r  th e ir  own sake but the 
a tta in m e n t o f  power: they th in k  themselves w orthy  to  have the
command o f  o th e rs ” (29) and fe e l "how honourable a th in g  I t  would be 
fo r  them «. to  be In fe r io r  to  none". (30) They are ready to  acknowledge 
th e ir  own des ire  to  ru le  and ascribe  I t  to  a n a tu ra l In c lin a tio n  o f  
mankind. R e fe rrin g  to  them selves they say:
Those men are w orthy o f  commendation, who fo llo w in g  the  n a tu ra l 
In c lin a tio n  o f  man In d e s ir in g  ru le  over o the rs , are  Jus te r than fo r  
th e ir  own power they need. (31)
The co m p e titive  s p i r i t  o f  the  A thenians Is no t confined  to  th e ir  
re la t io n s h ip  w ith  the o u ts id e  world, but extends to  th e ir  own soc ia l 
In te rcou rse  where "they  claim ed every one, no t to  be equal, but to  
be by fa r  the  ch ie f" . (32)
In h is  p o l i t ic a l  works Hobbes, too, acknowledges the  human des ire  o f 
a cq u ir in g  power over o th e rs  and c a lls  I t  "g lo ry " :
(26) H is to ry , I, pp. 75-6.
(27) Leviathan, p. 62.
(28) See, fo r  example, Elements o f  Law, p. 48.
(29) H is to ry , I, p. 166.
(30) H is to ry , I I ,  p. 82.
(31) H is to ry , I, p. 82.
(32) H is to ry , I I ,  p. 414.
-  35 -
G lory, o r In te rn a l g lo r ia t lo n  o r trium ph o f  the  mind, Is th a t
passion which proceedeth from  the  Im agination o r conception o f  our 
own power, above the power o f  him th a t contendeth w ith  us. (33)
As w i l l  be exp la ined  a t length In la te r  chapters, the  o b je c tiv e  o f
most Hobbes Ian people is  to  surpass o the rs  In power: th e ir  l i f e  can
be compared to  a “ race” th a t “ has no o th e r goal, bu t be
fo rem ost”  (34). As Hobbes puts I t  In Leviatham
-. I put fo r  a genera 11 In c lin a t io n  o f  a l l  mankind, a pe rpe tua l and 
re s tle s s  d e s ire  o f  power a f te r  power, th a t ceaseth one ly In 
death. (35)
A part from  agreeing w ith  Thucydides on the obse rva tion  th a t people 
have a re s tle s s  am bition  to  ru le  the  l i f e  o f  o the rs , and a v is c e ra l 
abhorrence a t being ru le d  by them, Hobbes fo llo w s  Thucydides' steps 
In another respect, namely in  n o tic in g  th a t even those th a t do not 
have by na tu re  the  d r iv e  to  dominate o the rs , must jo in  In the  race
a f te r  power fo r  the  sake o f  th e ir  own s u rv iv a l.
In the  H is to ry , the  people who are not prepared to  go to  war fo r  the 
mere des ire  o f  Imposing th e ir  ru le  are the Lacedemonians. Thucydides 
describes them as q u ie t by nature , m inding th e ir  own business, w ith  
no w ish to  In te r fe re  In o th e r people's. And ye t they cannot be 
o b liv io u s  to  the  power s tru g g le  between the  o the r c i t ie s  and are 
unable to  c a rry  on w ith  th e ir  liv e s  as noth ing  happened. On the
co n tra ry , as the  C o rin th ians  make them re a lize , as long as they are
surrounded by g lo ry -se e k in g  neighbours — e sp e c ia lly  as vo rac ious as 
the  Athenians — they cannot concern themselves m ere ly w ith  th e ir
(33) Elements o f  Law, pp. 36-7.
(34) Ibid., p. 47.
(35) Leviathan, pp. 85-6.
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In te rn a l a f fa ir s  but must Instead take s ides In the  war, fo r  the  sake 
o f  th e ir  own s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n :
... n e ith e r do any harm to  o the rs , nor rece ive  I t  Is a th in g  you 
ha rd ly  could  a tta in ,  though the  s ta te s  about you were o f  the same 
cond itions . But , as we have befo re  declared, your customs are In 
respect o f  th e irs  [ th e  A then ians '] an tiqua ted ; and o f  necess ity  « 
the new ones w i l l  p re v a il.  (36)
In a l l  h is  th ree  main p o l i t ic a l  works Hobbes, too, observes th a t the re  
e x is ts  a m in o r ity  o f  people who, a lthough “ tem perate”  and “moderate” 
by natu re , are unable to  fo llo w  th e ir  In c lin a tio n  and must Instead 
jo in  the  race o f  the am b itious  I f  they want to  remain a liv e .
And the cause o f  th is  [d e s ire  o f  power a f te r  power] Is no t always 
th a t a man hopes fo r  a more In tens ive  d e lig h t, than he has a lready 
a tta in e d  to ; o r th a t he cannot be content w ith  moderate power : but 
because he cannot assure the  power and means to  l iv e  w e ll, which 
he hath present, w ith o u t the  a c q u is it io n  o f  more. (37)
W hile Thucydides and Hobbes agree In considering  the  d es ire  o f  power 
as contagious. In the sense th a t e ve n tu a lly  I t  a f fe c ts  a l l ,  moderates 
and am b itious a lik e , they re fe r  to  two d if fe re n t  con tex ts  In which 
the power s tru g g le  takes place: Thucydides describes the  re la t io n s  
between c i t ie s  whereas Hobbes examines p r im a r ily  the  re la tio n s h ip s  
between In d iv id u a ls  In the  s ta te  o f  na ture .
F in a lly , as to  u nd e rlin e  the  a f f in i t y  o f  thought between Hobbes and 
Thucydides on the su b je c t o f  honour. I t  may be In te re s tin g  to  note 
th a t they make a number o f  s u rp r is in g ly  s im ila r  and s p e c if ic
(36) History^ I, p. 76.
(37) Leviathan, p. 86.
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obse rva tions on honour and human nature .
One d e ta il th a t can be found In the  works o f  both au thors  Is the 
n o ta tio n  th a t people tend to  honour and p ra ise  the  dead fo r  these, 
having passed away, are no t deemed to  be a th re a t to  the g lo ry  o f  
the  liv in g ; as P e ric le s  pu ts  I t  In thes fu n e ra l o ra tio n :
For every man useth  to  p ra ise  the dead For men envy th e ir  
com petito rs  In g lo ry , w h ile  they liv e  ; bu t to  s tand  ou t o f  th e ir  
way. Is a th in g  honoured w ith  an a ffe c t io n  fre e  from 
oppos ition . (38)
And Hobbes echoes In Lev ia th an
For men contend w ith  the  liv in g , not w ith  the  dead; to  these 
a sc rib in g  more than due, th a t they may obscure the  g lo ry  o f  the 
o the r. (39)
A re la te d  p o in t on which both Hobbes and Thucydides agree Is the 
obse rva tion  th a t people are  as u n w illin g  to  admire the  achievements 
o f  o th e rs  as they are ready to  d iscoun t them as fa lse . Thus P eric les: 
For to  hear ano ther man pra ised  f in d s  patience so long on ly  as 
each man s h a ll th in k  he could h im s e lf have done somewhat o f  th a t 
he hears. And I f  one exceed In th e ir  p ra ises, the  hearer p re sen tly  
through envy th in k s  I t  fa ls e . (40)
And Hobbes n o tice s  In Elem ents o f  Law:
everyman th in k in g  w e ll o f  h im s e lf and ha ting  to  see the same In 
o the rs . (41 )
(38) H is to ry , I, p. 200.
(39) Leviathan, p. 86.
(40) H is to ry , I, p. 189.
(41) Elements o f  Law, p. 71.
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As a f in a l  example o f  the  e x te n t to  which Thucydides' views on
honour permeate Hobbes's own though ts on the  top ic , one can po in t to
th e ir  In te rp ré tâ t Ion o f  fr ie n d s h ip  and enm ity m erely as s igns o f
power.
In the  H is to ry  the  A thenians q u ite  openly adm it to  the  Me Hans th a t 
they are not going to  t r e a t  them m e rc ifu lly  s ince  to  ac t f r ie n d ly  
tow ards them would be construed  by th e ir  o th e r su b jec ts  as a s ign  o f 
weakness:
your fr ie n d s h ip  w i l l  be an argument o f  our weakness, and your
ha tred  o f  our power, amongst those we have ru le  over. (4-2)
In a very s im ila r  ve in , Hobbes In chapter 10 o f  Leviathan  l is ts  
fr ie n d s h ip  and enm ity among the  “s igns o f  power", whereby an 
In d iv id u a l makes o th e rs  aware o f  h is  power.
1.4.2 Am bition to  ru le  and p o l i t ic a l  a ssoc ia tions
In the  e p is t le  In which he ded ica tes h is  tra n s la t io n  o f  Thucydides' 
H is to ry  to  S ir  W illiam  Cavendish, Hobbes n o tice s  th a t "In  h is to ry , 
a c tio n s  o f  honour and d ishonour do appear p la in ly  and d is t in c t ly ,  
which are which". (43)
Indeed, Thucydides' account o f  the  Peloponnesian war es tab lishes  
unambiguously which a c tio n s  are g lo ry -y le ld ln g  — v ic to ry  Is 
honourable and d e fea t sham eful. However, the  meaning o f  honour 
becomes ambiguous In a s p e c if ic  case, namely du ring  a c iv i l  war.
During the s e d itio n  o f  Corcyra, a l l  words (honour Included) lose th e ir
(42) H is to ry , I I ,  pp. 100-1
(43) H is to ry , I, p. v l.
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e s ta b lish e d  meanings and are g iven new d e f in it io n s :
The rece ived  va lue  o f  names imposed fo r  s ig n if ic a t io n  o f  th ings, 
was changed in to  a rb it ra ry .  For inconsidera te  boldness, was counted 
tru e -h e a rte d  m anliness: p rov iden t d e lib e ra tio n , a handsome fea r:
modesty, the  c loak o f  cowardice ». A fu r io u s  suddenness was reputed 
a p o in t o f  va lou r. (44)
A lthough the tra n s la t io n  o f  the f i r s t  sentence o f  th is  passage is  
debatab le  (45), i t  should be noted th a t Hobbes's re n d itio n , 
ir re s p e c t iv e ly  o f  i t s  accuracy, is  com plete ly in  tune w ith  h is  own 
d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the  a rb it ra r in e s s  in the f ie ld  o f  language and 
s ig n if ic a t io n  e x is t in g  In n a tu ra l cond itions . In Elements o f  Law he 
laments th a t “ scarse two men agreeC».] what is  to  be c a lle d  good, and 
what e v il;  what l ib e r a l i t y ,  what p ro d ig a lity ; what va lour, what 
te m e r ity ."(46 )
As va rio us  c r i t ic s  have po in ted  o u t, i t  is  the s e d it io n  o f  Corcyra, 
even more than the  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  e ith e r  anc ien t Greece o r o f  the 
re la tio n s h ip s  between c it ie s ,  th a t  provides the  most s t r ik in g  
s im i la r i t ie s  w ith  the  Hobbesian s ta te  o f  war o f  a l l  aga ins t a ll .
The concordance between Hobbes and Thucydides goes w e ll beyond the 
common re co g n itio n  th a t the e f fe c t  o f  p o l i t ic a l  anarchy is  the 
co llapse  o f  a l l  shared values, from  s o c ia l values, to  re lig io n  and 
even language i t s e l f .  Both authors agree a lso and more im p o rta n tly  on 
the u lt im a te  cause o f  anarchy. Both id e n t ify  in  am bition  and the 
d e s ire  to  ru le  the  o r ig in  o f  c iv i l  war, o r genera lised  c o n f l ic t  o f  a l l  
aga in s t a l l .
(44) Ib id ., p. 348.
(45) On th is  see C. Orwin, c it . ,  p. 834, fo o tn o te  5.
(46) Elements o f  Law, p. 23.
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Thus Thucydides:
The cause o f  a l l  th is  [ s e d it io n ] Is des ire  o f  ru le , ou t o f  avarice 
and am bition ; and the  zeal o f  content Ion from  those two 
proceeding. (4-7)
And Hobbes repeats, a lm ost verbatim , In a l l  h is  th ree  p o l i t ic a l  works 
the  fo llo w in g  d iagnos is  o f  c i v i l  war:
I t  Is tru e , th a t c e r ta in  l iv in g  c rea tu res , as bees, and ants, liv e  
so c ia b ly  one w ith  ano ther ». and th e re fo re  some man may perhaps 
d es ire  to  know, why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer, 
.. th a t men are co n tin u a l ly  In com petition  fo r  honour and d lg n ltv . 
which these c re a tu re s  are not; and consequently amongst men there  
a r ls e th  on th a t ground, envy and hatred, and f in a l ly  war. <48)
Thus fo r  the a tta inm en t o f  peace Hobbes s t ip u la te s  the  fo llo w in g  Law 
o f  Nature th a t Is an open renouncement to  am b ition  and p ride : “». th a t 
every man acknowledge ano ther fo r  h is  equal by na tu re . The breach 
o f  th is  precept Is p r id e .” <4-9)
I t  Is In te re s tin g  to  note th a t In the ancien t w o rld  as presented by 
Thucydides I t  was taken as s e lf-e v id e n t th a t am b ition  and p ride  were 
the  ro o t causes o f  s e d itio n . Th is view In fa c t  was shared by people 
as d if fe re n t  as the  Syracuslans and the Lacedœmon Ians and exp la ins 
why the o the rw ise  peacefu l and cau tious  Lacedœmon Ians were prepared 
to  take the most extrem e measures to  prevent g lo ry -se eke rs  from
(47) H is to ry , I, p. 350 (emphasis added).
(48) Leviathan, p. 156; see a lso  Eiements o f  Law, p. 102, De Cive, p.
87.
(49) Leviathan, p. 141; see a lso  Eiements o f  Law, p. 88, De Cive, p.
68.
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underm ining th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  In s t itu t io n s .  (50)
Much In the same way In which from Thucydides' d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the 
plague Hobbes learned th a t fe a r  provides the  founda tion  fo r  so c ia l 
and p o l i t ic a l  o rder, so from  the  n a rra tio n  o f  the s e d it io n  o f  Corcyra 
he must have drawn the  Idea th a t  u n co n tro lled  am b ition  s p e lls  the 
end o f  p o l i t ic a l  o rde r — an idea th a t was undoubtedly re - ln fo rc e d  by 
the  p o l i t ic a l  events which he h im s e lf w itnessed. From th is  perspective  
Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  co n s tru c t can be In te rp re te d  as an a ttem pt to  
p rov ide  the  th e o re t ic a l underp inn ings fo r  Thucydides' pow erfu l In s ig h t 
th a t w h ils t  fe a r Is the g lue o f  p o l i t ic a l  assoc ia tions , am b ition  to  
ru le  Is the dangerous heat th a t may cause I t  to  m e lt and thus 
des tro y  c iv i l iz a t io n .
But Thucydides' In s ig h t In the  e f fe c t  o f  am b ition  on human l i f e  Is 
no t lim ite d  to  the obse rva tion  th a t I t  can cause s e d itio n s . In the 
H is to ry  am bition  Is a lso  the  passion th a t led the  Athenians to  
surpass a l l  o the rs , th a t drove them to  “ grow c i v i l ” and “ to  pass In a 
more tender k ind  o f  l i f e " (51), th a t helped them to  reach the  peak o f  
c iv i l is a t io n .  There fo re , as In the  previous sec tion  I t  was shown how 
from  Thucydides' account o f  anc ien t tim e (when fe a r was overwhelm ing)
(50) To see to  what length  the Lacedœmon Ians were prepared to  go 
to  p ro te c t th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  In te g r ity ,  I t  s u ff ic e s  to  re c a ll the 
trea tm en t th a t was meted o u t to  the most am b itious  among the 
Helotes so as to  p reven t them from d e s ta b iliz in g  Sparta:
They caused proclam ation  to  be made, th a t as many o f  them as 
claimed the e s tim a tio n  to  have done the Lacedaemonians best 
se rv ice  In th e ir  wars, should be made fre e  : fe e lin g  them In 
th is  manner, and conce iv ing  th a t, as they should  every one out 
o f  p ride  deem h im s e lf w orthy to  be f i r s t  made fre e , so they 
would soonest a lso  re b e l aga in s t them. And when they had thus 
p re fe rre d  about two thousand, which a lso  w ith  crowns on th e ir  
heads went In procession about the tem ples as to  rece ive  
th e ir  lib e r ty ,  they no long a f te r  made them away ; and no man 
knew how they perished. {H is to ry , I, pp. 464-5)
(51) H is to ry , I, p. 6.
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and o f  the  plague (when fe a r was suppressed by the  ve ry  deadliness 
o f  the d isease) one can deduce a paradox o f  fe a r, now we can perform  
a s im ila r  exe rc ise  w ith  regard  to  am bition.
Thucydides' d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the  c iv i l iz e d  Athenians and h is  n a rra tio n  
o f  the  s ta s is  o f  Corcyra In d lre c ly  ra ise  the fo llo w in g  dilemma: to  
what e x te n t and under what co nd itions  Is am b ition  a b e n e fic ia l 
passion th a t can fo s te r  c iv i l is a t io n  and when does I t  Instead become 
the  ve ry  cause o f  p o l i t ic a l  d is s o lu t io n  ?
Hobbes se t ou t to  p rov ide  an answer to  th is  dilemma, too. Again he 
Id e n t if ie s  a s trong  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  as the  a r t i f i c i a l  Instrum ent 
whereby In d iv id u a ls  can channel, re s tra in , and d ire c t  th e ir  n a tu ra l 
des ire  to  surpass o the rs . He no tice s  th a t the  s ta te , by the 
In tro d u c tio n  o f  common ru le s  and laws provides common standards o f  
what Is r ig h t  and wrong, what Is meum and tuum. what Is honourable 
and d ishonourab le :
„. I t  belongeth to  the judgement o f  the sovere ign power , to  se t 
fo r th  and make known the  common measure by which every man Is to  
know what Is h is  , and what another's ; what Is good and what bad; 
and what he ought to  do, and what not ... And these measures o f  the  
a c tion s  o f  the sub jec ts  are  those which men c a ll LAWS POLITIC, o r 
c iv i l .  (52)
Laws and ru le s  make the p u rs u it  o f  g lo ry  poss ib le  In two ways; on 
the  one hand they put an end to  the  a rb itra r in e s s  In the f ie ld  o f  
language and va lues th a t characte rIzes  the s ta te  o f  na tu re  and thus, 
by s e tt in g  common c r i te r ia ,  enable In d iv id u a ls  to  agree on what Is
(52) Elements o f  Law, p. 112 (c a p ita ls  In the  o r ig in a l) .
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b e tte r  o r worse, more o r less, va luab le  o r not. On the  o the r hand, 
laws and re g u la tio n s  ( in  p a r t ic u la r  those regard ing  p r iv a te  p rope rty ) 
a llo w  com petition  to  take place In those f ie ld s  (such as science, a r ts  
and, above a l l ,  r ich e s ) where a b i l i t ie s  vary across In d iv id u a ls , thus 
fre e in g  people from  having to  compete on ly  In the  one f ie ld  In which 
they are by na tu re  equal, namely In th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  preserve and 
c o n tro l th e ir  own live s . He w rite s ;
The question  who Is the  b e tte r  man, has no place In the cond ition  
o f  mere natu re ; where has been shewn before, a l l  men are equal. 
The In e q u a lity  th a t now Is, has been Introduced by the laws 
c iv i l .  (53)
As a s tro ng  s ta te  can defend s o c ie ty  as a whole from  the e v i l  o f  
am b ition  by c re a tin g  ru le s  th a t tu rn  am bition  to  the  se rv ice  o f  
s o c ie ty  I t s e l f ,  so the  s ta te  can p ro te c t those In d iv id u a ls  who by 
n a tu re  are not g lo ry -se eke rs . The moderate, the  tem perate, the people 
who are no t In te re s te d  In power and th a t In n a tu ra l cond itions  are 
compelled to  jo in  the race o f  the  g lo ry -se eke rs  can now lead a 
t ra n q u il l i fe .
F in a lly  I t  should  be noted th a t Thucydides' deep observa tions on the 
e ffe c ts  o f  fe a r and g lo ry  on p o l i t ic a l  a ssoc ia tio n  come from the 
a n a lys is  o f  two o f  the most d ram atic  events o f  the  war, namely the 
plague o f  Athens and the  s e d itio n  o f  Corcyra. Th is  Is so because 
according to  Thucydides war and a d v e rs it ie s  teach more than tim es o f  
peace : “ war -. Is a most v io le n t  m aster” . (54)
(53) Leviathan, p. 140; see Elements o f  Law, p. 87 and De Cive, p.
68.
(54) H is to ry , p. 348.
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In h is  In tro d u c tio n  ("On the L ife  and H is to ry  o f  Thucydides"), Hobbes 
endorses w ho lehearted ly  th is  view:
men p r o f i t  more by looking on adverse events, than on 
p ro s p e rity . (55)
Not on ly  d id  Hobbes no t change h is  stand on th is  m a tte r fo r  the 
re s t o f  h is  l i f e  ( we f in d  the ve ry  same co n v ic tio n  re - I te ra te d  
a t the  beginning o f  the  Behemot)^ but more Im p o rta n tly  In h is  
p o l i t ic a l  works he developed and b u i l t  on the Thucydldean In s ig h t 
th a t  In o rde r to  e xp la in  the p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  one should s ta r t  from 
I ts  negation . I.e. from  the anarchy o f  the s ta te  o f  n a tu re  where the 
ca te g o rie s  o f  fe a r  and am b ition  can be observed a t th e ir  most 
u n re s tra in e d  and th e ir  e ffe c ts  derived  most d ire c t ly .
To conclude, a pa rt from  agreeing th a t most human beings have a 
re s t less d es ire  to  ru le  the  l i f e  o f  o the rs  and th a t moderate people 
are  compelled to  jo in  the  s tru g g le  o f  power fo r  the sake o f  th e ir  
s u rv iv a l,  Hobbes and Thucydides agree In another c ru c ia l respect, 
namely In p o in tin g  to  am bition  as the  core o f  any s e d itio n , the spark 
o f  any c iv i l  war, the  dormant cancer o f  p o l i t ic a l  s o c ie tie s .
1.5 ON PROFIT
As on fe a r and honour, so on p r o f i t  th e re  are some s t r ik in g  
s im i la r i t ie s  between Thucydides' and Hobbes's thought: w h ile  ranking 
the  p u rs u it  o f  p r o f i t  below the d es ire  fo r  honour as m o tiva tin g  
fo rces  o f  human behaviour, they both consider the  u n re s tra in e d  des ire
(55) Ib id ., p. XXIV.
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fo r  r ich e s  a p o te n t ia l ly  d e s ta b iliz in g  fo rce  o f  p o l i t ic a l  so c ie ty . 
Thucydides, In h is  d iagnos is  o f  the  causes o f  se d itio n , quoted In the 
p rev ious section , m entions avarice  (nXeoveÇlcx) as the human passion 
which, besides am bition , can cause s ta s is . (56)
In Elements o f  Law, De Cive, and Leviathan  Hobbes, too, no tice s  th a t 
one o f  the causes o f  c o n f l ic t  In the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  Is covetousness 
and fo r  the sake o f  peace s t ip u la te s  a law o f  na tu re  regarding 
“d is t r ib u t iv e  ju s t ic e ” th a t e x p l ic i t ly  fo rb id s  what "th e  Greeks c a ll 
nXeoveÇla which Is commonly rendered covetousness.” (57)
In the  H is to ry  the  d e s ire  o f  p r o f i t  Is unambiguously a weaker 
m o tiv a tio n a l fo rce  than the des ire  o f  honours, as Is expla ined by
P e ric le s  In the  fu n e ra l o ra tio n : "For the love o f  honour never
groweth o ld : nor doth th a t  u n p ro fita b le  p a rt o f  our l i f e  take d e lig h t 
(as some have sa id ) In ga the ring  o f  wealth, so much as I t  doth In
being honoured” . (58)
However, In the H is to ry  the d is t in c t io n  between g lo ry  and p r o f i t  Is
a t tim es on ly  apparent. In so fa r  as p r o f i t  Is o fte n  described as the 
s a fe s t means to  achieve g lo ry . Thucydides shows th a t th is  Is so even 
a t tim es o f  war, fo r  wars are won by money as much as by 
courage. (59)
In Elements o f  Law and De Give Hobbes too ranks the  d e s ire  o f  g lo ry  
above p r o f i t  and procla im s th a t " a l l  the mlndes p leasure  Is e ith e r 
G lory, M. o r re fe rs  to  G lo ry In the  end.” (60) A lthough In Leviathan  
Hobbes does not p rovide  a s im ple h ie ra rchy  o f  human passions, the
(56) H is to ry , I, p. 350.
(57) Elements o f  Law, p. 89; see Leviathan, p. 142, De Cive, p. 69.
(58) H is to ry , I, p. 200.
(59) See, fo r  example. Arch Idamus' o ra tion s .
(60) De Cive, p. 43.
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d is t in c t io n  between g lo ry  and p r o f i t  Is as b lu rre d  as I t  Is In the 
H is to ry , In so fa r  as rich e s  are considered as a s ig n  o f  power (61) 
and th e re fo re  p r o f i t  i t s e l f  becomes a source o f  g lo ry  and honour. (62)
1.6 CONCLUSION
In h is  le t te r  to  the  readers which precedes h is  t ra n s la t io n  o f  
Thucydides Hobbes n o tice s  and endorses the view, th a t In h is  tim es 
was widespread (63), th a t Thucydides was “ the  most p o l i t ic
h ls to r lo g ra p h e r th a t ever w r i t ” . (64-) In Leviathan  he e xp la ins  th a t a 
fundam ental Ing re d ie n t o f  a “ good h is to ry ” Is “ the  choice o f  the
a c tio n s  th a t are  more p ro f i ta b le  to  be known” . (65)
In th is  chapter I t  has been argued th a t the  reason why Hobbes saw 
the  H is to ry  as a work o f  the  h ighest p o l i t ic a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  lie s  In 
the  fa c t  th a t  In I t  Thucydides s p e lls  o u t both the  necessary
co n d itio n  fo r  a s ta b le  p o l i t ic a l  o rder and the causes o f  c i v i l  wars. 
More s p e c if ic a lly ,  I t  has been shown th a t Thucydides Id e n t if ie d  In 
c o n tro lle d  fe a r the  cornerstone  o f  p o l i t ic a l  order: whenever fe a r Is 
removed from the gamut o f  human passions, as d u ring  the  plague In
Athens, the outcome Is s o c ia l and p o l i t ic a l chaos. Conversely, when 
fe a r Is so overwhelm ing th a t a l l  o the r human passions are
(61) Leviathan, p. 64; Eiements o f  Law, p. 35.
(62) On th is  see C l i f fo r d  Orwln ‘The Just and the  Advantageous In
Thucydides: The Case o f  the M ytl I lenalan Debate', American
P o l i t ic a l Science Review, vo l. 78, 1984, pp. 485-94.
(63) On th is  see R ichard S ch la tte r, ‘ In tro d u c tio n ’ , In R. S ch la tte r 
(ed), Hobbes's Thucydides, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1975, pp. x l - x x v l l l .
(64) H is to ry , I, p. v l l l .
(65) Leviathan, p. 58.
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o b lite ra te d , as In the case o f  anc ien t Greece be fo re  I t  "grew c iv i l " ,  
then u n c e rta in ty  re igns  supreme, a n t ic ip a t io n  and f i r s t  s t r ik e  are the 
on ly  s tra te g y , dec is ions are taken under s tre s s  and, again, the 
outcome Is p o l i t ic a l  chaos.
In Thucydides' cha rac te r Iza t Ion o f  human na tu re  people have In 
them selves not on ly  the  p o s s ib i l i t y  to  c rea te  a s ta b le  p o l i t ic a l  o rder 
— by tu rn in g  to  th e ir  advantage th e ir  n a tu ra l fe a r  — but a lso  the 
p o te n t ia l source o f  I ts  d e s tru c tio n . In fa c t, the re  are two human 
passions th a t. I f  a llow ed to  o v e r -r id e  fea r, can undermine so c ia l 
and p o l i t ic a l  assoc ia tions : am b ition  to  ru le  and avarice . In th is
chapter I t  has been suggested th a t  In h is  p o l i t ic a l  works Hobbes 
develops the above In s ig h ts  and t r ie s  to  f in d  an escape from  a dual 
paradox Im p lic it  In Thucydides' H is to ry , namely the  paradox th a t fe a r 
can d is ru p t peace both w hen^ls  excessive (as In anc ien t tim es) and
when^ Is lacking a lto g e th e r (as d u ring  the plague o f  Athens) and ^  
am b ition  can e ith e r  promote c iv i l is a t io n  (as In the case o f  the 
A thenians) o r cause c iv i l  war (as In Corcyra).
I t  can be s a fe ly  assumed th a t Thucydides d id  not be lieve  e ith e r  th a t 
h is  dual dilemma could  ever be so lved o r th a t the mere understanding 
o f  the  fu n c tio n  o f  fe a r  and am b ition  In p o l i t ic a l  a ssoc ia tions  were 
s u f f ic ie n t  to  preserve fu tu re  genera tions from  war and the 
d is s o lu t io n  o f  so c ie ty . (66) Indeed In the H is to ry  one can f in d  
numerous h in ts  o f  h is  b e l ie f  th a t h is to ry  Is bound to  repeat I t s e l f  
and th a t no f in a l  s a lv a tio n  w i l l  ever be a tta in a b le .
In th is  respect, Hobbes's p o s it io n  Is d ia m e tr ic a lly  opposed to
(66) On th is  see C l i f fo r d  Orwln, ‘S ta s is  and Plague’ , c it .
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Thucydides'. In fa c t, Hobbes's pessimism does not extend e ith e r  to  
the  a b i l i t y  o f  the p o l i t ic a l  ph ilosopher to  decypher human 
In te ra c tio n s  o r to  the a b i l i t y  o f  mankind to  heed h is  message. In the 
E p is tle  D edicatory th a t p re faces De Cive^ Hobbes goes as fa r  as
sugges ting  to  have found the fo rm u la  fo r  e te rn a l peace;
I f  the M ora ll Philosophers had ». d ischarged th e ir  d u ty  ». I l f ]  the 
na tu re  o f  human a c tion s  [were] d is t in c t ly  knowne ». the  s tre n g th  o f  
Avarice  and Am bition ... would p re se n tly  fa in t  and languish; And 
Mankinds should enjoy such an Immortal I Peace, th a t ». the re  would 
h a rd ly  be le f t  any pretence fo r  war. (67)
Thus, desp ite  the  s t r ik in g  s im i la r i t ie s  In th e ir  d iagnos is  o f  the 
u lt im a te  causes o f  the  d is s o lu t io n  o f  so c ie ty  and o f  the  necessary 
co n d itio n s  fo r  I ts  s ta b i l i t y ,  Thucydides and Hobbes show a d if fe re n t  
a t t i tu d e  towards the m a te r ia l under s c ru tin y , th a t can perhaps be
exp la ined  In term s o f  the  d if fe re n t  tasks o f  the h is to r ia n  and o f  the 
p o l i t ic a l  ph ilosopher: the  form er wants to  exp la in  the  course o f
h is to ry , the la t te r  alms a t d ire c t in g  It .
Whereas In Thucydides' account fe a r, am bition, and gain are s trong
passions th a t keep the  sou ls  o f  the  p ro ta g o n is ts  o f  the  H is to ry  In
permanent tu rm o il and the  reader Is never a llow ed to  hope th a t 
c o n tro lle d  fe a r w i l l  e ve n tu a lly  p re v a il and o rder trium ph, Hobbes's 
w r it in g s  exude the confidence o f  the  p o l i t ic a l  ph ilosopher th a t tru e  
understand ing can a lte r  human behaviour and th a t mankind w i l l
(67) De Clve, pp. 25-6 (emphasis In the o r ig in a l) ;  In Leviathan  
Hobbes n o tice s  th a t “ though noth ing  can be Imm ortal, which 
m orta ls  make; ye t, I f  men had the use o f  reason they pretend 
to, th e ir  commonwealths m igh t be secured, a t leas t from 
pe rish ing  from In te rn a l d iseases.", p. 308.
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e v e n tu a lly  re a lis e  th a t p o l i t ic a l  s a lv a tio n  Is fe a s ib le  through the 
a r t i f i c e  o f  a pow erfu l S ta te  th a t e x p lo its  the n a tu ra l fe a r o f  people 
to  re s tra in  p rid e  and greed, thus preven ting  the co llapse  In to  
anarchy.
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C H A R T E R  I I 
MOTION» IDENTITY» AND EQUALITY
11.1 INTRODUCTION; 11.2 TOWARDS A POLITICAL DEFINITION OF MAN: 11.2.1 
Comparative ana lys is ; 11.2.2 T lm e-se rles  ana lys is ; I I . 2.3 The Id e n tity  
o f  Man; I I . 2.4 On v o lu n ta ry  motion and P o lit ic s ;  11.2.5 On the 
d is t in c t iv e  v o lu n ta ry  m otion o f  man; 11.3 EQUALITY OF MOTIONS: 11.3.1 
On Power; 11.3.2 E q u a lity  o f  wisdom, w it,  and o th e r form s o f  e q u a lity ;
11.3.3 E q u a lity  to  k i l l  In De Cive, Elements o f  Law, and Leviatharr,
11.3.4 E q u a lity  to  k i l l  as a fundam ental e q u a lity ; 11.3.5 E q u a lity  to  
k i l l  as the basis o f  the so c ia l con trac t.
11.1 INTRODUCTION
Hobbes's am bition  as expressed in De Cive and elsewhere was to  create  
a p h ilo so p h ica l system th a t organized and exp la ined eve ry th in g  th a t 
could  be explained, from cosmology to  morals, from  n a tu ra l science to  
p o l i t ic s  (1). His contem poraries tended to  th in k  th a t In th is  respect 
Hobbes had been success fu l : both h is  few adm irers and h is  many 
d e tra c to rs  seemed to  agree th a t h is  m ateria lism , theo logy (or lack o f  
I t )  and p o l i t ic s  were a l l  components o f  a s in g le  whole (2). From the 
end o f  the la s t cen tu ry  though, s ince G.C. Robertson has argued th a t 
Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  view derives  In fa c t from "h is  personal 
circum stances and the  events o f  h is  tim e" (3), the  bearing o f  
Hobbes's cosmology and theo ry  o f  motion on h is  p o l i t ic a l  thought
(1) De Cive, Preface to  the reader, p. 35.
(2) For a survey o f  the  re a c tion s  o f  Hobbes's contem porarles to  h is  
theo ries , see fo r  example Samuel I. M lntz, The Hunting o f  
Leviathan, Cambridge, Cambridge U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1962.
(3) George Croom Robertson, Hobbes, Edinburgh, W illiam  Blackwood and 
Sons, 1886, p. v l.
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has become a m a tte r o f  con trove rsy . On the one hand, S trauss (4), 
T ay lo r (5), and Warrender (6) have led the camp th a t m a in ta ins tha t, 
desp ite  Hobbes's c la im s to  the con tra ry , h is  p o l i t ic a l  theory Is 
com plete ly u n re la te d  to  h is  n a tu ra l science. On the  o the r hand, 
Oakeshott (7), Watkins <8), and Spragens (9) have led the opposite 
camp th a t be lieves th a t a lthough Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  theo ry  was not 
(and could not be) lo g ic a lly  deduced from h is  cosmology, ye t i t
(4) In the  p re face to  h is  The P o lit ic a l Philosophy o f  Hobbes. Its  
basis and its  genesis^ Chicago and London, U n iv e rs ity  o f  Chicago 
Press, 1963 ( f i r s t  pub lished In 1936), Leo S trauss no tices th a t 
the "p a r t ic u la r  o b je c t” o f  h is  s tudy  Is to  show " th a t the rea l 
basis o f  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  ph ilosophy Is no t modern science” (p. 
Ix).
(5) In ‘The E th ic a l D octrine  o f  Hobbes’ , Philosophy vo l. 13, 1938, pp. 
406-24, A.E. T ay lo r contends th a t Hobbes's e th ic a l theory Is a 
very s t r i c t  deonto logy "disengaged” from  the re s t o f  h is  
philosophy "w ith  which I t  has no lo g ic a lly  necessary connection” , 
p. 408,
(6) In The P o lit ic a l Philosof^y o f  Hc^ >t>es. His theory o f  Obligation, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970 ( f i r s t  pub lished 1957), Howard 
Warrender argues th a t Hobbes's theo ry  o f  p o l i t ic a l  o b b lig a tio n
must be separeted a n a ly t ic a lly  from h is  n a tu ra l philosophy and 
h is  psychology and th a t i f  In fa c t  Hobbes wanted to  de rive  h is  
moral theo ry  from  an e m p irica l theo ry  "he must be held to  have
fa ile d  In h is  main e n te rp r is e ” , p. 6.
(7) Unlike W atkins and Spragens who argue th a t the ve ry  content o f  
some o f  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  Ideas was s ig n if ic a n t ly  Influenced by 
h is  s c ie n t i f ic  views, Oakeshott Ind ica tes In a d is t in c t iv e  fo r m
o f reasoning the common th read  th a t u n if ie s  the e n t ire  Hobbes Ian 
co ns tru c tio n , see : ‘ In tro d u c tio n  to  Lev ia than ’ , In Hobt)es on c iv il  
association, Oxford, B as il B lackw ell, 1975 ( f i r s t  published in 
1946 and rev ised  In 1974), pp. 1-74.
(8) In h is  Hobbes's system o f  ideas. A study in the p o lit ic a l 
significance o f  philosophical theories, London, Hutchinson, 1973 
( f i r s t  pub lished  In 1965), John W.N. Watkins argues " th a t some o f
[Hobbes's] p o l i t ic a l  Ideas are Im plied by some o f h is  
p h iloso p h ica l Ideas” , p. 8.
(9) Thomas A. Spragens considers h is  book on The P o litic s  o f  Motion. 
The World o f  Thomas Hot^bes, London, Croom Helm, 1973, as a s tudy 
o f  "the  re la t io n s h ip  o f  n a tu ra l ph ilosophy and p o l i t ic a l 
philosophy In Hobbes” and summarises h is  p o s itio n  as fo llo w s : "My 
view, lik e  th a t o f  Watkins, Is th a t th e re  Is considerable 
In te ra c tio n  between the two and th a t the  re s u lts  o f  th is  
in te ra c tio n  are s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  the  f in a l  con ten t o f  Hobbes's 
p o l i t ic a l  th e o ry ” (p. 36).
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shou ld  not be considered as a s e lf-c o n ta in e d  whole to ta l ly  
Independent from  the re s t o f  Hobbes's philosophy.
W ithout tak ing  sides on such a major In te rp re ta t iv e  Issue (which 
would re q u ire  a d is s e r ta t io n  to  I t s e l f )  th is  chapter w i l l  examine 
Hobbes's d e f in it io n  o f  man as motion w ith  a tw o - fo ld  ob jec tive : on 
the  one hand, an a ttem p t w i l l  be made to  piece tog e th e r, on the basis 
o f  some observa tions made by Hobbes in Elements o f  Philosophy, some 
o f  the  poss ib le  reasons th a t  may have led him to  regard such 
d e f in it io n  as an app ro p ria te  s ta r t in g  p o in t o f  h is  p o l i t ic a l  theo ry  ; 
on the  o the r hand, by exam ining h is  argument on the  power o f  men- 
motIon, I s h a ll t r y  to  e x tra p o la te  a s p e c if ic  n o tio n  o f  e q u a lity ,
th a t w i l l  then be used In P art I I I  o f  th is  d is s e r ta t io n  as one o f  the 
b u lld ln g -b lo c k s  o f  the proposed ax lom atIza tIon  o f  Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  
theory.
I I . 2 TOWARDS A POLITICAL DEFINITION OF MAN
In th is  sec tion  I t  w i l l  be argued th a t the concept o f  motion, when 
used to  de fin e  man, had fo r  Hobbes a s trong  “ p o l i t ic a l ” appeal (sp e lt 
ou t in unambiguous terms In Chapter XI o f  Elements o f  Philosophy), In 
the sense th a t. In Hobbes's view. I t  had a l l  the requ ired  
c h a ra c te r ls t les to  make I t  the  app rop ria te  s ta r t in g  p o in t o f  h is  
p o l i t ic a l  theory.
11.2.1 Comparative ana lys is
As a f i r s t  s tep  In the  a ttem p t to  f in d  o u t why Hobbes found
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p o l i t ic a l ly  appealing the d e f in it io n  o f  man as motion, I t  may be 
p ro f i ta b ly  re c a lle d  th a t In h is  view "man" Is a "u n ive rsa l name", 
which, as such has no d ire c t  co un te rpa rt In the  w orld  (10), but 
re fe rs  to  an a b s tra c tio n , o r m ental Image.
Since "one u n iv e rs a l name Is Imposed on many th ing s , fo r  th e ir
s im ilitu d e  In some q u a lity ,  o r o th e r acc iden t" (11) and "a man 
denotes any one o f  a m u lt itu d e  o f  men ... by reason o f  th e ir
s im il i tu d e ’* (12), I t  fo llo w s  th a t In Hobbes's view In o rde r to  de fine  
man we have to  compare a l l  In d iv id u a ls  a t the  same tim e: whatever 
can be found In "every p a r t ic u la r  o f  mankind" (13), th a t Is man. 
Whereas I t  Is beyond doubt th a t what can be termed a com parative
ana lys is  o f  In d iv id u a ls  was considered by Hobbes as a necessary 
exerc ise  to  fo rm u la te  the d e f in it io n  o f  man. I t  Is more d i f f i c u l t  to  
e s ta b lis h  whether In h is  op in ion  such an exerc ise  would be a lso
s u ff ic ie n t .
Indeed, one could  re fe r  to  a w ea lth  o f  passages In Hobbes's works 
(e sp e c ia lly  In h is  a na lys is  o f  u n ive rsa l and compound names, and In 
h is  exp lana tion  o f  the com positive  natu re  o f  our mental processes) 
where Hobbes conveys the  s tro ng  impression th a t the above-mentioned 
comparison across men a t a given p o in t In tim e is  a l l  th a t Is needed 
to  a r r iv e  a t the  d e f in it io n  o f  man.
However, the view th a t a com parative c r i te r io n  be s u f f ic ie n t  to  
de fin e  man Is repud ia ted  a lto g e th e r by Hobbes h im s e lf In what I
(10) "th e re  being noth ing  In the  w orld  u n iv e rs a l bu t names",
Leviathan, p. 21; "There Is noth ing  u n iv e rs a l but names".
Elements o f  Law, p. 20.
(11) Leviathan, p. 21; emphasis added.
(12) Elements o f  Law, p. 18; emphasis added.
(13) Ib id ,  p. 19.
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be lieve  to  be a co rn e r-s ton e  o f  h is  re f le c t io n s  on the  d e f in it io n  o f  
man — I re fe r  to  se c tio n  7 o f  Chapter XI o f  Elements o f  Philosophy. 
Here Hobbes s p e c ifie s  an a d d it io n a l c r ite r io n  th a t shou ld  be deployed 
to  captu re  the Id e n t ity  o f  man. By focus ing  a tte n tio n  on th is
c r i te r io n  In the next two sec tions  I s h a ll be able to  provide
a poss ib le  exp lana tion  as to  why Hobbes de fined  man as motion, or,
more p re c ise ly , why he be lieved  th a t such a d e f in it io n  provided the  
a p p ro p ria te  s ta r t in g  p o in t fo r  h is  p o l i t ic a l theory.
I I . 2.1 T lm e-se rles  a na lys is
We may begin by n o tic in g  th a t In Elements o f  Philosophy  Hobbes
re je c ts  unambiguously the  Id e n t if ic a t io n  o f  man w ith  body, o r u n ity  
o f  m a tte r; he observes th a t a man's body changes over tim e and so. I f  
we were to  Id e n t ify  Man and Body, we would be bound to  conclude th a t 
young and o ld  Socrates are  not the same man. He w r ite s  :
For I t  Is one th in g  to  ask concerning Socrates, whether he be the 
same man, and another to  ask whether he be the same body; fo r  h is  
body, when he Is o ld , cannot be the same I t  was when he was an 
In fa n t, by reason o f  the  d if fe re n c e  o f  magnitude: fo r  one body has 
always one and the same magnitude; ye t, neverthe less, he may be the  
same man (14)
Hobbes re je c ts  In e q u a lly  s trong  terms the Id e n t if ic a t io n  o f  man w ith  
"aggregate  o f  acc iden ts", fo r ,  he argues. I f  we were to  accept I t ,  we 
would be bound to  say " th a t a man standing Is no t the  same he was
(14) Elements o f  Philosophy^ p. 137.
(15) Ib id .
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s i t t in g ” (15).
The consequence o f  Id e n t ify in g  Man w ith  e ith e r  body o r aggregate o f  
acciden ts, and th e re fo re  o f  being unable to  captu re  the  c o n tin u ity
between young and o ld  Socrates would, In Hobbes's view, be
d isa s tro u s
In so fa r  as I t  would lead to  a complete confusion  o f  a l l  c iv i l
r ig h ts :
w. he th a t s ins , and he th a t  Is punished, should  no t be the same 
man, by reason o f  the  pe rpe tua l f lu x  and change o f  man's body -  
which were to  confound a l l  c iv i l  r ig h ts . (16)
From the above q uo ta tio n s  I t  can be seen q u ite  c le a r ly  th a t according 
to  Hobbes a com parative a na lys is  Is not s u f f ic ie n t  to  a rr iv e  a t a
d e f in it io n  o f  man th a t  would enable him to  found (and not to
confound) c i v i l  r ig h ts . Another necessary co n d itio n  fo r  th a t
d e f in it io n  Is th a t I t  must captu re  the se lf-sam eness o f  persons over 
tim e. Hence a com parative c r i te r io n  has to  be combined w ith  what can 
be ca lle d  a t lm e -s e r le s  comparison th a t p in p o in ts  what Is permanent
In the  same In d iv id u a l a t d if fe re n t  tim es. I f  a d e f in it io n  o f  man as
e ith e r  body In pe rpe tua l change o r as developing s e l f  can s u it  w e ll 
the  needs o f  n a tu ra l s c ie n t is ts  and psycho log is ts . I t  Is a lto g e th e r 
Inadequate, a t leas t In Hobbes's view, fo r  a p o l i t ic a l  th e o r is t  (17).
(16) Elements o f  Philosophy, p. 136, emphasis added.
(17) I t  w i l l  be no ticed  th a t  the com parative c r i te r io n  and a tlm e - 
se rle s  c r i te r io n  are bu t an a p p lic a tio n  to  the  s p e c if ic  case o f  
the d e f in it io n  o f  man o f  the two types o f  comparisons examined 
In Chapter XI o f  Elements o f  Philosophy  ( e n t i t le d  “Of Id e n t ity  
and D iffe re n ce ” ) where Hobbes d if fe re n t ia te s  between :
-  the comparison o f  many ob jec ts  a t the same tim e so to  
d iscover e q u a lit ie s  and d iffe re n ce s  (pars 1-6);
-  the comparison o f  the  same body w ith  I t s e l f  a t d if fe re n t  
tim es (par 7) so to  f in d  I ts  Id e n t ity  (I.e. what Is permanent 
In I t ) .
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11.2.3 The Id e n t ity  o f  man
Having thus ascerta ined  the  compound c r ite r io n  necessary and 
s u f f ic ie n t  to  a r r iv e  a t a p o l i t ic a l ly  re le va n t d e f in it io n  o f  man, we 
can In te rp re t the e a r ly  chap te rs  o f  Elements o f  Law and Leviathan  as 
an a ttem p t to  answer the fo llo w in g  question ; what Is common to  a l l  
men and constant In each o f  them over time?
Hobbes leads the  reader to  re a liz e  th a t people are d if fe re n t  from  one 
ano ther not on ly  In th e ir  appearences, tas te s , and phys ica l 
c h a ra c te r ls t les but a lso  In th e ir  des ires , avers ions, thoughts, 
judgments, and values. In Elem ents o f  Law he n o tice s  :
w h ile  every man d lf fe r e th  from  o th e r In c o n s titu t io n , they d i f fe r  
a lso  one from  another concerning the common d is t in c t io n  o f  good 
and e v il.  (18)
In De Cive he s tre sses  the d i f fe r e n t  des ires  and avers ions o f  people 
and consequently th e ir  d i f fe r e n t  values;
„. such Is the  na tu re  o f  man, th a t every one c a lls  th a t Good which 
he des ires, and e v llL  which he eschewes; and th e re fo re  through the 
d iv e rs ity  o f  our a ffe c t io n s , I t  happens th a t one counts th a t good^ 
which another counts e v il  I (19)
». what th is  man commends, ( th a t Is to  say, c a lls  Good) the  o the r 
undervalues, as being E v il (20)
... the same A ction  Is p ra is 'd  by these, and c a ll 'd  Vertue, and 
d isp ra ised  by those, and termed v ice  (21)
(18) Elements o f  Law, p. 29.
(19) De Cive, p. 177.
(20) Ib id ,  p. 74.
(21) Ib id ,  p. 75.
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In Levia than  Hobbes combines the n o ta tio n  th a t people are d if fe re n t  
In th e ir  percep tion  o f  the  e x te rn a l w orld  w ith  the  obse rva tion  th a t 
they d i f f e r  In th e ir  e va lu a tio n  o f  I t :
And d ive rs  men, d i f f e r  not on ly  In th e ir  judgement, on the senses 
o f  what Is p leasant, and unpleasant to  the  ta s te , sm ell, 
hearing, touch, and s ig h t; but a lso  o f  what Is conformable, or 
d isagreeab le  to  reason. In the ac tions  o f  common l i f e  (22)
fo r  one man c a lle th  wisdom, what another c a lle th  fe a r; and one 
c ru e lty , what ano ther ju s tlce ;o n e  p ro d ig a lity ,  what another 
magnanimity; and one g ra v ity ,  what another s tu p id ity  (23)
Hobbes Is as keen to  s tre s s  th a t the re  are considerab le  v a r ia t io n s
across people as he Is to  p o in t ou t th a t the  same In d iv id u a l Is 
d if fe re n t  a t d if fe re n t  tim es, w ith  d if fe re n t  values, des ires , thoughts. 
In Leviathan  we read :
w. the  same man. In d iv e rs  tim es, d i f fe r s  from h lm se lfe ; and one
tim e p ra lse th , th a t  Is c a lle th  good, what another tim e he
d ls p ra ls e th , and c a lle th  e v i l  (24)
- a l l  men [a re ] -  no t a lik e  a ffe c te d  w ith  the same th in g , nor the 
same man a t a l l  tim es (25)
In De Cive:
... ve ry  o fte n  the  same man a t d ive rse  times, pra ises, and d isp ra ise s  
the same th in g  (26)
-  and the same man what now he esteem'd fo r  good, he Immediately 
looks on as e v i l  (27)
(22) Leviathan, p. 146.
(23) Ib id ,  pp. 28-9.
(24) Ib id ,  p. 146.
(25) Ib id ,  p. 28.
(26) De Cive, p. 74.
(27) Ib id ,  p. 177.
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By means o f  h is  dua l c r ite r io n ,  Hobbes e s ta b lish e s  th a t what men have 
In common and Is permanent In each o f  them Is bu t the very way 
o f  fu n c tio n in g  o f  th e ir  bodies ( v i ta l  m otion) and th e ir  mind 
(v o lu n ta ry  m otion). The Id e n t ity  o f  man Is the summation o f  v i t a l  and 
v o lu n ta ry  motion:
th a t man w i l l  be always the same, whose a c tio n s  and thoughts 
proceed a l l  from  the  same beginning o f  motion, namely, th a t which 
was In h is  genera tion  (28)
To conclude, the  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  man as motion Is the on ly  d e f in it io n  
th a t according to  Hobbes s a t is f ie s  both the  com parative and the 
tlm e s -s e r le s  c r i t e r ia  and thus a llow s him to  found and not to
“ confound a l l  c iv i l  r ig h ts ” .
11.2.4 V o lun ta ry  m otion and p o l i t ic s
A lthough the concept o f  v i t a l  m otion Is om nipresent In Hobbes's
argument as I t  form s a fundam ental p a rt o f  the “ s e l f ” , o r Id e n tity ,
th a t HobbesIan men want to  preserve, Hobbes never g ives an 
exhaustive  account o f  I t  In h is  p o l i t ic a l  w r it in g s ; he f e l t  th a t I t  
Is no t “ the course o f  the blood, the pulse, the b reath ing, the 
concoction, n u t r i t io n ,  e xc re tio n  &c” (29) o f  people th a t have a
bearing  on p o l i t ic s ,  but ra th e r those actions th a t proceed from th e ir  
though ts  and passions. Thus Hobbes concentrates e n t ir e ly  on vo lu n ta ry  
m otion and describes moral and p o l i t ic a l  philosophy as the s tudy o f  
th a t s p e c if ic  motion:
(28) Elements o f  Philosophy, p. 137.
(29) Leviathan, p. 38.
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moral philosophy s tu d ie s  the m otions o f  the mind, namely a p p e tite  
and avers ion  ». what causes they have and o f  what they be 
causes(30)
». the  p r in c ip le s  o f  the  p o l i t ic s  co ns is t In the  knowledge o f  the 
m otions o f  the mind (31).
11.2.5 On the d is t in c t iv e  v o lu n ta ry  motion o f  man
In h is  quest fo r  the  Id e n t ity  o f  man, Hobbes, both In Elements o f  Law 
and In Leviathan, p o in ts  to  c e rta in  d iffe re n ce s  th a t e x is t  between 
the  vo lu n ta ry  m otion In man and In animals. In these d is s im ila r it ie s  
l ie s  the  d is t in c t iv e  Id e n t ity  o f  man. (C o n s is ten tly  w ith  h is  lack o f  
emphasis on v i t a l  motion, no comparisons are made between v i t a l  
m otion In man and In anim als.)
In o rder to  unrave l the In tr ic a c ie s  o f  Hobbes's p o s itio n  on th is
Issue, I t  may be u s e fu l to  d is t in g u is h  between two types o f
d iffe re n c e s  In human and anim al v o lu n ta ry  motion, namely d iffe re n ce s
In k ind  and d iffe re n c e s  o f  degree.
D iffe re nce s  In k ind  re fe r  to  those c h a ra c te r Is tlc s  th a t are present In 
man and absent In animals, lik e  the a b i l i t y  to  develop language (32) 
and reason (33), the c a p a b ility  o f  th in k in g  d e d u c tive ly  (34), and a 
number o f  passions th a t range from c u r io s ity  (35) to  g lo ry  (36), from
(30) Elements o f  Philosophy, p. 72.
(31) Ib id.,, p. 74.
(32) Leviathan, Ch. 4.; Elements o f  Law, p. 18.
(33) Ib id ,  Ch. 5; on language and science; Elements o f  Law, p. 19.
(34) Ib id ,  pp. 13-4.
(35) Ibid., p. 44.
(36) Ib id ,  p. 156.
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the d es ire  to  communicate to  o the rs  one's wisdom, knowledge and 
op in ions (37) to  the  des ire  “ to  Innovate” the w orld  (38).
D iffe re nce s  o f  degree re fe r  to  those fa c u lt ie s  — lik e  Imagination, 
memory, prudence, and Induc tive  thought — th a t a lthough shared by 
both men and animals, are neverthe less  more developed In man. (39) 
Hobbes's argument seems to  suggest th a t what I termed d iffe re n ce s  In 
degree are In fa c t  b rought about by d iffe re n ce s  In kind: I t  Is man's 
unique a b i l i t y  to  develop language th a t helps him to  surpass animals 
In Im agination, memory, knowledge and in d uc tive  thought; I t  Is man's 
capac ity  to  th in k  d e d u c tive ly  and to  reason th a t helps him to  
envisage the fu tu re  and th e re fo re  to  be more prudent than animals.
As we w i l l  see In la te r  chapters. In o rder to  e xp la in  the  reason why 
men u n like  anim als liv e  In p o l i t ic a l  s ta te s , Hobbes focuses h is  
a tte n tio n  on the  d iffe re n c e s  o f  kind, namely on th a t p a r t o f  man's 
na tu re  th a t Is s p e c if ic  to  him and absent In animals.
Before tu rn in g  to  th a t Issue, though. In the next se c tio n  we s h a ll 
t r y  to  e s ta b lis h  whether the re  are  s ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia t io n s  across 
In d iv id u a ls  as motions.
I I . 3 THE EQUALITY OF MOTIONS
In th is  se c tion  I s h a ll In troduce Hobbes's no tio n  th a t people are 
eq u a lly  dangerous fo r  one another and h is  con ten tion  th a t  th is  form 
o f  e q u a lity  Is o f  fundam ental Importance In p o l i t ic a l  philosophy.
(37) Elements o f  Law, p. 23.
(38) Leviathan, p. 156.
(39) Elements o f  Law, Chapters 4- and 5; Leviathan, Ch. 3.
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The emphasis o f  the se c tion  Is on the p resen ta tion  and e lu c id a tio n  o f 
Hobbes's stand on e q u a lity  ra th e r than on a c r i t ic a l  exam ination and 
e va lu a tio n  o f  h is  p o s itio n . (For my own view on why Hobbes was 
Indeed co rre c t In cons ide ring  the  equal a b i l i t y  o f  people to  k i l l  as a 
s u f f ic ie n t  ground fo r  the  ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  equal r ig h ts ,  the reader Is 
re fe r re d  to  Chapter 6.)
11.3.1 On power
Having shown th a t the  fe a tu re  o f  man th a t Is permanent In each 
In d iv id u a l and common to  a l l  Is bu t the fu n c tio n in g  o f  h is  body and 
mind (namely the way in which h is  body and mind respond and In te ra c t 
w ith  the e x te rn a l w orld ), the  next s tep  Is fo r  Hobbes to  e s ta b lis h  
whether some people “ fu n c t io n ” b e tte r  than o thers.
As fo r  Hobbes m otion generates power which, In tu rn . Is the o r ig in  
o f  new motion (40), and thus comparing men-mot Ions Involves 
comparing th e ir  power, I t  may be u se fu l to  c la r i f y  b r ie f ly  the 
meaning o f  power.
In h is  works Hobbes exp la ins  th a t  one's power is  one's a b i l i t y  to  
achieve an o b je c tive  (41) and re fe r r in g  to  In d iv id u a ls  he draws a 
d is t in c t io n  between two form s o f  power : “n a tu ra l” (o r “ o r ig in a l” ) 
and “ acqu ired” (or “ In s tru m e n ta l” ).
In Elements o f  Law he describes as n a tu ra l
the powers o f  the body, n u t r i t iv e ,  genera tive, m otive and o f  the 
mind, knowledge (42)
(40) Motion Is a lso  de fined  as “a c tu a l power” and power as “ fu tu re  
m otion” . Elements o f  Philosophy, p. 131.
(41) Leviathan, p. 74.
(42) Elements o f  Law, p. 34.
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whereas by “ acqu ired powers” he means
such fa r th e r  powers, as by them are acquired (v iz .)  riches, place o f  
a u th o r ity , fr ie n d s h ip  o r favou r, and good fo r tu n e (4-3)
S im ila r ly , In Leviathan, he denotes as “o r ig in a l” (o r “n a tu ra l” )
the eminence o f  the fa c u lt ie s  o f  body, o r mind: as e x tra o rd in a ry  
s tre n g th , form, prudence, a r ts , eloquence, l ib e r a l i t y  and 
n o b i l i ty  (4-4) 
whereas he c la s s if ie s  as “ In s tru m e n ta l”
those powers, which acqu ired  by these, o r by fo rtu n e , are means or 
Instrum ents to  acqu ire  more : as riches re p u ta tio n , fr ie n d s  and *  
good luck (45)
A lthough In a passage o f  Levia than  Hobbes seems to  suggest th a t the 
above-mentioned Ins trum en ta l (o r acqu ired) powers — namely riches, 
p laces o f  a u th o r ity , fr ie n d s , science — can e x is t  “ as w e ll w ith in , as 
w ith o u t commonwealths” (46), g iven h is  characte r Iz a t Ion o f  the s ta te  
o f  na tu re  th is  seems u n lik e ly . Indeed since the Hobbes Ian s ta te  o f  
na tu re  Is a w orld  charac te rIzed  by the complete lack o f  p rope rty  
r ig h ts ,  o f  any so c ia l o r p o l i t ic a l  h lerachy, o f  le is u re - t im e  to  devote 
to  sciences and Industry , o f  common values etc. (47), I t  fo llo w s  th a t 
most powers th a t Hobbes d e fin e s  In Elements o f  Law as “ acqu ired” and 
In Leviathan  as “ Ins trum e n ta l”  are com plete ly m iss ing . (48)
(43) Ib id
(44) Leviathan, p. 74.
(45) Ib id
(46) Ib id ,  p. 78.
(47) For a d iscuss ion  o f  th is  to p ic , see Chapters I I I -V .
(48) Of the above l i s t  o f  “ acqu ired  powers” the  o n ly  Item th a t can 
be found a lso  In the s ta te  o f  na tu re  Is  o f  course “ good 
fo r tu n e ” ; as to  the power acquired by having fr ie n d s , Hobbes 
thought th a t In n a tu ra l co nd itio n s  I t  was ve ry  u n re lia b le  (see 
la te r  chapters).
— 63 —
This exp la ins  why, In o rde r to  e s ta b lis h  the e q u a lity  o f  men In 
n a tu ra l co nd itio n s , Hobbes concentra tes e n t ir e ly  on the  n a tu ra l (or 
o r ig in a l)  powers o f  th e ir  bodies and minds. Th is Is the  form  o f  power 
we s h a ll consider In th is  sec tion , leaving the d iscuss ion  o f  acquired 
powers to  la te r  chapters.
11.3.2 Hobbes on e q u a lity  o f  wisdom, w it,  and o the r n a tu ra l powers
Hobbes's p o s itio n  on the e q u a lity  o f  n a tu ra l powers o f  In d iv id u a ls  Is 
no t as c lea r and s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  as one would have like d  and the re  
appears to  be some v a r ia t io n s  no t on ly  from  Elements o f  Law to  De 
Give and Levia than  but a lso  w ith in  the  same work.
For example. In p laces Hobbes suggests th a t the  experience, prudence, 
and wisdom o f  people o f  the  same age Is l i t t l e  d if fe re n t  (49), 
whereas elsewhere he n o tice s  th a t some people are more prudent and 
w ise r than the  re s t because th e ir  Im agination Is q u icke r and thus In 
the  same amount o f  tim e they re g is te r  more th in g s  (and consequently 
accumulate more experience, prudence and wisdom) (50).
At tim es Hobbes re q u ire s  in d iv id u a ls  “ to  acknowledge” the e q u a lity  
th a t e x is ts  between them (51); In o th e r places he argues th a t even i f  
people were unequal, e q u a lity  shou ld  be presumed and “ adm itted ” fo r
(49) 'L  I f  we consider how l i t t l e  odds the re  Is o f  s tre n g th  or 
knowledge between men o f  m ature age” . Elements o f  Law, p. 70.
“ .« prudence ... experience o f  men equal In age Is not much 
unequal as to  the q u a n tity ” , Leviathan, p. 60.
“ Prudence is  but experience; which equal tim e, e q u a lly  bestows 
on a l l  men, in those th in g s  they e qu a lly  apply themselves un to ” , 
ib id,, p. 110.
(50) “ Men o f  qu ick Im agination, c e te r is  paribus, are more prudent 
than those whose im ag ination  Is slow; fo r  they observe more in 
less tim e ” , Elements o f  Law, p. 16.
(51) The re co g n itio n  (and not the  mere su p p o s itio n ) o f  e q u a lity  Is 
necessary fo r  accepting the f i r s t  Law o f  na tu re ; see in fra  p. 69.
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the  sake o f  peace (52).
On the one hand he n o tice s  th a t s ince a l l  people are s a t is f ie d  w ith  
th e ir  own share o f  wisdom and w it,  I t  must fo llo w  th a t wisdom and 
w it  are d is t r ib u te d  e qu a lly  (53); on the o th e r hand he p o in ts  out 
th a t some people do no t t r u s t  th e ir  own w it  (54) and th a t the w it  o f  
people Is w id e ly  d if fe re n t  In so fa r  as I t  depends on which o f  th e ir  
passions are dominant (55).
The l i s t  o f  appa ren tly  c o n tra d ic to ry  sta tem ents made by Hobbes on 
e q u a lity  could  continue.
T h is  s itu a t io n  has prompted one unsym pathetic reader to  a llege  th a t 
Hobbes's e n t ire  argument on n a tu ra l e q u a lity  Is “ conspicuously 
unsound" and to  c la im  th a t the  d iffe re n c e s  on the  to p ic  th a t e x is t  
between Elements o f  Law , De Cive and Leviathan  “ c o n tr ib u te  to  the 
e ros ion  o f  I ts  c r e d ib i l i t y "  (56).
(52) Consider the  9 th  Law o f  na tu re  : “ -. I f  na tu re  th e re fo re  have 
made men equal, th a t e q u a lity  Is to  be acknowledged; o r I f  
na tu re  have made men unequal ye t because men th a t th in k  
themselves equal, w i l l  no t e n te r In to  co nd itio n s  o f  peace, but 
upon equal terms, such e q u a lity  must be adm itted ". Leviathan, p. 
141; De Cive, p. 39; Elements o f  Law, p. 103.
(53) “ [men] w i l l  ha rd ly  be lieve  the re  be many so w ise as themselves; 
fo r  they see th e ir  own w it  a t hand, and o th e r men's a t a 
d istance. But th is  p roveth  ra th e r th a t men are In th a t p o in t 
equal, than unequal. For the re  Is not o rd in a r i ly  a g rea te r s ign  
o f  the equal d is t r ib u t io n  o f  any th ing , than th a t every man Is 
contented w ith  h is  share", Leviathan, p. 111.
(54) Ib id
(55) “The causes o f  the d iffe re n c e  o f  w its , are In the  passions; and 
the d iffe re n c e  o f  passions proceedeth, p a r t ly  from the d if fe re n t  
c o n s t itu t io n  o f  the body, and p a r t ly  from  d if fe re n t  education". 
Leviathan, p. 61.
“The d iffe re n c e  th e re fo re  o f  w it  hath I ts  o r ig in a l from the 
d if fe re n t  passions, and from the  ends to  which th e ir  a p p e tite  
leadeth them". Elements o f  Law, p. 49.
(56) Gary B. H erbert, ‘Thomas Hobbes's c o u n te r fe it  e q u a lity '.  Southern  
Journa l o f  Philosophy, vo l. 14, F a ll 1976, pp. 269-82, p. 271.
-  65 -
O ther c r i t ic s  Instead have a ttem pted  (and to  some e x te n t succeeded) 
to  organ ize  d if fe re n t  s ta tem ents th a t Hobbes makes on e q u a lity  In a 
coherent d iscourse  “ by making a ra th e r generous In te rp re ta t io n  o f  
what Is being said, o r by augmenting I t  w ith  hypotheses In the s p i r i t  
o f  h is  ph ilosophy" (57).
However the p re v a ilin g  tendency among Hobbes's commentators 
fo llo w ed  by scho la rs  as d if fe re n t  as G auth ier (58) and T ro n tl (59)- 
has been to  concentra te  on a p a r t ic u la r  cla im  on e q u a lity  th a t Hobbes 
made c o n s is te n tly  and repea ted ly  In a l l  h is  p o l i t ic a l  works 
namely the equal a b i l i t y  o f  men to  k i l l -  and to  Ignore a l l  h is  o the r 
s ta tem ents on e q u a lity .
On th is  p o in t th is  d is s e r ta t io n  s h a ll not dev ia te  from  the  mainstream 
and thus s h a ll focus a l l  the  a tte n tio n  on the e q u a lity  to  k i l l  o f  
Hobbeslan men. The ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  th is  choice Is th a t Hobbes was 
convinced, as we w i l l  show la te r  on, th a t the equal dangerousness o f  
people Is an e s s e n tia l form  o f  e q u a lity , the  basis o f  a l l  e q u a lit ie s .
11.3.3 E q u a lity  to  k i l l  In Elements o f  Law, De Cive, and Leviathan
Whereas on people's e q u a lity  o f  prudence, wisdom and w it  Hobbes made 
some c o n tra d ic to ry  remarks th roughou t the  pages o f  h is  works, he
(57) Joel K idder, ‘Acknowledgements o f  equals: Hobbes's n in th  law o f  
n a tu re ’ . P h ilosoph ica l Q ua rte rly , vo l. 33, no. 131, pp. 133-46, 
p. 141.
(58) David P. G auth ier, The Log ic  o f  Leviathan. The moral and 
p o l i t ic a l  theo ry  o f  Thomas Hobbes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, 
p. 15.
(59) Mario T ro n tl, ‘Hobbes e Cromwell*, In Mario T ro n tl (ed.), S tato  e 
R ivo luzione  in In g h ilte rra ,  M ilano, I I  Sagglatore, 1977, pp. 185- 
327.
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he never wavered on the equal v u ln e ra b il i ty  o f  men. He m aintained 
c o n s is te n tly  and d e c is iv e ly  th a t In a s ta te  o f  war no man, however 
s tro ng , can fe e l safe.
In Elements o f  Law he p o in ts  ou t the  "g re a t f a c i l i t y "  o f  — and "the  
l i t t l e  fo rc e " needed In — k i l l in g  a man and d e rives  from  I t  the 
e q u a lity  o f  men. He w r ite s  :
... I f  we cons ide r w ith  how g rea t f a c i l i t y  he th a t Is the  weaker In 
s tre n g th  o r In w it,  o r In both, may u t te r ly  des troy  the power o f  
the  s tro n g e r, s ince the re  needeth but l i t t l e  fo rce  to  the tak ing  
away o f  a man's l i fe ;  we may conclude th a t men considered In mere 
natu re , ought to  adm it amongst themselves e q u a lity ; and th a t he 
th a t c la lm e th  no more, may be esteemed moderate <60).
In De Civet too, Hobbes h ig h lig h ts  the  f r a g i l i t y  o f  the  human frame 
and makes the  e q u a lity  o f  people depend on I t :
I f  we look on men f u l l  grown, and consider how b r i t t l e  the  frame 
o f  our human body Is -  and how easy a m a tte r I t  Is, even fo r  the 
weakest man to  k i l l  the s tro n g e s t, the re  Is no reason why any man 
tru s t in g  to  h is  own s tre n g th  should conceive h im s e lf made by 
n a tu re  above o th e rs  (61).
The same view  th a t people can e a s ily  k i l l  each o th e r Is repeated In 
Chapter X I I I  o f  Levia than  :
Nature hath made men so equal. In the fa c u lt ie s  o f  the body, and 
mind; as th a t though the re  be found one man m a n ife s tly  s tro n g e r In 
body, o r o f  qu icke r mind than another; ye t when a l l  Is reckoned 
toge the r, the  d iffe re n c e  between man, and man. Is no t so
(60) Elements o f  Law, p. 70.
(61) De Cive, p. 45.
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considerab le  ... the  weakest has s tre n g th  enough to  k i l l  the 
s tro n g e s t (62)
The above q u o ta tio n s , taken re s p e c tiv e ly  from  Elements o f  Law, De 
Cive, and Levia than, show th a t  Hobbes never doubted th a t people In 
na tu re  are e q u a llv  able  to  k i l l  each o the r. Thus In Chapter 6 o f  th is  
d is s e r ta t io n  th is  view  w i l l  be taken as one o f  the assumptions 
common to  a l l  th re e  h is  p o l i t ic a l  works.
11.3.4 E q u a lity  to  k i l l  as a fundam ental form  o f  e q u a lity
Hobbes f e l t  th a t  the  e q u a lity  to  k i l l  was the  e q u a lity  th a t re a lly  
m attered, the  bas is  o f  a l l  e q u a lit ie s . In the  De Give he w rite s :
... they are  equal Is who can doe equal I th in g s  one aga in s t the o ther; 
bu t they who can do the  g re a te s t th in g , (namely k i l l )  can doe 
equal I th in g s  (63)
Prima fa c ie  Hobbes's c la im  th a t “ they who can do the g re a te s t th ing  
(namely k i l l )  can doe equal I th in g s ” sounds ra th e r s trange. Although 
I t  may be accepted th a t people are e q u a lly  vu lnerab le , I t  may be 
contended th a t In e q u a lit ie s  In o th e r f ie ld s  o f  comparison (such as 
science, wisdom, s p o rt, e tc .) are  more d e c is ive  thereby lending 
support to  the  A r is to te l ia n  view o f  n a tu ra l m asters and slaves. 
However, from  the  vantage p o in t a ffo rd e d  by sec. 11.2, I t  Is possib le  
to  exp la in  Hobbes's c la im  th a t the  equal dangerousness o f  people Is 
the basis o f  a l l  e q u a lity .
In fa c t,  s ince the  Id e n t ity  o f  the  Hobbeslan man Is motion, which
(62) Leviathan, p. 110.
(63) De Cive, p. 45.
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generates a l l  c o g n it iv e  and phys ica l powers, I t  fo llo w s  th a t the 
power o f  not los ing  h is  Id e n t ity  (I.e. the source o f  a l l  h is  o the r 
powers) Is the most basic power o f  man.
T here fo re  k i l l in g  Is the  "g re a te s t th in g "  th a t a man-motlon can 
p e rp e tra te  aga ins t another, no t because I t  Im plies the g re a te s t o f  
powers In the m urderer (on the  co n tra ry , as we saw above, according 
to  Hobbes k i l l in g  takes ve ry  l i t t l e  e f f o r t )  but because I t  e n ta ils  
the a n n ih ila t io n  o f  m otion (and thus o f  Id e n t ity )  In the  v ic t im  and 
thus prevents the p roduc tion  o f  any fu r th e r  form  o f  power .
11.3.5 E q u a lity  to  k i l l  as the  p re con d ition  o f  the  s o c ia l co n tra c t
Having argued why Hobbes the P hilosopher m ainta ined th a t the  e q u a lity  
to  k i l l  was a fundam ental form  o f  e q u a lity  fo r  men-mot Ion, what 
remains to  be c la r i f ie d  Is why Hobbes the P o l i t ic a l T h e o ris t agreed 
In conside ring  men's equal dangerousness as c ru c ia l.
The reason Is p la in  : I f  people were not e q u a lly  dangerous — as
Hobbes presumed — the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  would be a s ta te  o f  peace, 
ru le d  by the most pow erfu l; s tro n g e r people would never agree to  lay 
down th e ir  r ig h t  to  a l l  th ing s , the re  would be no s o c ia l co n tra c t, no 
basis fo r  equal r ig h ts ,  no Hobbes's theory.
There are many passages In Hobbes's works In which he recognizes 
th a t h is  theo ry  o f  the  s o c ia l c o n tra c t Is p red ica ted  on the 
hypothesis o f  the equal dangerousness and v u ln e ra b il i ty  o f  men.
Hobbes openly acknowledged th a t I f  some people were s tro n g e r than 
the re s t the re  would be "no cause" (I.e. ra t io n a l ju s t i f ic a t io n )  fo r  
them to  lay down th e ir  n a tu ra l r ig h t  to  a l l  th in g s  :
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Now I f  any man had so fa m e  exceeded the re s t In power, th a t a l l  
o f  them w ith  jo in e d  fo rces  could  not have re s is te d  him, the re  had 
been no cause why he should p a rt w ith  th a t r ig h t  th a t na tu re  had 
g iven him (64).
In a l l  th ree  p o l i t ic a l  works, the f i r s t  law o f  na tu re  (from  which a l l  
o th e r laws o f  n a tu re  fo llo w  (65)) re s ts  e n t ir e ly  on the  hypothesis o f  
people 's equal dangerousness. We read f i r s t  In Elements o f  Law:
But s ince I t  Is supposed from the e q u a lity  o f  s tre n g th  and o the r 
n a tu ra l fa c u lt ie s  o f  men, th a t no man Is o f  m ight s u f f ic ie n t ,  to  
assure h im s e lf fo r  any long tim e, o f  p reserv ing  h im s e lf thereby, 
w h ils t  he rem alneth In the s ta te  o f  h o s t i l i t y  and war; reason 
th e re fo re  d lc ta te th  to  every man, fo r  h is  own good, to  seek a f te r  
peace, as fa r  fo r th  as the re  Is hope to  a t ta in  the same (66). 
then In De Cive :
... ye t cannot men expect any la s tin g  p rese rva tion  con tinu ing  thus In 
the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  (I.e .) o f  War, by reason o f  th a t e q u a lity  o f  
power, and o th e r humane fa c u lt ie s  they are endued w ith  a ll.  
W herefore to  seek Peace ... Is the d ic ta te  o f  r ig h t  Reason (67) 
and f in a l ly  in Levia than
... Cln the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re ] the re  can be no s e c u r ity  to  any man, how 
s tro ng  o r w ise soever he be, o f  l iv in g  ou t o f  the tim e,which natu re  
o rd in a r i ly  a llo w e th  men to  live . And consequently I t  Is a precept, 
o r genera l ru le  o f  reason, th a t every man ought to  endeavour peace.
(64) De Cive, p. 186; emphasis added.
(65) the  re s t [o f  the  laws o f  na tu re ] are d e r iv 'd  from th is  
[fundam ental law], and they d ire c t the wayes e ith e r  to  Peace, o r 
se lf-d e fe n c e ", ib id ,  p. 53.
(66) Elements o f  Law, p. 74.
(67) De Cive, p. 50.
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consequently I t  Is a precept, o r general ru le  o f  reason, th a t every 
man oughth to  endeavour peace, as fa r  as he has hope o f  ob ta in ing  
I t  (68).
From the above q uo ta tio n s , we can see th a t I f  people were unequal In 
th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  k i l l .  I t  would not be ra t io n a l fo r  them e ith e r  to  lay
down th e ir  r ig h t  to  a l l  th in g s  o r to  en te r the  s o c ia l con trac t. Such
Is the  dependence o f  Hobbes's theo ry  o f  equal r ig h ts  on the
hypothes is  o f  equal dangerousness.
To summarize th is  se c tion , as fa r  as the fundam ental power o f  men- 
mot Ion Is concerned — namely the power to  m a in ta in  one's motion and 
to  oppose and d es tro y  o th e r motions, Hobbes f in d s  no d iffe re n ce s  
across In d iv id u a ls . In some men power comes to  a la rg e r ex te n t from 
the s tre n g l/th  o f  th e ir  body. In o the rs  from th e ir  minds, but the
outcome Is the same; men- motion are equa lly  vu lne rab le  and equa lly  
dangerous one fo r  the  o the r.
(68) Leviathan, p. 117.
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F* Si t  I I
THE MEANING OF GLORY IN HOBBES'S 
POLITICAL WRITINGS
I t  may be u s e fu l to  th in k  o f  c r i t ic s  as people d ire c t in g  search
lig h ts  a t ph ilosophe rs ' th e o rie s  — fo r  any fe a tu re  th a t  th e ir  beams
revea l, many o th e rs  are  put In the  shadow. I fe e l th a t in th is  
ce n tu ry  th ree  c r i t ic s  have been la rg e ly  respons ib le  fo r  the 
I llu m in a tio n  and e c lip se  o f  Hobbes's concept o f  g lo ry : Leo S trauss 
h ig h lig h te d  I t  In 1936 (1) whereas Macpherson (2) and M cNeilly (3) 
ob fuscated  I t  In the  1960s. W hile i t  is  easy to  n o tice  what fea tu re s  
an In te rp re te r 's  to rch  has pu t In to  r e l ie f ,  I t  Is much more d i f f i c u l t  
to  assess what o th e r aspects I t  has obscured.
Thus, whereas th e re  Is l i t t l e  disagreement In recogn iz ing  S trauss as 
the  most pe rcep tive  scho la r o f  Hobbes's concept o f  g lo ry , I fe a r th a t 
th e re  Is much less consensus In Im puting to  M cN eilly  and Macpherson 
the  re s p o n s ib il ity  o f  obscuring  th a t concept.
Yet In my view th e ir  re s p o n s ib il ity  has been considerable.
On the  one hand Macpherson has had the m e rit to  make us aware o f
some bourgeois t r a i t s  o f  the  Hobbeslan man — and th is  Is no l i t t l e
(1 ) Leo S trauss, The P o l i t ic a l Philosophy o f  Hobbes, I t s  bas is  and i t s  
genesiSf U n iv e rs ity  o f  Chicago Press, Phoenix Books: Chicago and 
London, 1963 ( f i r s t  pub lished  in 1936).
(2) C.B. Macpherson, The P o l i t ic a l Theory o f  Possessive Ind iv idua lism , 
Hobbes to  Locke, O xford U n iv e rs ity  Press: London, 1962.
(3) F.S. M cNeilly, The Anathomy o f  Leviathan, Macmillan: London, 1968.
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m e rit. However, as g lo ry  Is not an e x c lu s iv e ly  bourgeois value, but
Instead has Thucydldean and even b ib l ic a l aspects and can even 
be considered as a fe a tu re  o f  tim e less  human na tu re , Macpherson 
b e l i t t le s  I ts  s ig n if ic a n c e  In Hobbes's co n s tru c tio n  and s h if ts  the 
emphasis from  g lo ry  (thus moving I t  from  the ce n tre -s ta g e  p o s itio n  
In which S trauss had placed I t )  to  gain, p rope rty , greed, and
accumu la t Ion.
On h is  p a rt, M cN eilly  has had the  m e rit to  warn Hobbes's readers th a t 
they should no t make “m arve llous om e le ttes" o f  Hobbes's "broken eggs” 
and should acknowledge some changes th a t e x is t  between Hobbes's 
p o l i t ic a l  works. The cons iderab le  l im ita t io n  o f  h is  book Is th a t I t  
seems more In te re s te d  In sco ring  In te rp ré tâ t Ive p o in ts  aga inst 
scho la rs  lik e  L a ird  and Peters than In a ttem p ting  to  o f fe r  the reader 
an o b je c tive  account o f  the v a r ia t io n s  th a t e x is t  between Hobbes's 
works. As a re s u lt ,  M cN eilly  has exaggerated the d iffe re n c e s  on g lo ry  
between the Elements o f  Law, De Cive, and Levia than  and has been 
sometimes h ig h ly  s e le c tiv e  In h is  choice o f  quo ta tions .
In th is  p a rt o f  the  d is s e r ta t io n  I s h a ll not p rov ide  a b low -by-b low  
account o f  the  p o in ts  where I be lieve  Macpherson's and M cN elily 's  
In te rp re ta t io n s  to  be Inco rrec t. The c r it ic is m  o f  th e ir  views w i l l  be
Im plied ra th e r than e x p l ic i t ly  s ta te d . In the  next chapters I t  s h a ll
be argued. In In d ire c t c o n tra p o s itio n  to  Macpherson, th a t Hobbes had 
placed fa r  more emphasis on the  human des ire  o f  g lo ry  than on greed 
and th a t Indeed In many Instances he considered the  s t r iv in g  fo r  
possession as a mere means fo r  the  experiencing o f  g lo ry . I t  s h a ll 
a lso  be argued. In c o n tra s t to  McNe l i l y 's  th e s is , th a t a lthough In the 
Elements o f  Law, De Cive and Levia than  one can d e te c t some
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d iffe re n c e s  on g lo ry  th a t may suggest a change In Hobbes's philosophy 
o f  man, the re  are  conspicuous and s u b s ta n tia l s im i la r i t ie s  In the ro le  
assigned by Hobbes to  g lo ry  In h is  p o l i t ic a l  th e o ry .(4)
(4) In the fo llo w in g  th re e  chap te rs  I s h a ll re fe r  again to  the 
d is t in c t io n  between Hobbes's “ ph ilosophy” and “ p o l i t ic a l  the o ry ” . 
By the  form er I mean Hobbes's conception o f  man and e sp e c ia lly  
h is  theo ry  o f  the  passions, as presented In the  f i r s t  th lr te e e n  
chapters o f  Elements o f  Law and In the  f i r s t  tw e lve  chapters o f  
Leviathan; by the la t te r  Instead I mean Hobbes's ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  
p o l i t ic a l o b lig a tio n , h is  d iagnos is  o f  the  causes o f  c o n f l ic t ,  
s e d itio n , and c iv i l  war and h is  view on the fu n c tio n s  o f  the 
S tate .
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C M / K R T E R  I I I
GLORY IN E L E M E N T S  O F  L A W
111.1 INTRODUCTION; 111.2 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF GLORY: 111.2.1
G lory, Vain G lory, and False G lory; 111.2.2 G lo ry as P leasure and 
G lo ry  as A pp e tite ; 111.2.3 B e n e fic ia l and D e trim en ta l G lory; 111.2.4 
D e sc rip tive  and Value-Loaded Terms; I I I . 2.5 G lo ry and F e lic ity ;  I I I . 2.6 
G lory, Honour, Use, and Worth; 111.2.7 G lory and S e lf-P re se rva tio n ;
111.3 VARIATIONS ON GLORY: 111.3.1 G lory, Madness, and Melancholy;
111.3.2 G lory, S e n s u a lit ie s , Riches, and Knowledge; 111.3.3 G lory, 
Magnanim ity, C h a rity , and Laughter; 111.3.4 Are There Non-G lory- 
Seekers? 111.4 GLORY AND POLITICS: 111.4.1 G lory, Men, and Bees; 111.4.2 
G lo ry  and the S ta te  o f  Nature; 111.4.3 G lory, Honour, and the 
P o l i t ic a l S ta te ; 111.4.4 G lory, Am bition, and C iv i l  War; I I I . 5 
CONCLUSION.
111.1 INTRODUCTION
Even considering  the  lengthy passages devoted to  the e lu c id a tio n  o f  
man's passions and happiness In Thomas W hite 's De Mundo Examined (1 ) 
and In De Homine, the  most complete e xpo s itio n  o f  Hobbes's philosophy 
o f  man Is s t i l l  to  be found In Elements o f  Law.
Resuming my account o f  Hobbes's philosophy o f  man from where I had 
le f t  I t  In Chapter I I  — namely from  the d e f in it io n  o f  man-motlon — 
we may n o tice  th a t according to  Hobbes the d ire c t io n  o f  each man- 
m otlon Is determ ined by two opposing fo rces: an a t t r a c t iv e  fo rce
(ca lle d  "a p p e tite ")  th a t  leads men towards what they perceive as
(1 ) Thomas Hobbes, Thomas U n ite 's  De Mundo Examined, w r it te n  In L a tin  
probably between 1642 and 1643; f i r s t  pub lished (In  L a tin ) by 
L ib ra ir ie  P hilosophique J.V rln , Paris  In 1973; f i r s t  pub lished In 
Eng lish  by B rad fo rd  U n iv e rs ity  Press: London, 1976 and ed ite d  by 
Harold W. Jones; see e s p e c ia lly  chapters xxx, x x x l l - x x x l l l ,  
x x x v l l - x x x v l l l  (hence fo rth  re fe rre d  to  as A nti-W h ite ).
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being conducive to  e ith e r  m a in ta in ing  o r augmenting th e ir  power 
(thereby ensuring  th e ir  Id e n t ity  as men-motlons) and a re p u ls ive  
fo rce  (ca lle d  “ ave rs ion ” ) th a t d r ive s  them away from  what they see as 
causing e ith e r  s t i l ln e s s  o r loss o f  power (thereby des tro y in g  th e ir  
Id e n tity ) .  The focus o f  th is  Chapter Is the a n a lys is  o f  the Hobbes Ian 
In d iv id u a l's  a p p e tite  to  Increase h is  power — what In Elements o f  Law 
Hobbes c a lls  “ g lo ry ” . O ther key components o f  Hobbes's philosophy o f 
man, such as man's avers ion  fo r  death, h is  r a t io n a li ty ,  e tc, s h a ll 
a lso  be examined here, bu t on ly  In so fa r  as they are re le van t fo r  a 
f u l l  understand ing o f  the  human des ire  fo r  g lo ry  and thus In a 
cu rso ry  way.
I I I . 2 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF GLORY
In Elements o f  Law the  p leasure  o f  observing one's power In a tta in in g  
one's o b je c tive s  Is ca lle d  by Hobbes “ g lo ry ” .
As the speed o f  a horse running on a beach depends on the opposing 
powers th a t h inder I ts  movements (surface, wind, e tc .), so Hobbes 
m a in ta ins  th a t the power o f  man-motlon to  achieve h is  o b jec tive s  Is 
no t abso lu te , but determ ined by the  d iffe re n c e  w ith  the power o f  
o th e r men:
And because the  power o f  one man re s ls te th  and h lndere th  the 
e ffe c ts  o f  the power o f  another : power s im ply Is no more, but the 
excess o f  the power o f  one above th a t o f  another. For equal powers 
opposed, des troy  one another-. (2)
(2) Elements o f  Law, p. 34.
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Thus, a more p rec ise  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  g lo ry  is  the p leasure  o f  supe rio r 
power w ith  respect to  o the rs ; in Hobbes's words:
GLORY, o r in te rn a l g lo ^ t io n  o r trium ph o f  the mind, is th a t
passion which proceedeth from  the im agination  o r conception o f  our 
own power, above the power o f  him th a t contendeth w ith  us (3)
The aim o f  th is  se c tion  is  to  e s ta b lis h  the meaning o f  g lo ry  in 
Elements o f  Law. Th is  e n ta ils  c la r i fy in g  the  d is t in c t io n  between
g lo ry , fa ls e  g lo ry , va in  g lo ry  <111.2.1 ), e s ta b lis h in g  when g lo ry  is  a 
p leasure  and when an a p p e tite  ( I I I . 2.2), d iscuss ing  b e n e fic ia l and
d e tr im e n ta l g lo ry  ( I I I . 2.3), d is t in g u is h in g  p rid e  from  ju s t  esteem 
(111.2.4); d esc rib ing  g lo ry  and f e l i c i t y  (111.2.4); ch a ra c te ris in g  
g lo ry  v is -à - v is  such concepts as honour, use, and w orth  (111.2.6), 
e xp la in in g  the  re la t io n  between g lo ry , reason, and s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  
(111.2.7).
111.2.1 G lory, Vain G lory, and False G lory
In Elements o f  Law Hobbes compares th ree  form s o f  g lo ry , namely 
"g lo ry ", “ va in  g lo ry " , and " fa ls e  g lo ry "  and prov ides two c r i te r ia  to
d is t in g u is h  between them. As both c r i te r ia  are re le va n t not on ly fo r  
the d iscuss ion  o f  g lo ry  as opposed to  va in  and fa ls e  g lo ry , but a lso  
fo r  the  d is t in c t io n  between g lo ry  as p leasure and g lo ry  as a pp e tite , 
i t  is  w orth  examining them in some d e ta il.
One c r i te r io n  suggested by Hobbes to  d is t in g u is h  between g lo ry , va in  
g lo ry , and fa ls e  g lo ry  is  by cons ide ring  whether these passions are
(3) Ibid., pp. 36-7.
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based on e ith e r  re a l o r Im aginary ac tions  ; i f  one's fe e lin g  o f  
s u p e r io r i ty  is  grounded on re a l achievements, Hobbes says, the 
d e r iv in g  p leasure is  “ g lo ry ” ; i f  a c tions  are not re a l, and thus power 
is m erely imagined e ith e r  by the  g lo ry -se eke r o r by h is  adu la to rs , 
then the re s u lt in g  p leasure  is  f ic t i t io u s  and is  e ith e r  “ va in g lo ry ” 
( i f  i t  de rives  e n t ir e ly  from  one's Indu lg ing  in fa n c ifu l though ts) or 
“ fa ls e  g lo ry ” ( i f  i t  stems from  a d u la tio n  by o the rs). He w r ite s  :
Th is  im ag ination  o f  our power and worth, may be an assured and 
c e rta in  experience o f  our own actions, and then is  th a t g lo ry in g  
ju s t  and w e ll grounded ». The same passion may proceed not from 
any conscience o f  our own actions, but from  fame and t r u s t  o f  
o the rs , whereby one may th in k  w e ll o f  h im se lf, and ye t be deceived; 
and th is  is  FALSE GLORY ». The f ic t io n  (which a lso  is  im ag ination) 
o f  ac tions  done by ourse lves, which never were done, ». is  ca lled  
VAIN GLORY: and i t  is  e sem p lified  in the fa b le  by the  f l y  s i t t in g  
on the ax le  tre e , and saying to  h im se lf. What a dust do I ra ise ! (4) 
A second c r i te r io n  ind ica ted  by Hobbes to  d i f fe re n t ia te  between g lo ry  
and va in  and fa ls e  g lo ry  re fe rs  to  “ a s p ir in g ” . A sp ir in g  is  the urge to  
a c t and to  augment one's power in  the world. Hobbes observes th a t 
whereas g lo ry  engenders a s p ir in g , namely spurs people to  act so as to  
experience new g lo ry , va in  g lo ry  instead induces in a c tion  since no 
e f f o r t  o r achievement in the  w o rld  is  needed in o rder to  repeat a t 
one's w i l l  the mental p leasure  o f  va in  g lo ry .
g lo ry in g  ju s t  and w e ll grounded .« b eg e tte th  an op in ion o f  
increasing  the same by o th e r a c tion s  to  fo llo w ; in which co ns is te th
(4) Ibid,, p. 37.
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the  a p p e tite  which we c a ll ASPIRING, o r proceeding from  one degree 
o f  power to  another [va in  g lo ry ] bege tte th  no a p p e tite  nor 
endeavour to  any fu r th e r  a ttem pt, I t  Is m erely va in  and 
u n p ro fita b le  <5)
False g lo ry  on the o the r hand, a lthough Inducing a s p ir in g  lik e  g lo ry , 
b rin g s  about insuccess because the a b i l i t y  o f  the agent is  on ly  
Imagined and not rea l:
fa ls e  g lo ry  the a s p ir in g  consequent th e re to  p rocure th  I I  l -  
success (6)
111.2.2 G lory as p leasure  and g lo ry  as a p p e tite
The two c r i t e r ia  o f  " re a l a c tio n s " and "a s p ir in g " examined above are 
u s e fu l no t ju s t  fo r  the reason Ind ica ted  by Hobbes, namely fo r  
d i f fe re n t ia t in g  between g lo ry , va in  g lo ry , and fa ls e  g lo ry ; they are 
a lso  re le van t fo r  recogn is ing  In the Hobbes Ian concept o f  g lo ry  the 
dua l aspect o f  both a p leasure  and an a pp e tite . The c r i te r io n  o f 
"a s p ir in g "  t e l ls  us th a t g lo ry  co ns is ts  In d e s ir in g  fu tu re  v ic to r ie s . 
In a ttem p ting  to  ob ta in  them. I t  cha rac te rizes  g lo ry  as an a p p e tite . 
On the o the r hand, the c r i te r io n  o f  " re a l a c tio n s ” t e l ls  us th a t 
g lo ry  co ns is ts  In looking back a t our achievements. In adm iring our 
own past performances. In o th e r words. I t  cha rac te rizes  g lo ry  as a 
pleasure.
Thus fo r  Hobbes g lo ry  means both the p leasure and the d es ire  o f  
s u p e r io r ity .  Th is  may be confusing  a t tim es (see below the  d iscuss ion
(5) Ib id,
(6) Ib id.
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o f  g lo ry  and f e l ic i t y ) ,  bu t by re fe r r in g  to  the  two c r i te r ia  o f  
"a s p ir in g "  and " re a l a c tio n s " I t  is  poss ib le  to  so lve  some am b igu ities  
o f  Hobbes's te x t.
111.2.3 B e n e fic ia l and D e trim en ta l G lory
A lthough the  words "b e n e f ic ia l"  and "d e tr im e n ta l"  g lo ry  do not occur 
In Hobbes's w r it in g s ,  from  a reading o f  Elements o f  Law I t  appears 
th a t Hobbes considered some forms o f  g lo ry  as d e tr im e n ta l fo r  the 
human race, o th e rs  as b e n e fic ia l.
In Chapters 4- and 10, fo r  example, the  des ire  o f  g lo ry  and honour Is 
shown to  spur people to  perfo rm  to  th e ir  best thereby developing 
those passions and fa c u lt ie s  th a t are s p e c if ic  to  man, ranging from 
c u r io s ity  to  reason, from  language to  deductive  thought. Here Is how 
Hobbes describes the  mechanics whereby a man can be Induced to  
b e tte r  h im s e lf by the  d e s ire  o f  honour :
As when a man, from  the thought o f  honour to  which he has an 
a p p e tite , cometh to  the  though t o f  wisdom, which Is the  next means 
th e re to ; and from  thence to  the though t o f  s tudy, which Is the next 
means to  wisdom, e tc . [...] where honour, to  which a man hath 
a p p e tite , maketh him to  th in k  upon the next means o f  a tta in in g  I t ,  
and th a t again o f  the  next, &c. as men hunt a f te r  riches, place or 
knowledge <7)
For Hobbes the p leasures o f  the senses are d e le te r io u s  In so fa r  as 
they d is t ra c t  the  mind from  the d es ire  o f  honour and g lo ry  (on g lo ry
(7) /b/d., pp. 13-4.
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and honour, see in fra )  and thus hinder the development o f  man's
c o g n it iv e  powers:
S en su a lity  ... take th  away the in c lin a tio n  to  observe such th ings  as 
conduce to  honour; and consequently maketh men less cu rious, and 
less am bitious, whereby they less consider the  way e ith e r  to  
knowledge o r to  o th e r power; in which two co n s is te th  a l l  the 
exce llency o f  power c o g n it iv e  (8)
On the  o th e r hand, the  type o f  g lo ry  th a t Hobbes seems to
d isapprove o f  is  va in  and fa ls e  g lo ry ; in p a r t ic u la r  he seems to
condemn the va in  o r fa ls e  g lo ry  o f  those who w ith o u t e f f o r t  o r 
labour th in k  themselves w ise r than the re s t, and thus e n t it le d  to  
ru le  the l i f e  o f  o the rs , to  in s tru c t  them about what is  r ig h t  and 
wrong, to  co rre c t, change, and " innova te ” the government o f  a country. 
T h is  form  o f  g lo ry , Hobbes m ain ta ins, is  the source o f  c iv i l  war (9).
111.2.4- D e sc rip tive  and Value-Loaded Terms
A lthough in Elements o f  Law Hobbes shows to  consider va in  and fa ls e  
g lo ry  as d e tr im e n ta l to  the  human race, when he speaks o f  g lo ry  to u t 
c o u rt the re  is  no suggestion  th a t he is  re fe r r in g  to  a form  o f  g lo ry  
th a t is  unrese rved ly  b e n e fic ia l to  men.
In Chapter 9 o f  Elements o f  Law he exp la ins th a t "g lo ry ” is  a
d e s c r ip t iv e  and v a lu e -fre e  word th a t s im p ly  describes the 
re la t io n s h ip  between one's fe e lin g s  and one's ac tions ; and he no tices  
th a t "p r id e ” and " ju s t  esteem” are i t s  va lue-loaded  coun te rpa rts
(8) Ib id., p. 4-9.
(9) See In fra , se c tio n  111.4-.4.
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th a t describe  e ith e r  the  approving or the d isapprov ing  judgment o f  a 
man about o th e r people 's g lo ry in g . In h is  words :
and th is  passion [g lo ry ],  by them whom I t  d lsp lea se th  Is ca lled  
p ride : by them whom I t  p leaseth, I t  Is termed a ju s t  va lu a tio n  o f  
h im s e lf (10)
Keeping In mind the above d is t in c t io n  between g lo ry , p ride , and ju s t  
esteem, we may n o tice  th a t Hobbes u su a lly  re s o rts  to  the  v a lu e -fre e  
term  (I.e. “ g lo ry ” ) and reserves the  (nega tive ) va lu e - loaded vers ion  
(“ p r id e ” ) on ly  fo r  sp ec ia l occasions, as In the d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the 
fo llo w in g  law o f  na tu re :
fo r  peace sake na tu re  hath ordained th is  law. That every man 
acknowledge o th e r fo r  h is  equal. And the breach o f  th is  law. Is 
th a t we c a ll PRIDE (11)
111.2.5 G lory and F e lic i ty
In Elements o f  Law the unambiguous o b je c tive  o f  Hobbes Ian men Is to  
t r y  to  ob ta in  the p leasure  o f  su pe rio r power; th e ir  l i f e  Is compared 
by Hobbes to  a race which has “no o the r goal, nor o th e r garland but 
being fo rem ost” (12).
According to  Hobbes once people have achieved exce llence in one f ie ld  
they w i l l  tu rn  to  another “ as long as In any k ind  they th ink  
themselves behind any o th e r”  : 
as men a tta in  to  more riches, honours, o r o th e r power; so th e ir  
a p p e tite  c o n tin u a lly  groweth more and more; and when they are come
(10) Ibid., p. 37.
(11) Ib id ,  p. 88.
(12) Ib id ,  p. 47.
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to  the utm ost degree o f  one kind  o f  power, they pursue some o ther, 
as long as In any k ind  they th in k  themselves behind any o ther. Of 
those th e re fo re  th a t have a tta in e d  to  the h ighest o f  honour and 
riches, some have a ffe c te d  m astery In some a r t ;  as Nero In music 
and poetry, Commodus In the  a r t  o f  a g la d ia to r  (13)
The lin k  between g lo ry  and human happiness Is expla ined by Hobbes In 
terms o f  the  above mentioned race : w h ile  “ g lo ry ”  Is “ to  consider 
[o th e rs ] behind” , human “ f e l i c i t y ” cons is ts  In “ c o n tin u a lly  o u t-  
goClng] the next b e fo re ”  (14),
I f  we were to  judge the re la t io n s h ip  between g lo ry  and f e l ic i t y  
e n t ir e ly  on the  basis o f  the above quo ta tion , we would be bound to  
say th a t the d if fe re n c e  between the two Is th a t g lo ry  Is the 
p leasure  o f  looking back a t a success th a t has a lready been obtained 
and thus belongs to  the  past; f e l i c i t y  Instead Is the  p leasure o f 
p resent successes and as the p resent becomes Inexorably the  past, fo r  
the Hobbes Ian man the re  can be no f e l i c i t y  “ but In proceeding” (15). 
However, from our d iscuss ion  o f  the dual aspect o f  g lo ry  as pleasure 
and des ire , we may see th a t In the above q uo ta tio n  what Hobbes Is 
comparing w ith  f e l i c i t y  Is on ly  one fa ce t o f  g lo ry , namely g lo ry  as 
p leasure  — g lo ry -p le a s u re  does mean re s tin g  on past v ic to r ie s , w h ile  
f e l i c i t y  Is the s t r iv in g  fo r  fu tu re  v ic to r ie s .
But I f  we consider th a t g lo ry  Is a lso  an a p p e tite , th a t a lthough 
based on past a c tion s  I t  engenders “ a s p ir in g ” , I.e., the d es ire  fo r  new 
a c tion s  (and new g lo ry ), the  d is t in c t io n  between g lo ry  and f e l ic i t y
(13) Ibid., p. 30.
(14) Ibid., p. 48.
(15) Ib id., p. 30.
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captured by Hobbes's analogy w ith  a race is  incomplete. Indeed, lik e  
f e l ic i t y ,  g lo ry  too  d e rive s  from “ o u t-g o in g  the next b e fo re ” .
The c lue  to  d is t in g u is h in g  between g lo ry  and f e l i c i t y  is  no t th a t the 
form er co n s is ts  in looking back a t our achievements and the la t te r  in 
looking ahead a t fu tu re  v ic to r ie s ,  but ra th e r in the key word 
“ co n tin u a l ly".
Whereas f e l i c i t y  describes the continuous succession o f  ac tions  th a t 
form s a way o f  l i f e ,  g lo ry  exp la ins  each s in g le  ac tion ; whereas the 
la t te r  is  the m o tiv a tio n a l fo rce  behind any s p e c if ic  a c tion  and as 
such is  taken by Hobbes as being the g re a te s t a p p e tite  and pleasure 
o f  each agent, the  form er re fe rs  to  the observa tion  o f  a se rie s  o f  
a c tion s  by an e x te rn a l observer (or by the agent h im s e lf w h ile  tak ing  
a detached and re f le c t iv e  s tand-back) and, s ig n if ic a n t ly ,  is  never 
described by Hobbes as an end.
I I I . 2.6 G lory, Honour, Use, and Worth
A lthough in Elements o f  Law Hobbes never de fines e x p l ic i t ly  the 
re la t io n s h ip  between g lo ry  and honour, th e ir  connection can be
recons truc ted  q u ite  s tra ig h t fo rw a rd ly  from h is  argument.
The lin k  between g lo ry  and honour is  given by “ power” . Whereas g lo ry
is  the  re co g n itio n  by the agent o f  h is  own power, honour is fo r
Hobbes the re co g n itio n  o f  an agen t's  power by o th e r in d iv id u a ls . Thus 
g lo ry  and honour are two types o f  reac tion  to  an agent's  power
(re s p e c tiv e ly  by the agent h im s e lf and by o thers):
the acknowledgement o f  power is  ca lle d  HONOUR ... and to  honour a 
man (inw a rd ly  in the  mind) is  to  conceive o r acknowledge, th a t  th a t
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man hath the odds o r excess o f  power above him th a t contendeth or 
compareth h im se lf. C-.3 The s igns  o f  honour are those by which we 
perce ive  th a t one man acknowledgeth the power and worth o f  
a n o th e r(16)
A lthough they are both m irro rs  th a t r e f le c t  the  power o f  a person, 
g lo ry  and honour are d if fe re n t  m ir ro rs  In so fa r  as g lo ry  tends to  
en large  the p ro je c tio n  o f  ones's power w h ile  honour tends to  reduce 
I t ,  because
every man's passion welgheth heavy In h is  own scale, bu t not In the 
sca le  o f  h is  neighbour (17)
Hobbes does not suggest anywhere th a t the m ir ro r  o f  honour Is tru e r  
than the  m ir ro r  o f  g lo ry , nor th a t the tru e  Image o f  the  power o f  a 
person lie s  In some s o r t  o f  average o f  the two Images. What he does 
Is to  describe  a c r i te r io n  to  be used to  exp la in  d if fe re n t  degrees o f  
honour. The honour th a t we g ive  to  a man, he says, depends on h is  
value, and h is  va lue on the use th a t we can make o f  h is  n a tu ra l o r 
acqu ired  powers ("s tre n g th ” , "beauty o f  person” , "knowledge” , "r ic h e s ” , 
" n o b i l i t y ” , "good fo r tu n e ” , "a u th o r ity ” , e tc .);
and according to  the  s igns o f  honour and dishonour, so we estim ate  
and make the va lue and WORTH o f  a man. For so much w orth  Is every 
th in g , as a man w i l l  g ive  fo r  the  use o f  a l l  I t  can do (18)
T h is  suggests th a t the more u s e fu l are deemed by people c e rta in  
n a tu ra l c h a ra c te r ls t les o r acqu ired  s k i l ls ,  the h igher Is the value 
s o c ia lly  a t t r ib u te d  to  those In d iv id u a ls  who possess them and the 
g re a te r Is th e ir  honour.
(16) Fbid, pp. 34-5.
(17) Ib id ,  p. 92.
(18) Ib id., p. 35.
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According to  th is  lin e  o f  reasoning, the worth  and honour o f  an 
ug ly , poor and weak fo o l Is n i l .  Hobbes does not show concern fo r  h is 
ex is tence  nor does he seem c r i t i c a l  o f  the above c r i te r io n  which 
grounds honour and va lue on use. In many o f  h is  works (.Anti-W hite  
Included) though, Hobbes appears to  be s k e p tic a l o f  the people's 
a b i l i t y  to  app ly the  above c r i te r io n  c o rre c t ly, namely to  d iscern  
what Is t r u ly  p ro f i ta b le  and u n p ro fita b le ; he n o tice s  th a t people 
recognize sm all power and a tta ch  l i t t l e  honour to  men o f  science and 
ph ilosophy because they w rongly a t t r ib u te  l i t t l e  use fu lness to  th e ir  
a c t iv it ie s .
W hile the complete chain th a t re la te s  the In d iv id u a l to  o the rs  In 
Elements o f  Law goes from  g lo ry  to  power, from power to  use, from 
use to  w orth , and f in a l ly  from  w orth  to  honour, each lin k  In the 
chain Is not g iven equal prominence In Hobbes's argument which 
Instead emphasizes th ree  concepts (g lo ry , honour, and power) and does 
not lay much s tre s s  on the  rem aining two (worth and use).
I I I . 2.7 G lory and S e lf-P re se rva tio n
In Chapter xx x H I o f  A n ti-W h ite  Hobbes s ta te s  :
Of the  good th in g s  experienced by men, however, none can outweigh
the g re a te s t o f  the e v i l  ones, namely sudden death (19)
In a l l  h is  p o l i t ic a l  w r it in g s  Hobbes repeats the above view which 
Im plies th a t s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  Is more Im portant than g lo ry .
In A n ti-W h ite  Hobbes does not s p e ll ou t whether I t  Is the  agent's  or
(19) A nti-W h ite , p. 408.
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the  e x te rn a l obse rve r's  v iew po in t th a t Is being taken In a sse rting  
th a t g lo ry  cannot compensate fo r  death, nor does he s p e c ify  whether 
people are d rive n  away from  le th a l dangers by th e ir  passion, by 
reason, or by both.
In Elements o f  Law, Instead, Hobbes's stand on th is  p o in t Is c lea re r; 
he m a in ta ins th a t I t  Is the whole "n a tu re " o f  a man (by which he 
means both passions and reason since "reason Is no less o f  the 
na tu re  o f  man than passion” (20)) th a t u s u a lly  d rive s  him to  avoid 
death:
necess ity  o f  n a tu re  maketh men to  w i l l  and des ire  bonum s ib i,  th a t 
which Is good fo r  themselves , and to  avoid  th a t which Is h u r t fu l;  
but most o f  a l l  th a t te r r ib le  enemy o f  na ture , death, from  whom we 
expect both the  loss o f  a l l  power, and a lso  the g re a te s t b o d ily  
pains In the los ing  (21)
However, he n o tice s  th a t passions can sometime lead man to  reach a 
d if fe re n t  conclusion. In which case I t  Is reason th a t helps him 
understand th a t death Is the g re a te s t e v il.  He w r ite s  : 
and th is  [th e  whole way to  one's p re se rva tio n ] Is th a t good and [ I t s  
co n tra ry ] th a t e v il,  which not every man In passion c a lle th  so, but 
a l l  men by reason (22)
In Elements o f  Law I could  f in d  on ly  a couple o f  examples given by 
Hobbes In which passions would lead a man to  d ie  ra th e r than endure 
h u m ilia tio n :
Inasmuch as l i f e  I t s e l f  w ith  the co nd itio n  o f  enduring scorn. Is not
(20) Elements o f  Law, p. 75.
(21) Ib id ,  p. 71.
(22) Ib id ,  p. 94.
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esteemed w orth  the en joying, much less peace (23) 
fo r  though I t  be not hard, by re tu rn in g  e v il fo r  e v il,  to  make one's 
adversary d isp leased w ith  h is  own fa c t; ye t to  make him 
acknowledge the same. Is so d i f f i c u l t ,  th a t many a man had ra the r 
d ie  than do I t  (24)
The above q u o ta tio n s  p rovide  Instances o f  people w il l in g  to  d ie  to 
avoid d ishonour, bu t In Elements o f  Law the re  are no examples o f  men 
prepared to  d ie  In o rde r to  a t ta in  g lo ry  and honour. Th is Is no 
accident, but an Im p lica tio n  o f  Hobbes's d e f in it io n  o f  g lo ry . In fac t, 
as g lo ry  Is de fined  as the p leasure  o f  su p e rio r power. I t  fo llo w s  
th a t one must be a liv e  In o rde r to  experience I t .  Thus, whereas In 
the common use o f  language we speak o f  g lo r io u s  and noble deaths and 
dying seems sometimes the on ly  a va ila b le  means fo r  achieving g lo ry , 
the no tio n  o f  g lo r io u s  death makes no sense In Hobbes's term ino logy 
and Is Indeed never mentioned by Hobbes h im se lf.
A lthough Hobbes never th in ks  th a t honour can compensate fo r  loss o f 
l i fe .  In an Im portant passage o f  Part II  o f  Elements o f  Law he 
suggests th a t the “ danger” o r r is k  to  one's s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  can be 
o f fs e t  by “ honour, riches, and means whereby to  d e lig h t the mind” . 
R e fe rring  to  the sovere ign  power, he says ;
the Inconvenience a r is in g  from  government In genera l to  him th a t 
governeth, co n s is te th  p a r t ly  In the co n tin u a l care and tro u b le  
about the business o f  o th e r men, th a t are h is  sub jec ts ; and p a r tly  
In the danger o f  h is  person. For the head always Is th a t part, not 
on ly  where the care re s ld e th , but a lso aga ins t which the s troke  o f
(23) Ibid., p. 86.
(24) Ib id ,  p. 39.
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an enemy most commonly Is d ire c ted . To balance th is  Incommodlty, 
the sovere ign ty , tog e the r w ith  the n ecess ity  o f  th is  care and 
danger, comprehendeth so much honour, riches, and means whereby to  
d e lig h t the mind, as no p r iv a te  man's w ea lth  can a t ta in  unto (25)
111.3 VARIATIONS ON GLORY
In Elements o f  Law Hobbes argues th a t a l l  key human passions, as 
described In Chapter 9, de rive  from the p leasure o r d isp leasu re  th a t 
a man ob ta ins  In being honoured o r dishonoured, namely In g lo ry in g  
o r In de jec tion :
In the p leasure men have, o r d isp leasu re  from the  s igns o f  honour 
o r d ishonour done unto them, co n s is te th  the na tu re  o f  the passions 
In p a r t ic u la r ,  whereof we are to  speak In the next chapter (26)
Th is view combined w ith  the d e ta ile d  comparison o f  the  l i f e  o f  man 
to  a race w ith  “ no o the r goal, nor o th e r garland, bu t being fo rem ost” 
and added to  the Idea th a t human happiness co ns is ts  In con tinuous ly  
surpassing o the rs  seems to  Imply th a t g lo ry  Is the major a p p e tite  o f  
man and th a t he who Is n e ith e r e xc ite d  by the thought o f  some form 
o f  g lo ry  nor dejected by the fe a r o f  d ishonour f a l ls  sh o rt o f  
humanity. However, the re  are passages In Elements o f  Law th a t 
c o n tra d ic t the  above view. In so fa r  as Hobbes suggests th a t some 
people do not seek s u p e r io r ity ,  bu t would be content w ith  n a tu ra l 
e q u a lity . As th is  am b igu ity  p e rs is ts  In Hobbes's la te r  p o l i t ic a l  works, 
I t  Is w orth  paying some a tte n tio n  to  I ts  f i r s t  appearance In Elements
(25) Ibid., pp. 138-9,
(26) Ibid., p. 36.
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o f  Law,
In th is  se c tion  the  p rec ise  terms o f  th is  am b igu ity  w i l l  be explained; 
to  th is  end, and w ith o u t presuming to  o f fe r  an exhaustive  account o f  
the  whole range o f  In d iv id u a ls  described by Hobbes in Elements o f
Law, Hobbeslan men w i l l  be c la s s if ie d  according to  the fo llo w in g  
c r i te r ia :
( I )  the va ry ing  degree o f  in te n s ity  o f  th e ir  g lo ry in g ;
( ID  the d if fe re n t  f ie ld s ,  o r a c t iv i t ie s ,  which th e ir  des ire  o f
honour d ire c ts  them to;
( I I I )  the d if fe r e n t  ways In which they express th e ir  s u p e r io r ity ,
once they have achieved I t .
I I I . 3.1 G lory and Madness
A c r i te r io n  to  d i f fe re n t ia te  among Hobbeslan In d iv id u a ls  Is provided 
by the va ry ing  degree o f  In te n s ity  o f  th e ir  g lo ry in g .
Hobbes m a in ta ins th a t g lo ry in g  Is more Intense In some people than In 
o th e rs  and accounts fo r  th is  e n t ir e ly  on p h ys io lo g ica l grounds, 
namely on the basis o f  the more o r less adequate working o f  the
v i t a l  motion.
He c a lls  “madness” an excessive degree o f  g lo ry  and “m elancholy” an 
excessive degree o f  d e jec tio n  . We may desume th a t between these 
oppos ite  lie s  the  e n t ire  range o f  human characte r. He w r ite s  :
MADNESS ... Is no th ing  e lse  but excessive va in  g lo ry , o r vain 
d e je c tio n  (27)
(27) Ibid., p. 51.
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madness, and the degrees th e re o f proceedCsl from the excess o f  s e l f
opin ion ; so a lso  the re  be o th e r examples o f  madness, and the
degrees th e re o f proceeding from  too much va in  fe a r and 
d e je c t io n (28)
I I I . 3.2 G lory, Riches, Places o f  Power, Knowledge, and S en su a litie s
Another c r i te r io n  to  c la s s ify  Hobbeslan men re fe rs  to  the d if fe re n t  
f ie ld s ,  o r a c t iv i t ie s ,  to  which they are d ire c te d  by th e ir  des ire  o f  
honour.
In Elements o f  Law th re e  such f ie ld s  are mentioned repeated ly , namely 
riches, places o f  a u th o r ity ,  and knowledge. The way In which the
des ire  fo r  honour leads men to  acqu ire  knowledge and wisdom Is
described thus:
from the thought o f  honour to  which he has an a p p e tite , [a man] 
cometh to  the though t o f  wisdom, which Is the next means the re to ; 
and from  thence to  the thought o f  study, which Is the next means 
to  wisdom, e tc. [...] where honour, to  which a man hath a p p e tite , 
maketh him to  th in k  upon the  next means o f  a tta in in g  I t ,  and th a t 
again o f  the next, &c. as men hunt a f te r  riches, place o r knowledge 
(29)
S e n su a litie s  occupy a sp ec ia l place In Elements o f  Law; In so fa r  as 
they re fe r  to  p leasures o f  the body, they d is t ra c t  the  human mind 
from the d es ire  fo r  honour. In Hobbes's words:
S ensua lity  ... take th  away the  In c lin a t io n  to  observe such th in g s  as
(28) Ib id,, p. 52.
(29) Ibid., p. U .
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conduce to  honour; and consequently maketh men less curious, and 
le ^  am b itious , whereby they less consider the  way e ith e r  to  
knowledge o r to  o th e r power; in which two co ns is te th  a l l  the 
excellency o f  power c o g n it iv e  (30)
On the o th e r hand, in so fa r  as s e n s u a lit ie s  invo lve  a lso  a p leasure 
o f  the mind, the y  too  ( lik e  riches, p laces o f  a u th o r ity , and 
knowledge) are exp la ined  by Hobbes in terms o f  g lo ry in g . Lust, o r 
love, says Hobbes, Is the  pleasure o f  observ ing  our power in 
d e lig h tin g  another.
LUST .» is  a sensual p leasure, but not on ly  th a t; the re  is  in i t  
a lso a d e lig h t  o f  the  mind: fo r  i t  co n s is te th  o f  two a p p e tite s  
toge the r, to  please, and to  be pleased ; and the  d e lig h t men take 
in d e lig h tin g , is  not sensual, but a p leasure  o r jo y  o f  the mind, 
co ns is ting  in  the  Im agination  o f  the power they have so much to  
please (31)
As to the  problem why some people seek s e n s u a lit ie s  and o the rs  
knowledge, Hobbes's stand seems to  be th a t these d iffe re n c e s  de rive  
from  the d i f fe r e n t  working o f  the v i t a l  motion (32). He w rite s :
And i t  may w e ll be conjectured, th a t such passion [ fo r  sensual 
p leasure ] hath h is  beginn ing from a grossness and d i f f i c u l t y  o f  the 
motion o f  the  s p i r i t s  about the heart (33)
(30) Ib id ., p. 49.
(31) Ib id., p. 43.
(32) In Elem ents o f  Philosophy  instead Hobbes seems to  put down
the d if fe re n c e  in in te re s ts  to  a d iffe re n c e  in education -  a t 
least i f  we are a llow ed to  take s e r io u s ly  the fo llo w in g  
sta tem ent:
N e ith e r do vo lup tuous men neg lect philosophy, but only because 
they know no t how g rea t a pleasure i t  is  to  the mind o f  man
to  be rav ished  In the v igourous and pe rpe tua l embraces o f  the
most beauteous w orld  (E p is tle  to  the Reader, p. x lv ).
(33) Elements o f  Law, p. 50.
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As In Elements o f  Philosophy  Hobbes uses tim e to  measure and compare 
d if fe r e n t  motions, so In Elements o f  Law Hobbes re s o rts  to  the tlm e - 
dlmenslon to  I l lu s t r a te  the  d is s im ila r i t ie s  between the v i t a l  motions 
o f  people and th e ir  a t t ra c t io n s  towards p leasures as d if fe re n t  as 
s e n s u a lit ie s , riches, and knowledge. He argues th a t w h ile  some men 
are d riven  by th e ir  na tu re  to  look fo r  e a s ily  ob ta inab le  pleasures 
and thus to  Indulge In s e n s u a lit ie s , which “ please on ly  fo r  the 
p resen t" (34); o the rs  aim a t less f le e t in g  p leasures and thus asp ire  
a t riches, a u th o r ity ,  re p u ta tio n  which "have respect to  the 
fu tu r e " (35) and the  a tta inm ent o f  which re q u ires  long-te rm  p ro jec ts  
and e f fo r t ;  o the rs  f in a l ly  aim a t philosophy and knowledge which are 
ever la s tin g  p leasures which can be obta ined on ly  w ith  g re a t labours 
and tim e. In comparison to  which riches and places o f  a u th o r ity  "are 
bu t s e n s u a lity  a d iv e rs io n  o f  l i t t l e  p leasure" (36).
111.3.3 G lory, Magnanim ity, C harity , and Laughter
Yet another c r i te r io n  to  d is t in g u is h  between Hobbeslan Ind iv idu a ls  Is 
by cons ide ring  the  d if fe re n t  way In which they express th e ir  fe e lin g  
o f  s u p e r io r i ty  over o thers . In th is  respect Hobbes describes va rious 
types o f  behaviour whose extremes seem to  me to  be captured In 
Hobbes's concepts o f  laugh te r on the one hand and magnanimity and 
c h a r ity  on the o the r.
Of magnanimity, he says
MAGNANIMITY Is no more than g lo ry  ... but g lo ry  w e ll grounded upon
(34) Ibid,, p. 49; emphasis added.
(35) Ib ld f  p. 49; emphasis added.
(36) Ib id., p. 46.
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c e rta in  experience o f  power s u f f ic ie n t  to  a t ta in  h is  end In open 
manner(37)
C h a rity  Is exp la ined In Elements o f  Law as the s tro n g e s t argument 
showing the s u p e r io r i ty  o f  a man above another. In Hobbes's words i
CHARITY .» the re  can be no g re a te r argument to  a man o f  h is  own
power, than to  f in d  h im s e lf able, not on ly  to  accomplish h is  own 
des ires , bu t a lso  to  a s s is t o the r men In th e irs :  and th is  Is th a t 
conception wherein co n s is te th  c h a r ity  (38)
A t the o the r extreme o f  the range o f  possib le  a tt i tu d e s  o f  Hobbeslan 
people when they fe e l su p e rio r to  o thers we f in d  " la u g h te r" . In 
Elements o f  Law laugh te r Is described as a sudden re a c tio n  to  the
re a lis a t io n  o f  our s u p e r io r i ty  above e ith e r  o the rs  o r past Images o f  
ourse Ives:
LAUGHTER The passion o f  laugh te r proceedeth from  a sudden
conception o f  some a b i l i t y  In h im se lf th a t laugheth (39)
(37) Ibid., p. 47. In Chapter 19 he suggests th a t magnanim ity and
courage In the s ta te  o f  na tu re  cons is t In respecting  the l i f e  
o f  o the rs  “unless fe a r suggest anyth ing  to  the c o n tra ry " 
( ib id ., p. 101) and In re fra in in g  from unnecessary c ru e lty . 
Magnanimity and courage are a t the core o f  "th e  law o f  na tu re  
[which] In war. Is no th ing  but honour" ( ib id ., p. 99); Hobbes 
exp la ins  : "the  law o f  na tu re  commandeth In war: th a t men
s a tia te  not the c ru e lty  o f  th e ir  present passions, whereby In 
th e ir  own conscience they foresee no b e n e fit to  come" ( ib id .,  p. 
100). And he comments : "though the re  be In war no law, the 
breach whereof Is In ju ry , ye t there  are those laws, the breach 
whereof Is d ishonour. In one word, th e re fo re , the on ly  law o f  
ac tions  In war Is honour; and the r ig h t  o f  war, providence" 
( ib id ., p. 101).
(38) Ibid., p. 44. Hobbes recommends c h a r ity  In the fo llo w in g  law o f  
nature : "For seeing the causes o f war and deso la tio n  proceed 
from those passions, by which we s t r iv e  to  accommodate 
ourselves, and to  leave o thers  as fa r  as we can behind us : I t  
fo llo w e th  th a t th a t passion by which we s t r iv e  m u tu a lly  to  
accommodate each o the r, must be the cause o f  peace ... c h a r ity "  
( ib id ., p. 85).
(39) Ibid., p. 41.
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the  pass ion o f  laugh te r proceedeth from the sudden Im agination o f  
our own odds and eminence.» The passion o f  laugh te r Is noth ing  e lse 
but a sudden g lo ry  a r is in g  from  sudden conception o f  some emlnency 
In ourse lves, by comparison w ith  the In f irm it ie s  o f  o the rs , or w ith  
our own fo rm e rly  (40)
In Hobbes's view “men cannot absta in  from provoking one another" (41) 
and laugh te r Is one o f  the g re a te s t forms o f  provocation. A lthough 
never In h is  w r it in g s  Hobbes Inves tiga tes  the  mechanics o f  the 
p rovoca tion  Inherent In d e r is io n  and laughter, he c o n s is te n tly  regards 
th is  passion as an enemy o f  peace and t r a n q u i l l i t y  (42).
111.2.8 Are the re  Non-G lory-Seekers?
Having no ticed  th a t the des ire  o f  honour can m o tiva te  people to  chase
(40) Ibid.f p. 42. In h is  s tudy o f  Hobbeslan laugh te r Heyed lin ks
laugh te r to  va in  g lo ry . However as we can see from  the above 
quo ta tions , th is  Is not the case. Hobbes connects laugh ter w ith  
g lo ry , w ith o u t enq u irin g  whether such g lo ry in g  Is I I I -  o r w e ll-  
grounded; see David Heyed, The Place o f  Laughter In Hobbes's 
Theory o f  Em otions’, Journa l o f  H is to ry  o f  Ideas, Apr 11-June 
1982, vo l. 43, pp. 285-95.
(41) Elements o f  Law, p. 85.
(42) "Since men by n a tu ra l passion are d ive rs  ways o ffe n s iv e  one to
another, every man th in k in g  w e ll o f h im se lf, and ha ting  to  see
the same In o the rs , they must needs provoke one another by 
words, and o the r s igns o f  contempt and hatred , which are 
Inc iden t to  a l l  comparison; t i l l  a t la s t they must determ ine
the pre-em inence by s tre n g th  and fo rce  o f  body", ib id ., p. 71. 
Thus as he recommends c h a r ity  and magnanimity w ith  a law o f 
nature , so he fo rb id s  d e ris io n  w ith  the fo llo w in g  law o f  
nature : "because a l l  s igns which we shew to  one another o f  
hatred and contempt, provoke In the h ighest degree to  q ua rre l 
and b a tt le  (Inasmuch as l i f e  I ts e lf ,  w ith  the  co nd itio n  o f  
enduring scorn, Is not esteemed w orth the en joying , much less 
peace); I t  must nece ssa rily  be Implied as a law o f  nature , THAT 
NO MAN REPROACH, REVILE, DERIDE, OR ANY OTHERWISE DECLARE HIS 
HATRED, CONTEMPT, OR DISESTEEM OF ANY OTHER. But th is  law Is 
very l i t t l e  p ra c tis e d " ( ib id ., p. 86).
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riches, wisdom, and knowledge, th a t a l l  the passions described In 
Elements o f  Law depend on the pleasure (d isp leasu re ) th a t people 
d e rive  from honouring (d ishonouring), th a t the l i f e  o f  men Is a race 
to  surpass o the rs , th a t honour Is the basis o f  c u r io s ity  and 
c u r io s ity  Is the cause o f  advancement, th a t happiness cons is ts  In 
c o n tin u a lly  ou tgo ing  the next before, one would expect th a t the re  
cou Id not be n on -g lo ry -seeke rs .
And ye t In some passages o f  Elements o f  Law Hobbes mentions the 
ex is tence  o f  people who would be contented w ith  th e ir  share o f power, 
who do not seem In te re s te d  In surpassing o th e rs  and who would be 
happy to  accept e q u a lity  I f  on ly  o the rs  would not t r y  to  subdue them. 
For example we read:
cons ide ring  the  g rea t d iffe re n c e  there Is In men, from the 
d iv e rs ity  o f  th e ir  passions, how some are v a in ly  g lo r io u s , and 
hope fo r  precedency and s u p e r io r i ty  above th e ir  fe llo w s , not on ly 
when they are equal In power, but a lso when they are In fe r io r  I t  
must n ece ssa rily  fo llo w , th a t those men who are moderate, and look 
fo r  no more but e q u a lity  o f  na tu re , sh a ll be obnoxious to  the fo rce  
o f  o the rs , th a t w i l l  a ttem p t to  subdue them C».] and thus the 
g re a te s t p a rt o f  men, upon no assurance o f  odds, do neverthe less, 
through v a n ity , o r comparison, o r appe tite , provoke the re s t th a t 
o the rw ise  would be contented w ith  e q u a lity  (4-3)
From the above passage I t  emerges th a t a lthough g lo ry -seeke rs  are 
"the  g re a te s t p a r t o f  men", s t i l l  the re  e x is ts  a m in o r ity  o f non- 
g lo ry -seekers . Hobbes does not dw e ll on p o rtra y in g  th is  m in o r ity  and
(43) Ibid., pp. 70-1.
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s im p ly  describes I t  as being made up by “moderate” men. As a re s u lt  
one Is le f t  wondering as to  th e ir  psycho log ica l and m o tiva tio n a l 
make-up : as they do no t seek s u p e r io r ity , what Is the  meaning o f  
happiness fo r  them ? as they do not seem In te re s te d  In e xce llin g  
over o the rs , what m o tiva tes  th e ir  c u r io s ity ,  what d r iv e s  them to  
Improve th e ir  c o g n it iv e  power, to  acquire  wisdom and knowledge? 
Hobbes does not p rov ide  answers to  these questions. A poss ib le  and 
p la u s ib le  exp lana tion  could  be th a t th is  m in o r ity  o f  “moderates” , 
a lthough “ contei^<led w ith  e q u a lity ”  In some f ie ld s  o f  human endeavour 
(such as r ich e s  and places o f  a u th o r ity ) , may s t i l l  w ish to  compete 
and excel In o th e r spheres o f  l i fe .  However, th is  in te rp ré tâ t Ion 
cannot be grounded on any s p e c if ic  te x tu a l re ference, and thus must 
be taken as sp ecu la tive . I t  should be acknowledged th a t Elements o f  
Law s im p ly  do no t address the problem.
I I I . 4 GLORY AW POLITICS
In th is  sec tion  I s h a ll d iscuss the e ffe c t  o f  g lo ry  on p o l it ic s ;  sec.
111.4.1 s h a ll examine Hobbes's cla im  th a t the fa c t  th a t sociab le  
animals, such as bees, can liv e  pea ce fu lly  In n a tu ra l cond itions  
w h ils t  men have to  re s o rt to  a r t l f I c la l ly - c r e a te d  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te s  can 
be accounted fo r  In terms o f g lo ry . In the next th ree  sections I 
s h a ll analyse Hobbes's argument on g lo ry  In the s ta te  o f  na tu re  
(111.4.2), on g lo ry  In the p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  (111.4.3) and on the 
re la t io n s h ip  between g lo ry  and c iv i l  war (111.4.4).
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111.4.1 Glory, Men, and Bees
In the concluding chapter o f  the f i r s t  p a rt o f  Elements o f  Law 
Hobbes addresses the question  “ why concord rem alneth In a m u ltitu d e  
o f  some I r ra t io n a l c rea tu res  [ l ik e  bees], and not o f  men” (44). I t  Is 
w orth  quo ting  h is  answer a t length, as we w i l l  f in d  I t  repeated 
alm ost verbatim  In De Cive and Leviathan:
I answer th a t amongst o the r liv in g  crea tu res, the re  Is no question 
o f  precedence In th e ir  own species, nor s t r i f e  about honour or 
acknowledgement o f  one another's  wisdom, as the re  Is amongst men; 
from whence a ris e  envy and hatred  o f  one towards another, and from 
thence s e d itio n  and war. Secondly, those liv in g  c re a tu re s  aim every 
one a t peace and food common to  them a l l ;  men aim a t dominion, 
s u p e r io r ity ,  and p r iv a te  wealth, which are d is t in c t  In every 
man, and breed contention . T h ird ly , those liv in g  c re a tu re s  th a t are 
w ith o u t reason, have not learn ing  enough to  espy, o r to  th in k  they 
espy, any d e fe c t In the government; and th e re fo re  are contented 
the re w ith ; bu t In a m u ltitu d e  o f  men, the re  are always some th a t 
th in k  themselves w ise r than the re s t, and s t r iv e  to  a l te r  what they 
th in k  amiss; and d ive rs  o f  them s t r iv e  to  a l te r  d iv e rs  ways; and 
causeth war. F o u rth ly , they want speech and are th e re fo re  unable to  
In s t ig a te  one another to  fa c tio n , which men want not. F if th ly ,  they 
have no conception o f  r ig h t  and wrong, but on ly  o f  p leasure and 
pain, and th e re fo re  a lso  no censure o f  one another, nor o f th e ir  
commander, as long as they are themselves a t ease; whereas men
(44) Ibid., p. 99.
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th a t make themselves judges o f  r ig h t  and wrong, are  then least a t 
q u ie t, when they are most a t ease. Las tly , n a tu ra l concord, such Is 
amongst those c rea tu res , Is the work o f  God by the  way o f  nature; 
bu t concord amongst men Is a r t i f i c ia l ,  and by way o f  covenant (45) 
As I t  can be seen from  the above quo ta tion , g lo ry  Is viewed as the 
unequivocal source o f  com petition , s e d itio n , and war. In the long l i s t  
o f  causes o f  c o n f l ic t  between men, a l l  words used by Hobbes (bar one) 
are g lo ry - re la te d  : "precedence” , "honour", "acknowledgement o f  one 
ano the r's  wisdom", " dom inion", "s u p e r lo r lty " ,  the though t " to  be w ise r 
than the re s t" , to  know b e tte r  than o the rs  what Is " r ig h t  and wrong". 
The on ly  non-g lo ry - re la te d  word In the above l i s t  Is "p r iv a te  w ea lth", 
which Is mentioned ra th e r c u rs o r ily .  As we s h a ll see la te r . In the 
p a ra lle l passage In De Cive Hobbes mentions again the  des ire  o f  
possessions as a cause o f  c o n f l ic t ,  but lin ks  th is  Idea f irm ly  to  
g lo ry ; In the  corresponding passage In Leviathan, Instead, the concept 
o f  p r iv a te  w ea lth  as cause o f  c o n f l ic t  Is dropped a lto g e th e r. I t  Is 
w orth  no tin g  th a t n e ith e r the apprehension fo r  s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  nor 
the concern fo r  scarce resources are mentioned a t a l l  as causes o f  
war. On the co n tra ry , on the problem o f  resources Hobbes a n tic ip a te s  
what he w i l l  argue In a la te r  chapter In Elements o f  Law, namely th a t 
the minds o f  men "are  least a t q u ie t"  and more propense to  
d isco n te n t and s e d it io n  "when they are most a t ease "(46).
As to  s e lf-p re s e rv a t Ion, Hobbes seems to  suggest th a t I f  the so le  
concern o f  men were th e ir  s u rv iv a l,  they would cooperate lik e  bees
(45) Ib id ., p. 102.
(46) On the re la t io n  between lack o f want and p o l i t ic a l  d isco n te n t 
see in fra ,  sec. 111.4.4.
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and Live p e a ce fu lly  w ith o u t the need fo r  a r t i f i c i a l  covenants and 
bonds.
111.4.2 G lory and the S ta te  o f  Nature
Whereas In the above passage aimed a t e xp la in ing  the  causes o f  
com petition , s e d itio n , and war Hobbes does not mention s e l f -  
p re se rva tio n  a lto p ^ h e r .  In Chapter 14 where the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  Is 
analysed Hobbes shows th a t the concern fo r  s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  Is what 
t r ig g e rs  o f f  war. I t  Is o f  c ru c ia l Importance to  re a liz e  why Hobbes 
can m a in ta in  c o n s is te n tly  both p ropos itions . For th is  purpose, I s h a ll
sketch the va rio us  s teps th a t make up Hobbes's argument as se t out
In Chapter 14: f i r s t l y  he argues th a t men are equal (secs. 1-2);
secondly, he p o in ts  ou t th a t some men “ are v a in ly  g lo r io u s , and hope 
fo r  precedency and s u p e r io r i ty  above th e ir  fe llo w s " (47). He devotes 
th ree  sec tions  (2 -4 ) to  I l lu s t r a te  how these people are “ by va in  
g lo ry  Indisposed to  a llo w  e q u a lity  w ith  themselves to  o th e rs " and are 
“ap t to  provoke one another by comparisons ... and to  encroach one 
upon ano ther" (48). T h ird ly , In sec. 3 he In troduces the concept o f  
d if f id e n c e  and fea r, as experienced by moderate men towards the va in  
g lo r io u s . F o u rth ly , in sec. 5 he no tices  th a t “many men" want the
same th ing , which o fte n  cannot be enjoyed In common o r d iv ided. From 
the con tex t I t  Is c le a r th a t he Is re fe r r in g  not to  the means o f
s u rv iv a l (o therw ise  he would not have s p e c ifie d  th a t many, and not
(47) Ibid.f p. 71.
(48) Ibid., p. 70.
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a l l ,  men want them), but to  the best land and resources. F in a lly , he 
concludes th a t l i f e  Is In danger and tu rns  to  describe  the r ig h t  o f  
n a tu re  and the s ta te  o f  war.
As we can see from  th is  account, the  f i r s t  cause o f  c o n f l ic t  is  vain 
g lo ry ; the fa c t  th a t some people are va in g lo riou s  exp la ins  why a l l  
fe e l d i f f id e n t  and concerned about resources and s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n . In 
o th e r words, whereas d if f id e n c e  and fea r o f death are the proxim ate 
causes o f  war in the s ta te  o f  nature , vain g lo ry  is  the u lt im a te  
cause. A t th is  stage i t  may be reca lled  th a t in Chapter I we 
e s ta b lish e d  th a t Thucydides in h is  explanation  o f  the  Peloponnesian 
war had deployed a ve ry  s im ila r  lin e  o f  reasoning, d is tin g u is h in g  
between u lt im a te  and proxim ate causes o f  war: the am bition  o f  the 
Athenians to  augment fu r th e r  th e ir  dominion is  seen a t the o r ig in  o f  
the  fe a r  o f  the  Lacedœmonians to  be subdued which, in tu rn , sparks 
o f f  the war.
In conclusion, i t  can be sa id  th a t there  is no c o n tra d ic tio n  between 
Hobbes's p o s itio n  th a t g lo ry  alone is  the o r ig in  o f  com petition , war, 
and s e d itio n  and h is  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  n a tu re  where the 
concern fo r  s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  and resources t r ig g e rs  o f f  the 
c o n f l ic t .  In the passage examined in the previous se c tion  Hobbes is 
examining the u lt im a te  cause o f  c o n f lic t,  whereas in  Chapter 14- 
analysed in th is  se c tion  he is  s p e llin g  out the dynamics o f  war.
As we s h a ll see in the next Chapter, Hobbes w i l l  employ again the 
Thucidedean scheme o f  u lt im a te  and proximate causes o f  war in a l l  
h is  p o l i t ic a l  w r it in g s , w ith  on ly  m inor m od ifica tions .
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111.4.3 Glory, Honour, and the Polit ica l State
I t  Is s ig n if ic a n t  to  note th a t In h is  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f 
n a tu re  In Chapter 14 Hobbes never uses the term  g lo ry , bu t vain 
g lo ry  Instead. Th is Is because throughout h is  w r it in g s  Hobbes 
m a in ta ins  c o n s is te n tly  th a t the re  can be no g lo ry  nor s u p e r io r ity  
between men o u ts id e  a p o l i t ic a l  s ta te . He w rite s  :
The question , which Is the b e tte r  man. Is determ inab le  on ly  In the 
e s ta te  o f  government and p o lic y  (49)
In Hobbes's argument one can f in d  the exp lana tion  fo r  the 
Im p o s s ib il ity  o f  g lo ry  In n a tu ra l cond itions, which proceeds In two 
steps.
F ir s t ly ,  Hobbes n o tice s  th a t “ In the s ta te  o f  n a tu re ” the re  are no 
common values, no agreement “o f what Is to  be c a lle d  r ig h t ,  what
good, what v ir tu e ,  what much, what l i t t l e ,  what meum and tuum^ what a 
pound, what a q ua rt, &c." (50). As a re s u lt ,  v a in g lo r io u s  people.
Instead o f  competing by producing b e tte r, o r more, th in g s  than others, 
compete In d e fin in g  “ b e t te r ” and “more” and to  Impose to  o the rs  th e ir  
own conception o f  what belongs to  whom and why. Hence vio lence
a rise s  :
a l l  v io lence  proceedeth from co n trove rs ies  th a t a r is e  between men 
concerning meum and tuum^ r ig h t  and wrong, good and bad, and the 
like , which men use every one to  measure by th e ir  own
judgments (51 )
(49) Ib id ,  p. 87.
(50) Ib id ., p. 188.
(51) Ib id., p. 112.
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The same Idea is  re ite ra te d  in the la s t chapter o f  Elements o f  Law:
In the s ta te  o f  na tu re , where every man is  h is  own judge, and 
d if fe re th  from  o th e r concerning the names and a p p e lla tio n s  o f
th ing s , and from  those d iffe re n c e s  a rise  q ua rre ls , and breach o f  
peace (52)
Secondly, i t  is  obvious th a t, as soon as the s ta te  o f  na tu re  is  
tu rned  in to  a s ta te  o f  war, people cannot achieve s u p e r io r i ty  and 
experience g lo ry ; in fa c t, as men are assumed by Hobbes to  be by
n a tu re  equ a lly  able to  k i l l  each o the r (see supra, Chapter II) , i t
fo llo w s  th a t, as long as com petition  is  fo r  l i f e  and not in o the r
f ie ld s  o f  endeavour, nobody can prove h im se lf s u p e rio r to  anybody 
else.
In complete c o n tra s t, in the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  c iv i l  laws de fin e  common 
measures o f  meum and tuum, r ig h t  and wrong, good and bad, e tc.:
i t  was necessary the re  should be a common measure o f  a l l  th ings  
th a t m ight f a l l  in con trove rsy; as fo r  example: o f  what is  to  be
ca lle d  r ig h t ,  what good, what v ir tu e , what much, what l i t t l e ,  what 
meum and tuum, what a pound, what a q ua rt, &c. C.-l c iv i l  laws are 
to  a l l  sub jec ts  the measures o f th e ir  ac tions, whereby to
determ ine, whether they be r ig h t  o r wrong, p ro f i ta b le  or
u n p ro fita b le , v ir tu o u s  o r v ic ious ; and by them the use and 
d e f in it io n  o f  a l l  names not agreed upon, and tend ing to
con trove rsy, s h a ll be e s tab lished  (53)
A lthough Hobbes does not d iscuss the e f fe c t  o f  c iv i l  laws on g lo ry , 
the im p lica tio n s  fo r  g lo ry -se ek ing  behaviour are obvious in so fa r  as
(52) Ib id ., p. 188.
(53) Ib id., pp. 188-9.
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im p lic a tio n s  fo r  g lo ry -se e k in g  behaviour are obvious In so fa r  as the 
c iv i l  laws reverse com ple te ly  the s itu a t io n  e x is t in g  In the s ta te  o f  
na tu re . On the  one hand, they p ro te c t everybody's l i f e  and thus 
exclude the form  o f  com petition  between men In the  one f ie ld  In 
which men a b i l i t ie s  are equal; on the o the r hand, they e s ta b lish  
common measures o f  meum and tuurr\ qua rt and pound, r ig h t  and wrong, 
good and bad, v ir tu e s  and vices, thereby opening up new f ie ld s  o f 
comparison between people, ranging from p ro pe rty  to  a r ts , from 
b u t te r f ly  c o lle c t in g  to  p u b lic  m o ra lity .
There Is, however, a form  o f  g lo ry , o r am bition, th a t Is fo rb idden to  
c it iz e n s  In the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te , and cons is ts  In the  a ttem pt to  
“ Innovate" the  laws, to  pu t once again In d iscuss ion  a l l  values and 
a l l  measures. Hobbes warns the sovereign aga ins t th is  form  o f  
am b ition  (54-) and connects I t  f i rm ly  to  s e d itio n  and c iv i l  war (see 
next sec tion ).
W hile In the Hobbes Ian s ta te  o f  na tu re  nobody could  experience g lo ry , 
In the p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  everybody can — the c it iz e n s  by competing 
w ith in  the bounds o f  c i v i l  laws and the sovereign by making c iv i l  
laws, dec id ing  and e n fo rc in g  the ru le s  and measures o f  com petition  
among h is  sub jec ts . Hobbes w r ite s  :
To balance th is  Incommodlty [th e  Inconvenience a r is in g  from 
government], the so ve re ign ty , toge the r w ith  the n ecess ity  o f  th is  
care and danger, comprehendeth so much honour, r iches  and means 
whereby to  d e lig h t the mind, as no p r iv a te  man's w ea lth  can a tta in  
un to " (55)
(54) Ib id ., pp. 182-3.
(55) Ib id ., p. 138.
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111.4.4 Glory, Ambition, and C iv il War
Hobbes d iscusses the re la t io n s h ip  between honour, am bition, and c iv i l  
war In p a rt I I  o f  Elements o f  Law. In Chapter 5 he shows th a t 
monarchy Is less su b jec t to  d is s o lu tio n  than o the r forms o f
government because the man In charge does not need to  compete w ith  
o th e rs  to  see h is  w i l l  obeyed; In assemblies. Instead, people compete 
to  have the honour to  see th e ir  advIs'es fo llow ed  and “ when they
cannot have the honour o f  making good th e ir  own devices, they ye t
seek the  honour to  make the counsel o f  th e ir  adversaries to  prove
va in " (56). Th is generates fa c tio n s , which are the  o r ig in  o f  c iv i l  war. 
In Chapter 8 he examines “ the th ings  th a t dispose to  re b e llio n "  (57). 
He l is t s  th ree  necessary and s u f f ic ie n t  causes “ to  dispose men to  
s e d itio n " , namely “ d isco n te n t", “ pretence o f  r ig h t ” , and “ hope o f  
success". He d is tin g u is h e s  two s o rts  o f  d iscon ten t, namely “ fe a r o f
want o r punishment" on the one hand and “am b ition ” on the o ther. He
w r ite s  :
the f i r s t  th in g  th a t d lsposeth  to  re b e llio n , namely, d iscon ten t, 
consistes] In fe a r and am b ition  (58)
He connects am b ition  w ith  liv in g  “ a t ease, w ith o u t fe a r o f  want, o r 
danger o f  v io le nce " and says :
the o the r s o r t  o f  d isco n te n t which tro u b le th  the mind o f  them who
o therw ise  liv e  a t ease, w ith o u t fea r o f  want, o r danger o f  v io lence,
a r ls e th  on ly  from  a sense o f  th e ir  want o f  th a t power, and th a t 
honour and tes tim ony th e re o f, which they th in k  Is due unto  them.
(56) Ib id ., p. 143.
(57) Ib id ., p. 168.
(58) Ib id ., p. 170.
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For a l l  jo y  and g r ie f  o f  mind co n s is tin g  (as hath been said, Part I, 
Chap. 9, sect. 21) .. In a con ten tion  fo r  precedence to  them w ith  
whom they compare themselves; such men must needs take I t  I I I ,  and 
be g rieved  w ith  the s ta te , as f in d  themselves postponed to  those In 
honour, whom they th in k  they excel In v ir tu e  and a b i l i t y  to  
gove rn (59)
W hile In h is  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  na tu re  as a s ta te  o f  war he 
fo llo w s  Thucydides' d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the o r ig in  o f  the Peloponnesian 
war, In h is  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  d is s o lu t io n  and s e d itio n  he fo llo w s  
Thucydides' d iagnosis  o f  the  s e d itio n  o f  Corcyra.
In th is  respect I t  may be re c a lle d  what Thucydides says o f  se d ition s : 
The cause o f  a l l  th is  [s e d it io n ] Is des ire  o f  ru le , o u t o f  avarice  
and am bition; and the  zeal o f  con ten tion  from those two 
proceeding (60).
I I I . 5 CONCLUSION
In The Needs O f S trangers, Ignat le f f  observes ;
Philosophers have ca lle d  man the  p o l i t ic a l  animal, the language 
maker, the to o l maker, the ra t io n a l animal, even the laughing 
animal. To de fin e  man In th is  way Is to  de fine  what I t  means to  be 
human In term s o f  the best o f  us. And the w ors t ? (61)
From the above d iscuss ion  we have seen th a t In Elements o f  Law there  
is  no dichotomy between the  best and the w orst o f  human nature .
(59) Ib id ., p. 169.
(60) H is to ry , I, p. 350.
(62) M ichael Ig n a t ie f f .  The Needs o f  S trangers, Chatto  & Windus,
Hogart Press: London, 1984, p. 57.
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Hobbes concentra tes on the  w orst in man, on the  laughing animal th a t 
despises and provokes a l l  o th e rs  and In the w ors t he f in d s  the d rive  
fo r  men to  develop reason, language, Indus try , and to  become 
p o l i t ic a l .  W ithout the w ors t, fo r  Hobbes, the re  would no t be the  best.
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C H A R T E R  I \ /
GLORY IN DE CIVE
IV. 1 INTRODUCTION; IV.2 THE MEANING OF GLORY: IV.2.1 G lory, Reason, 
and S e lf-P re se rva tio n ; IV.2.2 G lory, Honour, Power, and Opinion; IV.3 
GLORY AND HUMAN NATURE; IV.4 GLORY AhD POLITICS: IV.4.1 G lory, Men, 
and Bees; IV.4.2 G lory and the  S ta te  o f  Nature; IV.4.3 G lory, Honour, 
and the  P o l i t ic a l S ta te ; IV.4.4 Am bition and C iv i l  War.
IV. 1 INTRODUCTION
The f i r s t  obvious d i f f i c u l t y  in  comparing Elements o f  Law w ith  De 
Cive  is  th a t whereas the  form er conta ins a d e ta ile d  exam ination o f  
human nature , the  la t te r  does not. The reason fo r  th is  is  th a t  Hobbes 
had planned De Cive as the  la s t book o f  a t r i lo g y ;  the  second book o f  
the  s e rie s  was to  con ta in  h is  account o f  man (1 ). I f  allowance is  
made fo r  the  d if fe re n t  to p ic s  analysed in  the  two works, the 
und e rly in g  philosophy o f  man is  la rg e ly  the same. In th is  chapter I 
s h a ll show th a t in De Cive  Hobbes presumes the p h ilo so p h ica l views on 
g lo ry  described in Elements o f  Law and sharpens the  ideas on the 
re la tio n s h ip s  between g lo ry  and p o l i t ic s  d iscussed in h is  p rev ious 
work. I s h a ll argue th a t  the  fa c t  th a t in De Cive  (as in Leviathan  
and Elements o f  Law) Hobbes m a in ta ins on the  one hand th a t the 
o r ig in  o f  com petition , s e d itio n , and war is  to  be found in  g lo ry  alone 
and on the o th e r hand s in g le s  ou t scarce resources and concern fo r  
s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  as causes o f  c o n f l ic t  need no t g ive  r is e  to  a
(1 ) De Cive, p. 35.
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c o n tra d ic tio n . By re s o rt in g  to  the  Thucydldean d is t in c t io n  between 
u lt im a te  and proxim ate  causes o f  war, Hobbes’s argument w i l l  be shown 
to  be f u l l y  co ns is te n t.
IV.2 THE MEANING OF GLORY
As In Elements o f  Law, so In De Clve  Hobbes ca I les “ g lo ry "  the  Joy
o f  s u p e r io r i ty  and describes I t  as the  dominant passion o f  man :
a l l  the  p leasure, and j o l l i t y  o f  the  mind, cons is ts  In th is ;  even to
ge t some, w ith  whom comparing. I t  may f in d  somewhat wherein to
Triumph, and Vant I t  s e l f  <2)
a l l  the  m ind's p leasure  Is e ith e r  g lo ry , o r re fe rs  to  g lo ry  In the 
end (3).
U n like  In Elem ents o f  Law, though. In De Cive Hobbes does not d iscuss 
the  d iffe re n c e s  between g lo ry , va in  g lo ry , and fa ls e  g lo ry ; nor does 
he o f fe r  any c r i t e r ia  to  d is t in g u is h  between g lo ry  as p leasure and 
g lo ry  as a p p e tite ; nor does he separate b e n e fic ia l from  d e trim e n ta l 
g lo ry ; nor does he ch a rac te rize  p rid e  and ju s t  esteem as the  va lue- 
loaded ve rs ions o f  g lo ry ; nor does he exp lore  the  re la tio n s h ip  
between g lo ry  and f e l ic i t y .  Th is no tw iths tand ing , on these to p ics  he 
endorses the  d e f in it io n s  and c r i t e r ia  o f  Elements o f  Law.
As an example o f  Hobbes's unchanged b e l ie f  In a form  o f  g lo ry  
b e n e fic ia l to  mankind, we read In De Cive:
I have no t [w r it te n  De Civei ». ou t o f  a des ire  o f  p ra ise  (a lthough 
I f  I had, I m ight have defended m yselfe w ith  th is  fa ir e  excuse.
(2) Ib id ., p. 46.
(3) Ib id., p. 43.
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th a t  ve ry  few doe th in g s  laudably, who are  n o t a ffe c te d  w ith  
commendation) <4)
Examples o f  d e tr im e n ta l g lo ry  w i l l  be discussed below In the  section  
on the  s ta te  o f  na tu re . In De Clve^ as w e ll as In Elements o f  Law  ^
Hobbes appears to  re s o r t  to  the  term  va in  g lo ry  to  s ig n ify  a form  o f  
g lo ry  grounded on fan c ie s  and no t on re a l a c tio n s  and uses I t  
whenever re fe r r in g  to  g lo ry  In the  s ta te  o f  na tu re . In both works 
Hobbes re fe rs  ra re ly  to  “ p r id e ” , and on ly  In con tex ts  where g lo ry  Is
c le a r ly  condemned, as In the  fo llo w in g  Law o f  Nature :
In the  e ig h t ». Law o f  na tu re . That every man be accounted by nature  
equal I to  another, the co n tra ry  to  which Law Is PRIDE (5)
I t  can be seen, thus, th a t as fa r  as the to p ic s  examined In the  f i r s t  
se c tio n  o f  the  p rev ious chapter are concerned, the re  are no
c o n tra d ic tio n s  between Elements o f  Law and De Clve^ fo r  the  s lig h t  
v a r ia t io n s  th a t e x is t  between the two works can be exp la ined  e n t ire ly  
on account o f  th e ir  d if fe re n t  na tu re , ph iloso p h ica l and p o l i t ic a l  the 
form er, e x c lu s iv e ly  p o l i t ic a l  the  la t te r .
However, we can f in d  some In te re s tin g  developments regard ing  two 
to p ic s  d e a lt w ith  In sec. I I I . 2 .6 -7 : I am re fe r r in g  to  Hobbes's
d iscuss ion  o f  s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  and r a t io n a l i t y  and to  some o f  h is  
re f le c t io n s  on honour.
IV.2.1 G lory, Reason, and S e lf-P re se rva tio n
In De Clve we f in d  the  c le a re s t and nea tes t p re se n ta tio n  o f  the
<4) Ibid., p, 36.
<5) Ibid., p. 68.
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re la t io n s h ip  between g lo ry , s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , and reason to  be found 
In Hobbes's w r it in g s .
On the one hand, g lo ry  (o r p leasure o f s u p e r io r ity )  is  described as 
the  u lt im a te  end o f  man :
a l l  the  m ind's p leasure  Is e ith e r  g lo ry, o r re fe rs  to  g lo ry  In the  
end (6)
On the  o the r hand, reason Is de fined  as the method whereby each man 
t r ie s  to  a t ta in  h is  goals; more p rec ise ly , “ reason ing" Is sa id  to  
c o n s is t In the  seeking o u t o f  the means fo r  the  a tta in m e n t o f  any 
g iven end.
every man by reasoning seeks ou t the meanes to  the  end which he 
propounds to  h im s e lf (7)
I f  we combine the  d e f in it io n  o f  g lo ry  as end o f  man w ith  Hobbes's 
d e f in it io n  o f  reason as the  s tudy o f  the means to  an end, we a rr iv e  
a t the  Hobbes Ian concept o f  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  as a means found ou t 
by reason fo r  the  a tta inm en t o f  one's end (g lo ry ). In fa c t, a man 
cannot fe e l su p e rio r, and thus achieve g lo ry  In the  Hobbes Ian sense 
o f  the  word (8), un less he Is a live .
We are now In a p o s itio n  to  apprecia te  f u l ly  the  fo llo w in g  statem ent 
made by Hobbes In the  E p is tle  Dedicatory which opens De Cive, where 
he n o tice s  th a t whereas g lo ry  Is found by exam ining human 
psychology, the re levance o f  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  to  p o l i t ic a l  science Is 
po in ted  ou t by reason :
(6) /b id ,  p. 4-3.
(7) /b id., p. 177.
(8) As noted In sec. I I  1.2.7, whereas In the common parlance ‘g lo r io u s  
death ’ is  no t a c o n tra d ic t to in terminis^ in  Hobbes's d ic t io n a ry  i t  
Is, In so fa r  as being a liv e  is a necessary co n d itio n  fo r  
experiencing  the  p leasure o f  dominion, namely g lo ry .
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Having th e re fo re  thus  a rr iv e d  a t two maximes o f  humane Nature, the 
one a r is in g  from  the concup isc lb le  p a rt, which d es ires  to  
a pp ro p ria te  to  I t  s e lfe  the  use o f  those th in g s  In which a l l  o thers  
have a jo y n t In te re s t, the  o th e r proceeding from  the ra tio n a lly  
which teaches every man to  f l y  to  c o n tre -n a tu ra ll D isso lu tio n , as 
the  g re a te s t m lsch le fe  th a t can a rr iv e  to  Nature; Which P rin c ip le s  
being la id  down, I seem from  them to  have dem onstrated by a most 
ev iden t connexion, In th is  l i t t l e  work o f  mine, f i r s t  the  abso lu te  
n ece ss ity  o f  Leagues and C ontracts, and thence the rud im ents both 
o f  moral I and c i v i l  I Prudence. (9)
In De Cive, as In Elements o f  Law, Hobbes p o in ts  o u t th a t i t  Is 
reason what he lps man recognize and avoid  the  a c tio n s  th a t can 
endanger h is  l i f e  :
w. the  D ic ta te  o f  r ig h t  Reason, conversant about those th in g s  which 
are e ith e r  to  be done, o r o m itted  fo r  the constant p re se rva tio n  o f  
L ife  (10)
On the  o th e r hand. In both works Hobbes m a in ta ins th a t when people 
fo llo w  b lin d ly  th e ir  passions and f a l l  to  act ra t io n a lly ,  they may a t 
tim es r is k  th e ir  l i f e  ra th e r than “ s u f fe r  reproach" :
because a l l  s ignes o f  hatred, and contempt provoke most o f  a l l  to  
b raw ling  and f ig h t in g ,  Insomuch as most men would ra th e r lose 
th e ir  live s , ( th a t I say not th e ir  Peace) then s u f fe r  reproach (11)
(9) Ib id., p. 27. The “use o f  those th in g s  In which a l l  o th e rs  have a 
jo y n t In te re s t"  does not re fe r  to  e ith e r  covetousness o r des ire  
o f  p r o f i t ,  bu t to  g lo ry , as Hobbes h im se lf makes c le a r In the 
ve ry  same page: “And I found the reason was, th a t from  a 
Community o f  Goods, the re  must needs a r is e  C ontention whose 
enjoyment shou ld  be g re a te s t, and from th a t con ten tion  a l l  k ind  
o f  C a lam ities  must unavoydably ensure".
(10) Ib id., p. 52.
(11) Ib id ., p. 67.
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However, I t  should  be re c a lle d  th a t In a l l  h is  works Hobbes 
emphasises q u ite  s tro n g ly  th a t fe a r o f  death Is g e n e ra lly  in s t in c t iv e : 
fo r  every man Is des irous o f  what Is good fo r  him, and shuns what 
Is e v i l  I, bu t c h ie f ly  the  c h ie f  e s t o f  n a tu ra l I e v i l  Is, which Is 
Death(12)
fo r  every man, by n a tu ra l n ece ss ity  endeavours to  defend h is  body, 
and the  th in g s  which he Judgeth necessary tow ards the  p ro te c tio n  
o f  h is  body (13)
I t  can be sa id  In conclusion  th a t  both In De Cive and In Elements o f  
Law Hobbes m a in ta ins  th a t  fe a r  o f  death and d e s ire  o f  g lo ry  are  
passions th a t every man fe e ls  s tro n g ly  and th a t, a lthough  most men 
would be d rive n  to  r is k  th e ir  liv e s  fo r  the  sake o f  honour, reason 
helps them understand th a t th e re  can be no g lo ry  o r s u p e r io r i ty  
un less they are  a liv e . T here fo re  whenever these two passions lead to  
c o n f l ic t in g  courses o f  ac tions . I t  Is ra t io n a l to  g ive  p r io r i t y  to  
s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n . S e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , In fa c t. Is the  unrenounceable 
c o n s tra in t th a t g lo ry -se e ke rs  must meet In o rd e r to  achieve th e ir  end 
(g lo ry ).
IV.2.2 G lory, Honour, Power, and Opinion
As In Elements o f  Law, so In De Clve^ g lo ry  and honour are tw in  
concepts th a t “ co n s is t In comparison and preceHence":
G lo ry  Is lik e  Honour, I f  a l l  men have I t ,  no man hath I t ,  fo r  they
(12) Ib id ,, p. 47.
(13) Ib id ., p. 53.
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c o n s is t In comparison and prece Hence (14)
However, on th is  to p ic  two In te re s t in g  changes can be n o tice d  In the  
t ra n s it io n  from  Elements o f  Law to  De Cive. F ir s t ly ,  whereas In 
Elements o f  Law Hobbes describes honour as the  acknowledgement o f  an 
In d iv id u a l's  power by o th e rs  and says :
the  acknowledgement o f  power Is ca lle d  HONOUR ». and to  honour a 
man (Inwardy In the  mind) Is to  conceive o r acknowledge, th a t th a t 
man hath the  odds o r excess o f  power above him th a t  contendeth o r 
compareth h im s e lf (15)
In De Clve Instead honour Is de fined  as the  “ op in ion  o f  anothers 
power” . We read :
honour, to  speak p ro pe rly . Is no th ing  e lse  b u t an op in ion  o f  
anothers power ». honour ». placed In op in ion  (16)
honour ». Is no th ing  e lse  bu t the e s tim a tion  o f  ano thers power; and 
th e re fo re  he th a t hath le a s t power hath always le a s t honour (17) 
Secondly, whereas In Elements o f  Law honour Is the  passive m ir ro r  o f
power. In De Cive I t  acqu ires the  a d d it io n a l ro le  o f  genera ting  power
I t s e l f  — from  the op in ion  o f  power. In which honour co ns is ts , ac tua l 
power Is derived:
Now because men beleeve him to  be pow erfu l I whom they see 
honoured ( th a t Is to  say, esteemed pow erfu l by o th e rs ) I t  f a l ls  ou t
th a t honour Is Increased by worship; and by the  op in ion  o f  power,
tru e  power Is acqu ired  (18))
(14) Ib id., p. 43.
(15) Elements o f  Law, pp. 34-35.
(16) De Clve, p. 188.
(17) Ib id ., p. 124.
(18) Ib id ., p. 190.
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IV.3 GLORY AM) HUMAN NATURE
Although In h is  w r it in g s  CDe Cive Included) Hobbes o fte n  remarks th a t 
people are d if fe re n t  from  one another and th a t “ the  same man, In
d iv e rs  tim es, d i f fe r s  from  h im se lfe " (19), in fa c t  in De Cive he 
p o rtra y s  on ly  one man, and o f  th a t  man he describes on ly  one fe a tu re  
— h is  d es ire  o f  dom inion over o the rs , h is  in c lin a t io n  to  deride, 
provoke, scorn o th e rs  “ e ith e r  by deeds, o r words, countenance, o r 
la ugh te r", h is  tendency to  seek o th e rs  on ly  fo r  h is  p r o f i t  o r va in 
g lo ry , h is  p ro pe n s ity  to  h u r t the  absent (20).
One can o f fe r  two complementary exp lana tions fo r  the  lack o f
emphasis on more agreeable human t r a i t s  such as love, c h a r ity ,
g ene ros ity , e tc . th a t ch a rac te rize s  De Cive (even to  a la rg e r e x te n t
than Elements o f  Law and Leviathan).
On the  one hand. I t  shou ld  be re c a lle d  th a t De Cive was fo r  Hobbes 
the  work in which he in tended to  found p o l i t ic a l  science and th a t a 
requirem ent o f  reason (and science) is  fo r  Hobbes to  proceed d ire c t ly  
from  premises to  consequences, w ith o u t “ goCing] a s tra y ":
i f  th e re fo re  he reason r ig h t  ( th a t is  to  say, beginning from  most
(19) Leviathan, p. 146 and pp. 28-9; De Cive, p. 74 and p. 177.
(20) Here is  a s e le c tio n  o f  u n f la t te r in g  remarks on human natu re  
made by Hobbes in  De Cive: “ we doe no t by n a tu re  seek Society 
fo r  i t s  own sake, b u t th a t  we may rece ive  some Honour o r P ro f i t  
from  i t ;  these we d e s ire  P rim a rily , th a t Secondarily"; when men 
meet “ fo r  Pleasure, and Recreation o f  mind, every man is  wont to  
please h im s e lf most w ith  those th in g s  which s t i r r e  up laughter, 
whence he may «. by comparison o f  another mans Defects and 
In f irm it ie s ,  passe the  more c u rre n t in h is  owne op in ion  «. but 
fo r  the most p a rt, in these kind  o f  m eetings, we wound the 
absent .« h is  reason was no t i l l ,  who was wont alwayes a t 
p a rtin g  to  goe ou t la s t" . “ I t  is  m an ifes t [men] are not so much 
d e lig h te d  w ith  the  Socie ty, as th e ir  own Vain g lo ry "; De Cive, 
pp. 42-3.
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ev iden t p r in c ip le s , he makes a d iscourse ou t o f  consequences 
c o n tin u a lly  necessary) he w i l l  proceede In a most d ire c t  way; 
o the rw ise  hee 'l goe a s tra y , th a t Is to  say, he w i l l  e ith e r  doe, say, 
o r endeavour somewhat a g a in s t h is  proper end (21)
As q u a lit ie s  such as g ene ros ity , magnanimity, lo y a lty , c h a r ity , e tc . 
cannot exp la in  why men, u n lik e  bees and ants, are unable to  liv e  In 
peace w ith o u t the  sword, they are o f  scarce In te re s t to  a p o l i t ic a l  
th e o r is t .
The same ‘s c ie n t i f ic *  requirem ent o f  economy c a lls  fo r  an assumption 
o f  non-genera I Ized g lo ry -se e k in g  behaviour, s ince (as w i l l  be argued 
In p a r t 111 o f  the d is s e r ta t io n )  fo r  Hobbes's argument to  stand, I t  
s u ff ic e s  th a t an u n id e n tif ia b le  m in o r ity  o f  people be g lo ry -se eke rs . 
Indeed, In the  Preface to  the  Reader Hobbes shows h im s e lf aware th a t 
h is  theo ry  holds even I f  g lo ry -se e ke rs  were on ly  a m in o r ity :
fo r  though the wicked were few er then the  righ teous , ye t because
we cannot d is t in g u is h  them, the re  Is a necess ity  o f  suspecting ,
heeding, a n tic ip a tin g , sub juga ting , se lf-d e fe n d in g , ever Inc iden t to  
the  most honest, and fa i r e s t  co nd itio n 'd  (22) 
and In va rio us  places o f  De Clve he mentions, as In Elements o f  Law 
and Leviathan, the  ex is tence  o f  non -g lo ry-seekers .
A l l  men In the  S ta te  o f  n a tu re  have a des ire , and w i l l  to  h u rt, bu t
no t proceeding from  the  same cause, n e ith e r equa lly  to  be condemn'd
-  th is  man's w i l l  to  h u r t  a r ls e th  from Vain g lo ry  _ the  o th e r's  
from  the nece ss ity  o f  defending h im se lfe , h is  l ib e r ty ,  and h is  
goods(23)
(21) Ib id ,  p. 177.
(22) Ib id., p. 33.
(23) Ib id ,  p. 46.
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On the  o th e r hand, one cannot f a l l  to  n o tice  th a t the  whole De Cive 
Is  permeated by the view  th a t se lf-co n ce rn  and overwhelm ing am bition 
a re  a u n iv e rs a l t r a i t  o f  man. Th is  b e l ie f  can on ly  be accounted fo r  
as a s ign  o f  Hobbes's own disenchantment w ith  mankind and not as a 
s c ie n t i f ic  requirem ent o f  h is  theory.
IV.4 GLORY AND POLITICS
IV.4.1 G lory, Men, and Bees
In the  p rev ious chapter I t  was noted th a t In Elements o f  Law Hobbes 
s in g le s  o u t “ g lo ry ” as the  reason why men, u n lik e  bees, are unable to  
l iv e  In peace In n a tu ra l cond itions . A p a ra lle l argument can be found 
a lso  In De Cive where Hobbes co n tra s ts  again bees and ants  w ith  men. 
These c rea tu res , he argues, “ l iv in g  on ly  by sense and a p p e tite ” , 
fo llo w in g  “ ba re ly  th e ir  n a tu ra l In c lin a t io n ” , liv e  In constant peace 
among themselves. But, he adds, “among men the  case Is o the rw ise ” . I t  
Is  Im portan t to  l i s t  f u l l y  the  reasons why men cannot manage to  liv e  
p ea ce fu lly  o u ts id e  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te s  :
f i r s t  among [men] th e re  Is a c o n te s ta tio n  o f  honour and preferm ent; 
among beasts the re  Is none: whence ha tred  and envy, ou t o f  which 
a r is e  s e d itio n  and warre, Is among men, among beasts no such 
m a tte r. Next, the n a tu ra l I a p p e tite  o f  Bees, and the  lik e  crea tu res. 
Is conformable, and they d e s ire  the  common good which among them 
d i f fe r s  no t from  th e ir  p r iv a te ; bu t man scarce esteems any th ing  
good which hath no t somewhat o f  eminence In the  enjoyment, more 
then th a t which o th e rs  doe possesse. T h ird ly , those c re a tu re s  which
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are voyd o f  reason, see no d e fec t, o r th in k  they see none. In the 
a d m in is tra tio n  o f  th e ir  Common-weales; bu t In a m u lt itu d e  o f  men 
th e re  are  many who supposing themselves w ise r then o thers, 
endeavour to  Innovate, and d ive rs  Innovators Innovate d ive rs  wayes, 
which Is a meer d is tra c t io n ,  and c iv i l  I warre. F o u rth ly , these b ru te  
c rea tu res , howsoever they may have the use o f  th e ir  voyce to  
s ig n ify  th e ir  a ffe c t io n s  to  each o the r, ye t want they th a t same a r t  
o f  words which Is n ece ssa rily  re q u ired  to  those m otions In the
mind, whereby good Is represented to  I t  as being b e tte r , and e v il I 
as worse then In t r u th  I t  Is; But the  tongue o f  man Is a trum pet 
o f  warre, and s e d it io n  C.) F l f t l y ,  they cannot d is t in g u is h  between 
in ju ry  and harme^ Thence I t  happens th a t as long as I t  Is w e ll w ith  
them, they blame no t th e ir  fe llo w es ; But those men are o f  most 
tro u b le  to  the  République, who have most leasure to  be Id le; fo r  
they use no t to  contend fo r  pub lique  places be fo re  they have
g o tte n  the  v ic to ry  over hunger, and cold. Last o f  a l l ,  the consent
o f  those b ru ta l I c re a tu re s  Is n a tu ra l I, th a t o f  men by compact
one ly, ( th a t Is to  say) a r t i f i c i a l  I; I t  Is th e re fo re  no m a tte r o f
wonder I f  somewhat more be need fu l I fo r  men to  the  end they may
liv e  In peace (24)
As In Elements o f  Law, so In De Cive  the  d iffe re n c e s  In behaviour
between men and bees are ascribed  alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  to  g lo ry ;
v i r t u a l ly  a l l  words used by Hobbes to  exp la in  c o n f l ic t ,  s e d itio n  and 
c iv i l  war are g lo ry - re la te d : “ honour” , “ p re fe rm ent", “ eminence” , b e l ie f  
In one's su p e rio r wisdom, con ten tion  fo r  places o f  a u th o r ity . Unlike
(24) Ibid., pp. 87-8.
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In Elements o f  Law, even the  des ire  o f  possessions Is derived  from 
the  d es ire  o f  g lo ry  : "man scarce esteems any th in g  good which hath 
no t somewhat o f  eminence In the  enjoyment, more then th a t which 
o th e rs  doe possesse” . Again I t  Is w orth  emphasising th a t  no mention 
Is made o f  e ith e r  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  o r scarce resources as prim ary 
causes o f  c o n f l ic t  among men. On the con tra ry , as In Elements o f  Law, 
so In De Cive I t  Is n o tice d  th a t men s t r iv e  fo r  "pub lique  places” 
when they are " Id le ”  and "have go tten  v ic to ry  over hunger and co ld ” . 
Here Hobbes Im plies th a t am b ition  become paramount on ly  when the 
most basic des ires  (o f food and s h e lte r)  have been s a t is f ie d ,  thus 
suggesting  th a t th e re  e x is ts  a n a tu ra l h ie ra rchy between des ires. The 
same view  Is pu t fo rw a rd  la te r  on In Chapter X II o f  De Cive where we 
read:
A l l  men n a tu ra lly  s t r iv e  fo r  Honour and Preferm ent, bu t c h ie fly  
they who are le a s t tro u b le d  w ith  caring  fo r  necessary th in g s  (25)
As to  the  Issue o f  scarce resources. In the  above passage Hobbes 
makes no mention o f  I t  In h is  exp lana tion  o f  the reasons why men are 
prone to  com petition , s e d itio n , and war. In De Clve Hobbes Is w e ll 
aware th a t h is  whole argument Is co n d itio n a l on resources no t being 
In s u f f ic ie n t  to  s u s ta in  the  e n t ire  popu la tion  : in the  E p is tle  to  the 
Reader he warns us th a t he can provide  us w ith  a rec ipe  fo r
Immortal Peace, -. unlesse I t  were fo r  h a b ita tio n , on suppos ition  
th a t the E arth  should  grow too  narrow fo r  her In h a b ita n ts  (26).
I t  Is w orth  emphasising th a t Hobbes, w h ile  assuming th a t  resources 
are no t In s u f f ic ie n t  to  su s ta in  the  e n t ire  popu la tion , be lieves  them
(25) Ib id ,  p. 153.
(26) Ib id ,  p. 25.
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not to  be p le n t i fu l ,  even to  the  p o in t o f  suggesting  th a t, unless 
even ly shared, they cou ld  not meet everyone's needs, as ind ica ted  in 
the  fo u r th  law o f  na tu re :
so a man, who fo r  the  harshness o f  h is  d is p o s it io n  in re ta in in g  
s u p e r f iu it ie s  fo r  h im se lf, and de ta in ing  o f  necessaries from  o thers, 
and being in c o r r ig ib ie  is  commonly sa id  to  be -  troublesom e unto 
o th e rs  «. i f  any man w i l i  contend «. fo r  s u p e r f lu it ie s ,  by h is  
d e fa u lt  the re  w i l l  a r is e  a Warre [ I t  is  a iaw o f  n a tu re ] th a t 
every man accommodate h im se lf to  o the rs  (27).
IV.4-.2 G lo ry and the  S ta te  o f  Nature
In Chapter V o f  De Cive Hobbes mentions g lo ry  as the  so le  cause o f  
com petition , s e d itio n , and war, w h ils t  in Chapter I o f  the  same book, 
where he describes how the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  co liapses in to  a s ta te  o f  
war, he re fe rs  no t on ly  to  va in  g lo ry  but a lso  to  fe a r  o f  death and 
concern fo r  scarce resources as reasons o f  c o n f l ic t  among men.
In p a r t ic u la r ,  a lthough  in Chapter I he s t i l l  m a in ta ins  th a t “ the  
combate o f  W its is  the  f ie r c e s t ” (28) and th a t  men have a “n a tu ra lI  
p r o c l iv i t y  «. to  h u r t each o the r, which they d e rive  from  the  passions, 
bu t c h ie f ly  from  a va in  esteem o f  them selves” (29) he departs  from 
h is  views as expressed in Chapter V by p o in tin g  to  scarce resources 
as a source o f  c o n f l ic t  :
the  most fre q u e n t reason why men d e s ire  to  h u r t each o ther.
(27) /b id., pp. 66-7.
(28) Ib id ., p. 46.
(29) Ib id ., p. 49.
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a r ls e th  hence, th a t  many men a t the same tim e  have an A ppe tite  to  
the  same th in g ; which ye t ve ry  o fte n  they can n e ith e r enjoy In 
common, nor ye t d iv id e  I t  (30) 
and by observing  th a t some people who are tem perate and no t g lo ry -  
seekers are  led to  war by th e ir  concern fo r  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n :
a l l  the  In the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  have a des ire , and w i l l  to  h u rt, but 
no t proceeding from  the  same cause T h is  mans w i l l  to  h u rt 
a r ls e th  from  Vain g lo ry  the  o the r's , from  the  necess ity  o f  
defending h im se lfe  (31)
We have a lready n o tice d  the  same problem o f  apparent Inconsistency 
In Elements o f  Law and s h a ll f in d  I t  again In Leviathan. The common 
p ra c tic e  among readers o f  Hobbes to  so lve  th is  d i f f i c u l t y  has been to  
Ignore I t  by ove rlook ing  the  passage on bees and ants and 
focus ing  Instead e x c lu s iv e ly  on Hobbes's d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the s ta te  
o f  na tu re , and thus cons ide ring  va in  g lo ry , fe a r, and scarce resources 
as concom itant causes o f  c o n f l ic t .  In my view, to  neg le c t Hobbes's 
argument on the  d if fe re n c e  between apian and human so c ie ty , which 
recu rs  In a l l  th re e  works In an a lm ost Id e n tic a l wording. Is not 
m erely a s in  o f  om ission, but may lead to  m is in te rp re tin g  the s ta te  
o f  n a tu re  I t s e l f .  As suggested In the  previous chapter, the re  Is no 
c o n tra d ic tio n  In m a in ta in in g  both th a t g lo ry  Is the  so le  cause o f  
com petition , s e d itio n , and war and th a t In the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  g lo ry , 
fe a r  o f  death, and concern o f  scarce resources a l l  concur to  t r ig g e r  
o f f  the  war. In fa c t,  by app ly ing  to  Hobbes the  Thucydldean 
d is t in c t io n  between u lt im a te  and proxim ate causes o f  war, both views
(30) Ib id ., p. 4.6.
(31) Ib id.
— 121 —
can be accommodated In a s in g le  cons is ten t argument. I t  may be
re c a lle d  th a t In Chapter I I t  was argued th a t according to  Thucydides 
the  dynamics o f  the  Peloponnesian war proceeds from  the  Athenians' 
am b ition  to  augment th e ir  power to  the fe a r o f  the  Lacedœmonians, 
which e v e n tu a lly  sparks o f f  the  war;
The causes why they brake the  [peace], and th e ir  q u a rre ls , I have 
th e re fo re  se t down f i r s t  -  and the  tru e s t  q u a rre l, though least In 
speech, I conceive to  be the  growth o f  the  A thenian power; which 
p u tt in g  the  Lacedœmonians In to  fe a r necess ita ted  the  war (32)
I f  the  same p a tte rn  o f  u lt im a te  and proxim ate causes o f  war Is
app lied  to  Hobbes, then the  d e s ire  o f  g lo ry  can be seen as the spur 
th a t  leads men to  Invade each o th e r te r r i t o r y ,  the  s c a rc ity  o f
resources as the  fa c to r  th a t engenders fea r, and fe a r as p rov id ing  
the  spark th a t t r ig g e rs  o f f  a s ta te  o f  war.
IV.4.3 G lory, Honour, and the  P o l i t ic a l  S ta te
In De Cive Hobbes adheres to  the p ra c tice  e s ta b lish e d  In Elements o f  
Law o f  never re fe r r in g  to  g lo ry  In the  con tex t o f  the  s ta te  o f
natu re , bu t to  va in  g lo ry  Instead. T h is  shows th a t  he had no t changed 
h is  view  th a t no tru e  g lo ry  (I.e . based on tru e  achievements and not 
on fan c ie s ) Is a tta in a b le  In the s ta te  o f  na tu re , as the  fo llo w in g  
quo ta tio n s  dem onstrate:
The question  whether o f  two men be the  more w orthy, belongs not to  
the  n a tu ra l I, bu t c l v l l l  s ta te  a l l  men by n a tu re  a re  equal I, and
(32) Thucydides, History^ I, p. 27.
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th e re fo re  the  In e q u a lity  th a t now is, suppose from  riches, power, 
n o b i l i t y  o f  k indred, Is come from the  c iv i l  I Law (33)
a l l  men th e re fo re  among themselves are by n a tu re  equal I; the
In e q u a lity  we now d isce rn , hath I ts  spring  from  the  C lv l l l  Law (34) 
The fa c t  th a t no g lo ry  can e x is t  In the s ta te  o f  n a tu re  can be 
exp la ined  by n o tic in g  f i r s t l y  th a t according to  Hobbes In n a tu ra l 
co n d itio n s  the re  are no common values, no agreement on what Is meum
e t tuurr\ u s e fu l o r d e tr im e n ta l, ju s t  o r un jus t. On meum e t tuum under
n a tu ra l co nd itio n s  he w rite s :
[ In ]  the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  «. a l l  th in g s  belong to  a l l  men; and the re
Is no place fo r  meum and tuun\ which Is c a l l 'd  Dominion, and
p ro p r ie ty  (35);
p ro p r ie ty  re c e iv 'd  I ts  beginning when C itie s  re ce iv 'd  th e ir s  (36); 
what Is ours, and what anothers. Is a question  belonging to  the  
c l v l l l  Law (37)
Secondly, because o f  the  lack o f  common standards, v a in g lo r io u s  
people. Instead o f  competing by producing b e tte r  o r more th in g s  than 
o the rs, compete In d e fin in g  b e tte r  and worse, more and less so as to  
Impose th e ir  own s tandards to  o thers. This breeds v io lence :
a l l  co n tro ve rs ie s  are bred from hence, th a t the  op in ion  o f  men
d i f f e r  concerning Meum and Tuum, ju s t  and u n ju s t, p ro f i ta b le  and
u n p ro fita b le , good and e v i l  I, honest and d ishonest, and the  like .
(33) Ib id ., p. 68.
(34) Ib id ., p. 35.
(35) Ib id., p. 91. Hobbes t re a ts  w ith  some Irony the  Idea th a t meum
e t tuum cou ld  e x is t  before  the In tro d u c tio n  o f  c i v i l  laws; “ as
I f  I t  were o f  I t  s e lfe  ev iden t, th a t what Is  begotten by me. Is 
mine", ib id ., p. 122.
(36) Ib id., p. 100.
(37) Ib id., p. 101.
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which every man esteems according to  h is  own judgment (38); 
when every man fo llo w e s  h is  owne opinion, I t 's  necessary th a t the  
co n tro ve rs ie s  th a t  a r is e  among them w i l l  becaome Innumerable and 
Indeterm inable ; whence the re  w i l l  breed among men (who by th e ir  
own n a tu ra l I In c lin a t io n  doe account a l l  d is se n t Ion an a f f r o n t )  
f i r s t  hatred, then braw les and warres, and thus a l l  manner o f  peace 
and s o c ie ty  would vanish (39);
a l l  the w o rld  knows th a t  such Is the  natu re  o f  men th a t d isse n tin g  
In questions which concern th e ir  power, o r p r o f i t ,  o r premlnence o f  
w it ,  they s lande r and curse each o th e r (40)
F in a lly , I t  Is c le a r th a t, as soon as the s ta te  o f  n a tu re  Is tu rned  
In to  a s ta te  o f  war, no g lo ry  Is possib le . As people are by na tu re  
equal In th e ir  power to  k i l l  each o th e r (see Chapter I I )  and honour 
and g lo ry  d e rive  from  excess o f  power o f  one above another. I t  
fo llo w s  th a t no g lo ry  Is a tta in a b le  as long as men are  In a s ta te  o f  
war.
In a p o l i t ic a l  s ta te . Instead, g lo ry  Is possib le ; Hobbes's argument on 
th is  to p ic  Is more d e ta ile d  In De Cive than In Elements o f  Law. 
Hobbes remarks th a t ru le rs  cannot remove am b ition  from  human 
natu re ;
because am b ition  and greedinesse o f  honours cannot be roo ted  ou t 
o f  the mlndes o f  men. I t  Is no t the du ty  o f  R ulers to  endeavour 
I t  (41)
nor should  they t r y  to  do so, bu t ra th e r to  s te e r men's a c tio n s  In a
(38) Ib id., p. 95.
(39) Ib id., p. 246.
(40) Ib id., p. 264.
(41) Ib id ., p. 162.
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s o c ia lly  b e n e fic ia l d ire c t io n ;
lawes were no t Invented to  take away, bu t to  d ire c t  mens
a c tio n s (42)
the  end o f  punishment Is no t to  compel I the  w i l l  o f  man, b u t to  
fash ion  I t  (43)
In o th e r words. In Hobbes's op in ion  the sovere ign 's  task  Is to  a llo w  
people to  achieve g lo ry , w h ile  channe lling  I t  In ways th a t  b e n e fit  the 
S ta te . Th is  channe lling  Is fe a s ib le  by means o f  rewards and
punishments, re ly in g  on the  n a tu ra l am b ition  and fe a r o f  men so as to  
put honour and g lo ry  a t the  se rv ice  o f  the  community Instead than 
a llo w in g  them to  harm I t :
bu t by constan t a p p lic a tio n  o f  rewards, and punishment, [R u le rs ] 
may so o rd e r I t ,  th a t men may know th a t the  way to  honour Is, no t
by contempt o f  the  present government, n o t by fa c tio n s , and the
popular ayre, bu t by the  c o n tra r ie s  (44)
Whereas In Elem ents o f  Law Hobbes suggests th a t  the re  are two k inds 
o f  g lo ry  (d e tr im e n ta l and b e n e fic ia l)  but Is unable to  promise to  the  
reader th a t an In v is ib le  hand w i l l  d ire c t In d iv id u a ls  to  achieve the  
good o f  the  whole by pursu ing  th e ir  own am b ition . In De Give he 
cla im s th a t  th is  s o c ia lly  b e n e fic ia l outcome Is ach ievab le  by the  
ve ry  v is ib le  hands o f  the  sovereign, who se ts  the  ru le s  and a llow s 
h is  c it iz e n s  to  compete w ith in  the ru les :
I t  belongs to  the  same ch ie fe  power to  make some common Rules f o r  
a l l  men, and to  dec lare  them pub llque ly , by which every man may 
know what may be ca lle d  h is , what anothers, what ju s t ,  what u n ju s t.
(42) Ib id., p. 165.
(43) Ib id ., p. 166.
(44) Ib id ., p. 163.
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what honest, what d ishonest, what good, what e v i l  I, th a t Is 
summarily, what Is to  be done, what to  be avoided In our common 
course o f  l i f e .  But those Rules and measures are u s u a lly  ca lle d  the 
c i v i l  I Lawes (45);
what th e re fo re  T h e ft, what M urther, what A d u lte ry  and In genera 11 
what In ju ry  Is, must be known by the  c iv i l  I Lawes (46); 
sub jec ts  and c it iz e n s  should a b so lu te ly  obey th e ir  p rinces In a l l  
questions concerning meum and tuum, th e ir  own and o th e rs  r ig h t (47) 
In conclusion, according to  Hobbes's argument, the  p u rs u it  o f  g lo ry  Is 
fe a s ib le  w ith in  a se t o f  ru le s  determ ined by the  sovereign , whereas 
no g lo ry  Is poss ib le  under n a tu ra l co nd itions  where co m pe tition  takes 
the  form  o f  a tte m p tin g  to  Impose one's own ru le s  on o the rs . Any 
a ttem p t a t ru le -m ak ing  by In d iv id u a ls  Is mere evidence o f  va in  g lo ry  
and may b rin g  about the  co llapse  o f  c iv i l  s o c ie ty  and the  f a l l  In to  
the  abyss o f  the  s ta te  o f  na tu re .
IV.4.4 Am bition and C iv i l  War
In Chapter X II o f  De C/ve Hobbes examines “ the  In te rna  11 causes, 
tend ing  to  the  d is s o lu t io n  o f  any Government". He examines “ f i r s t  the  
D octrines and the  Passions co n tra ry  to  Peace, w herew ith the  mlndes o f  
men are f i t t e d  and disposed; next th e ir  q u a lity  and co n d itio n  who 
s o l l ic i te ,  assemble, and d ire c t  them a lready thus disposed, to  take up 
arms Last, the  manner o f  how th is  Is done"(48).
(45) Ib id ,  p. 95.
(46) Ib id ,  p. 102.
(47) Ib id ,  p. 227.
(48) Ib id ,  p. 146.
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P riva te  op in ion  as a s e d itio u s  d o c tr in e .
Among the  seven d o c tr in e s  considered by Hobbes as “ s e d it io u s ” , the 
f i r s t  l is te d  In De Cive Is p a r t ic u la r ly  In te re s tin g  from  our 
pe rspec tive  fo r  I t  concerns p rid e  and cons is ts  In the  b e l ie f  th a t not 
on ly  In the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  bu t a lso  In a p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  I t  Is up to  
each In d iv id u a l to  decide what Is good and e v il.  In Hobbes's words: 
one, and the  f i r s t  [d o c tr in e ] which d lsposeth  [men] to  s e d itio n . Is 
th is ,  That the knowledge o f  good and e v il I belongs to  each s in g le  
man (49).
“ In the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  Indeed — Hobbes remarks — « we have granted 
th is  to  be tru e  But — he adds — In the  c iv i l  I s ta te  I t  Is fa lse . 
For I t  was shown th a t the  c i v i l  I Lawes were the  Rules o f  good and 
e v i l  I, Just and u n ju s t, honest and dishonest*'. (50)
He c ite s  the  B ib le  as a u th o r ita t iv e  evidence th a t the  p rid e  o f  Adam 
to  decide good and e v i l ,  thus cha lleng ing  God, has been mankind's 
ru  In:
the  most anc ien t o f  a l l  God's commands Is, «. thou s h a lt  no t ea t o f  
the  tre e  o f  knowledge o f  good and e v il I; and the  most anc ien t o f  
a l l  d ia b o lic a l I te n ta tio n s  .. Yee s h a ll be as Gods, knowing good and 
e v i l  I; and Gods f i r s t  e xp o s tu la tio n  w ith  man ». Who to ld  thee th a t
thou w e rt naked? hast thou eaten o f  the tre e , w hereof I commanded
thee th a t thou shouIdest no t eat? <51)
T h is  passage o f  Genesis Is mentioned again In the I I I  p a r t o f  De Cive
and recu rs  In o th e r Hobbes's w r it in g s :
(49) Ib id.
(50) Ib id .
(51) Ib id., p. 147.
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by th a t p recept o f  no t e a tin g  o f  the tre e  o f  the  knowledge o f  good 
and e v i l  I -  God d id  re q u ire  a most sim ple  obedience to  h is  
commands, w ith o u t d isp u te  whether th a t were good, o r e v i l  I, which 
was commanded; fo r  the  f r u i t  o f  the tre e , I f  the  command be 
w anting, hath no th ing  In I ts  own nature, whereby the  ea ting  o f  I t  
cou ld  be m o ra lly  e v i l  I, th a t  Is to  say, a slnne (52)
The d iscuss ion  o f  the  l l l - e f f e c t s  on c iv i l  a ssoc ia tio n s  o f  p r iv a te  
op in ion  Is a c e n tra l theme In De Cive and Is no t confined  to  Chapter 
X II; Hobbes o fte n  s tre sse s  how d if fe re n t  are the  judgments o f  people 
and the  judgment o f  the  same man a t d if fe re n t  tim es:
what th is  man commends^ ( th a t Is to  say, c a lls  Good) the o the r 
undervalues, as being E v il; Nay, very o fte n  the  same man a t d ive rse  
tim es, pra ises, and d is p ra is e s  the  same th in g . W h ils t thus they doe, 
necessary I t  Is th e re  should  be discord, and s t r i f e  : They are
th e re fo re  so long In the  s ta te  o f War, as by reason o f  the
d iv e rs ity  o f  the  p resen t a pp e tite s , they mete Good and E v il I by
d ive rse  measures ( 54).
He argues th a t d if fe re n t  op in ions engender con tes t and v io lence  and 
th a t th is  Is a cause o f  q u a rre ls  and war In the s ta te  o f  na tu re  and 
o f  the  co llapse  o f  the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te :
when every man fo llo w e s  h is  owne opinion. I t 's  necessary th a t the 
co n tro ve rs ie s  th a t a r is e  among them w i l l  becaome Innumerable and 
Indeterm inable ; whence the re  w i l l  breed among men (who by th e ir
own n a tu ra l I In c lin a t io n  doe account a l l  d isse n t Ion an a f f r o n t )  
f i r s t  hatred, then braw les and warres, and thus a l l  manner o f  peace
(52) Ib id ., p. 201.
(53) Ib id ., p. 74; see a lso  pp. 26, 52, 75.
-  128 -
and so c ie ty  would vanish (54).
And he d w e lls  a t length on the  Items th a t make up the  fo rb idden  d ie t 
from  which c it iz e n s  must abs ta in  In order to  enjoy the  p r iv ile g e  o f  
peace:
su b jec ts  and c it iz e n s  should a b so lu te ly  obey th e ir  p rinces In a l l  
questions concerning meum and tuum, th e ir  own and o th e rs  r ig h t (55) 
no sub jec t can p r iv a te ly  determ ine who Is a pub lique  fr ie n d , who an 
enemy when war re, when peace, when tru ce  Is to  be made; nor ye t 
what sub jec ts , what a u th o r ity ,  and o f  what men, are commodious o r 
p re ju d ic ia l I to  the s a fe ty  o f  the common-wea le. These, and a l l  lik e  
m a tte rs  th e re fo re  are to  be learned. I f  need be, from  the c ity ,  th a t 
Is  to  say, from  the  sovere ign  powers (56)
d e te rm ina tion  o f  whats ju s t ,  and un jus t, the  cognizance o f  a l l  
co n tro ve rs ie s  about the  meanes o f  peace and pub lique  defence; and 
the  exam ination o f  d oc tr in e s , and books In a l l  manner ra t  Iona 11
science depends upon the  tem pora lI r ig h t  (57)
Am bition and Hope as s e d itio u s  s ta te s  o f  mind
In Chapter X II o f  De Cive, a f te r  having examined the  seven d oc trine s  
th a t In h is  view are s e d itio u s , Hobbes considers the  passions, o r 
s ta te s  o f  mind, th a t In c lin e  men to  c iv i l  war. Two o f  these passions 
are  In te re s tin g  fo r  us, “ am b ition ” and “ hope".
As to  “ a m b ition ” , we have a lready no ticed  In two p rev luos chapters (I
and IV) the s t r ik in g  s im i la r i t y  between Hobbes's and Thucydides' 
arguments In cons ide ring  I t  as a passion th a t “d lspose th  men to
(54) Ib id ., p. 246.
(55) Ib id., p. 227.
(56) Ib id., p. 228.
(57) Ib id ., p. 230; “ I t  belongs to  the c iv i l  I a u th o r ity  ». what
d e f in it io n s  and In ferences are tru e  ” , ib id ., p. 229.
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S e d itio n ’*. On th is  the re  Is no change In De Cive w ith  respect to  
Elem ents o f  Law.
On “ hope” o f  success as a passion “ to  be numbred among ». s e d itio u s  
In c lin a t io n s ” , again Hobbes fo llo w s  Thucydides. As was argued In 
Chapter I, Thucydides though t th a t men are guided In l i f e  more by 
hope o f  success than by fe a r o f  fa i lu re  and th a t th is  In t r in s ic  
optim ism  o f  human n a tu re  In d is rega rd ing  d i f f i c u l t ie s  sometimes leads 
men to  ru in . In Book I I I  o f  the  H is to ry , fo r  example, I t  Is argued by 
D lodotus th a t c a p ita l punishment cannot work as a d e te rre n t because 
the  hope o f  people to  achieve what they want w ith o u t being caught Is 
u s u a lly  s tro n g e r than th e ir  fe a r to  be apprehended, found g u i lty ,  o r 
punished (58). In h is  d iscuss ion  o f  s e d itio n , Hobbes agrees w ith  
Thucydides th a t hope o f  success (as opposed to  fe a r)  Is an a t t i tu d e  
o f  mind th a t Is necessary to  lead men to  tu rn  a s ta te  o f  peace In to  
c i v i l  war. He w r ite s :
The hope o f  overcoming Is a lso  to  be numbred among o th e r s e d itio u s  
In c lin a tio n s . For le t  the re  be as many men as you w ll,  in fec ted  
w ith  op in ion  repugnant to  Peace, and c iv i l  Government; le t  the re  be 
as many as th e re  can, never so much wounded and to rne  w ith  
a ff ro n ts ,  and calumnies, by them who are In A u th o r ity ; ye t I f  the re
(58) “». death hath been In s ta te s  ordained fo r  a punishment o f  many 
o ffences ». Yet encouraged by hope, men hazard themselves: not 
d id  any man ever y e t e n te r not a p ra c tice , which he knew he 
could not go th rough  w ith  ». fo r  men have gone over a l l  degrees 
o f  punishment, augmenting them s t i l l  ». hope and d es ire  work 
th is  e ffe c t  In a l l  e s ta te s  ». th is  as the  leader, th a t as the 
companion; th is  c o n tr iv in g  the  e n te rp rlze , th a t suggesting  the 
success, are  the  cause o f  most crimes th a t are committed: and 
being leas t d iscerned, are more m ischievous than e v i l  seen” . 
H isto ry , I, pp. 311-12.
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be no hope o f  having the b e t te r  o f  them, the re  w i l l  no s e d itio n  
fo llo w ; every man w i l l  d issemble h is  thoughts, and ra th e r content 
h im s e lf w ith  the  p resent burthen, then hazard an heav ie r w e ig h t(59) 
However, as I t  was argued In Chapter I, In h is  p o l i t ic a l  w r it in g s  
Hobbes g e n e ra lly  re je c ts  Thucydides' p o s itio n  th a t as a ru le  hope o f  
success p re v a ils  on fe a r o f  fa i lu r e  in determ in ing  behaviour; In fa c t, 
a lthough  Hobbes accepts th a t both hope and fe a r d ire c t  human action : 
“ the  a c tion s  o f  men proceed from  the  w i l l ,  and the  w i l l  from  hope, 
and fe a r ”  (60) and agrees th a t hope leads people to  f ig h t  (“The hope 
th e re fo re  which each man hath o f  h is  s e c u r ity , and s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , 
co n s is ts  In th is ,  th a t by fo rce  o r c ra f t  he may d isa pp o in t h is  
neighbour, e ith e r  openly o r by stra tagem " (61)), ye t he m a in ta ins  th a t 
fe a r  Is s tro n g e r than hope and Is Indeed Ins trum en ta l In making 
people p o l i t ic a l :
the  O rig in a l I o f  a l l  g rea t, and la s tin g  S oc ie ties , cons is ted  -  In 
the  m utual I fe a r [men] had o f  each o the r (62)
« through fe a r o f  each o the r we th in k  I t  f i t  to  r id  ourse lves o f  
[ th e  s ta te  o f  n a tu re ] (63)
». the  reason why [th e  r ig h t  o f  ru lin g  over a l l ]  was a b o lls h t among 
men, was no o th e r bu t m u tu a ll fe a r  (64)
Eloquence as a s e d itio u s  fa c u lty
F in a lly , a f te r  having l is te d  the  d o c tr in e s  and mental a t t i tu d e s  th a t 
In c lin e  men to  s e d itio n  Hobbes mentions “ eloquence w ith o u t w isdom "(65)
(59) De Cive, p. 153.
(60) Ib id ., p. 85.
(61) Ib id.
(62) Ib id., p. 44.
(63) Ib id., p. 50.
(64) Ib id., p. 185.
(65) Ib id ., p. 154.
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as the  most e f fe c t iv e  means o f  In c it in g  people a ga ins t the  S tate . 
T h is  theme recu rs  In Hobbes's w r it in g s  and can be found In the 
passage on Bees quoted In se c tion  IV.4.1 where I t  Is sa id  th a t  people 
use language to  make th in g s  look d if fe re n t  from  what they are  and I t  
Is  procla im ed th a t “ the  tongue o f  man Is trum pet o f  warre, and 
s e d it io n "  (66).
Combining the  p o in ts  made above, I t  can be seen th a t, s ince 
most men ( I )  be lieve  th a t  they know b e tte r  than o th e rs  what Is  bad 
and good fo r  the  community; ( I I )  are am bitious and always hope to  
change and Innovate the  w orld  to  th e ir  advantage; and ( I I I )  use 
eloquence to  confound o th e rs  about th e ir  re a l ends, according to  
Hobbes I t  fo llo w s  th a t on the  one hand the  form  o f  government 
p re fe rre d  by people Is  democracy fo r
where a l l  men have a hand In pub lique  businesses, th e re  a l l  have 
an o p p o rtu n ity  to  shew th e ir  wlsedome, knowledge, eloquence. In 
d e lib e ra tin g  m a tte rs  o f  the  g re a te s t d i f f i c u l t y  and moment; which 
by reason o f  th a t d e s ire  o f  p ra ise  which Is bred In human na tu re  
Is to  them who e x c e ll In such lik e  fa c u lt ie s ,  and seeme to  
themselves to  exceed o the rs , the most d e l ig h t fu l I o f  a l l  th ln g s (6 7 ) 
th e re  Is no reason why every man should no t n a tu ra lly  ra th e r mlnde 
h is  own p r iv a te , then the  pub lique  buslnesse, but th a t  here he sees 
a means to  dec la re  h is  eloquence, whereby . he may gain the 
re p u ta tio n  o f  being Ingenuous, and wise, and re tu rn in g  home to  h is
(66) Ib id., p. 88.
(67) Ib id ., p. 136.
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fr ie n d s , to  h is  Parents, to  h is  w ife , and ch ild re n , re  Joyce, and 
trium ph  In the  applause o f  h is  dexterous behaviour : as o f  o ld  a l l  
the  d e lig h t Marcus C orlo lanus had In h is  w a rlik e  ac tions , was, to  
see h is  p ra ises  so w e ll p leas ing  to  h is  Mother (68).
On the  o th e r hand, s ince  In “Democraty” , to  a la rg e r e x te n t than 
under “Monarchie” and “ A r ls to c ra ty ” , men can “m u tu a lly  g ive  way to  
each o the rs  a p p e tite ”  (69), the  dem ocratic government Is fo r  Hobbes 
the  most l ik e ly  to  be tro u b le d  by fa c tio n s , s e d itio n s , and c iv i l  war.
(68) Ib id., p. 138.
(69) Ib id ., p. 134.
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C M A R - T E R  \ /
THE MEANING OF GLORY IN LEVIATHAN
V.1 INTRODUCTION; V.2 EXPRESSION AND COMPRESSION IN LEVlATHAti V.2.1 
D e f in it io n  o f  Honour; V.2.2 D e f in it io n  o f  G lory, Vain G lory, D esire o f  
Fame, and Desire  o f  Pra ise; V.2.3 D e fin it io n  o f  Power; V.2.4 S e lf-  
p re se rva tio n  and R a tio n a lity ; V.3 A CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE ?: V.3.1 
Human Passions, U ltim a te  M o tiva tion , and Behaviour; V.3.2 The Role o f  
G lo ry : from  genus to  species; V.3.3 The Role o f  Power : a u n ify in g  
p r in c ip le  o f  a c tio n  ?; V.3.4 F e lic ity ,  and the E x te rn a l Observer; V.4 
A REMARK; V.5 GLORY AN) POLITICS; V.5.1 On Bees; V.5.2 A Thucydldean 
In te rp re ta t io n  o f  the  s ta te  o f  na tu re ; V.5.3 G lo ry  and the P o l i t ic a l 
S ta te ; V.5.4 Am bition and C iv i l War.
V.1 INTRODUCTION
In Volume 7 o f  the  E ng lish  Works o f  the Molesworth e d itio n , In the 
se c tion  on LETTERS AND OTHER PIECES we f in d  the  concluding passage 
to  a t re a t is e  on O ptics  In which Hobbes describes h is  De Cive as the 
“ most p ro f i ta b le  o f  a l l  o th e r"  books w r it te n  on p o l it ic s :
B u tt I f  I t  [ th is  t re a t is e ]  bee found tru e  d o c tr in e , (though y e t t  I t  
wanteth p o lish in g ), I s h a ll deserve the re p u ta tio n  o f  having beene 
ye f i r s t  to  lay the  grounds o f  two sciences; th is  o f  Optiques, ye 
most curious, and y t  o th e r o f  N a tu ra l Jus tice , which I have done In 
my book De Clve, ye most p ro f i ta b le  o f  a l l  o th e r .(1)
(1 ) E ng lish  Works^ vo l. V II, p. 471. O f the above T re a tise , e n t i t le d  “A 
m inute o r f i r s t  d raugh t o f  the Optiques. In two p a rts . By Thomas 
Hobbes. A t P aris  1646“ we have In Latin , In De Homlne the  second 
p a rt on V is ion , whereas the  f i r s t  p a rt on Illu m in a tio n  was never 
published.
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As the above s ta tem ent was made In 1646, I t  Is c le a r th a t Hobbes 
considered De Cive more "p ro f ita b le "  than Elements o f  Law, w r it te n  In 
1640-42. And on th is  the re  Is no disagreement among c r i t ic s  In 
accepting  Hobbes's judgment. What Is more c o n tro v e rs ia l, though. Is 
whether Hobbes considered De Cive supe rio r a lso  to  Leviathan  and 
whether he would have been c o rre c t In th in k in g  so.
On the  23rd o f  A p r i l  1655 when Hobbes dedicated h is  Elements o f  
Philosophy  to  W illiam , E a rl o f  Devonshire, a l l  h is  th ree  p o l i t ic a l  
w r it in g s  were a lready c irc u la t in g  In p r in t  (In  E ng lish ) In London. (2) 
Here Hobbes mentioned De Cive and not Leviathan  as the  founda tion  o f  
p o l i t ic a l  science. We read:
N a tu ra l Philosophy Is th e re fo re  bu t young; but C iv i l  Philosophy ye t 
much younger, as being no o ld e r ... than my own book De C lve .(3)
I t  seems obvious to  me th a t I f  Hobbes had f e l t  th a t  the  changes 
between De Clve  and Levia than  were s ig n if ic a n t  and th a t  Leviathan  
showed a c le a r Improvement In re la t io n  to  De Clve, In the  above 
passage he would have mentioned h is  la te s t work and no t De Clve as 
h is  legacy to  mankind.
However, the  g re a t m a jo r ity  o f  Hobbes's readers seem to  agree th a t 
even I f  Hobbes h im s e lf had judged De Clve as s u p e rio r to  Leviathan, 
he would have been wrong. Most c r i t ic s  have no doubt In considering  
Levia than  as Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  masterpiece. And th is  seems to  them 
so obvious th a t Jean Hampton, w r it in g  In 1986, fe e ls  e n t it le d  to  
s ta te  th a t Levia than  Is the  “most so p h is tica te d " o f  Hobbes's works.
(2) Taking as h is  source Macdonald and Hargreaves, Rogow dates the 
p u b lic a tio n  In London o f  both Leviathan  and De Cive In 1651, and 
Human N ature in  1650; Rogow, op. c it . ,  p. 183.
(3) Elements o f  Philosophy, p. Ix.
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w ith o u t vo lu n te e rin g  a word o f  exp lanation  o r ju s t i f ic a t io n .  (4) Among 
the  excep tions th a t cons ider De Cive supe rio r to  Leviathan^ one could  
mention Warrender, Johnston, and Gert. (5)
On my p a rt, I th in k  th a t  the answer to  the ques tion  o f  whether 
Levia than  surpasses o r no t De Cive depends e n t ir e ly  on the ta s te  o f  
the  reader. I f  one, lik e  m yself. Is mainly concerned w ith  Hobbes's 
founda tion  o f  p o l i t ic a l  o b lig a tio n , one Is bound to  consider De Cive 
as Hobbes's m asterpiece, fo r  here h is  argument reaches an 
u n p a ra lle le d  degree o f  p re c is io n  and c la r ity .  I f  Instead one Is more 
In te re s te d  In Hobbes's ph ilosophy o f  man. In h is  the o ry  o f  passions 
and des ires , In h is  In s ig h t In to  human behaviour and s o c ia l 
In te ra c tio n s , then Leviathan Is the c lea r w inner. I am Inc lin ed  to  
b e lieve  th a t Hobbes, as judge o f  h is  own works, may w e ll have 
p re fe rre d  De Cive to  any o th e r o f  h is  books, because In th a t work he 
managed to  e xp la in  In an Impeccable and — by h is  standards — 
" s c ie n t i f ic "  way what m attered  most to  him, namely the  o r ig in  and 
n a tu re  o f  p o l i t ic a l  o b lig a tio n .
L ike the  p rev ious two chapters, th is  chapter, too , w i l l  be d iv id ed  
In to  two main p a rts , one examining the meaning o f  g lo ry  In Hobbes’s 
philosophy, and the o th e r ana lysing the re la t io n s h ip  between g lo ry  
and p o l it ic s .  As fa r  as the  la t te r  Is concerned. I t  w i l l  be po in ted
(4) "The f i r s t  p re sen ta tio n  o f  Hobbes's argument .» was In Elements 
o f  Law _ The second p resen ta tion  was made In De Clve ». However, 
Hobbes's f in a l  and most so ph is tica ted  p re se n ta tio n  o f  the  
argument was In Levia than ." J. Hampton, Hobbes and the S ocia l 
C ontract T rad ition^  Cambridge: Cambridge U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1987, 
p. 5.
(5) "A lthough as l i te ra tu r e  De Cive does not r iv a l  Leviathan, which 
Is a m asterpiece o f  Eng lish  prose s ty le , I t  Is su p e rio r to  I t  as 
ph ilosophy” , Bernard Gert, " In tro d u c tio n " to  Man and C itizen , 
Garden C ity , New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1972, p. 3.
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o u t th a t Hobbes’s argument in Leviathan  Is e x tra o rd ln a r lly  s im ila r  to  
De Give's, as Is h is  the o ry  o f  o b lig a tio n , In which th is  d is s e rta t io n  
Is m a in ly In te res ted . However, In the t ra n s it io n  from  De Cive to  
Levia than  Hobbes's ph ilosophy o f  man seems to  have changed In some 
In tr ig u in g  ways and become fa r  more complex and s t im u la tin g . In 
p a r t ic u la r ,  the  concept o f  g lo ry  tu rn s  from a genus o f  human passions 
In De Cive In to  a species  In Leviathan, Moreover, a lthough  Hobbes Is  
s t i l l  In te re s te d  In the m o tiva tio n  o f  people. In the  t ra n s it io n  to  
Levia than  the  emphasis s h i f t s  to  people's behaviour and actions.
V.2 EXPRESSION AND COMPRESSION IN LEVIATHAN
In h is  In tro d u c tio n  to  Elements o f  Law, G oldsm ith argues th a t 
Hobbes's e a r l ie r  work " Is  o fte n  p la in e r than Leviathan; occas iona lly  I t  
expresses a p o in t th a t Leviathan compresses". (6) In th is  sec tion  we 
s h a ll see th a t G oldsm ith 's comment does app ly to  some aspects o f  the  
d e f in it io n s  o f  g lo ry , honour, and power, but does not hold In o th e r 
respects.
V.2.1 D e f in it io n  o f  Honour
In p rev ious chapters we no tice d  th a t In Elements o f  Law "honour" Is 
the  "acknowledgement o f  power", whereas In De Cive  honour Is 
"o p in io n " o f  power. In Levia than  Hobbes develops the  view  Introduced 
In De Cive and lin ks  honour to  "judgment" and says th a t "honour
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co n s ls te th  on ly  In the  op in ion  o f  power” . (7) He argues th a t to  
honour a man Is to  va lue  him (8), p o in tin g  out th a t the  va lue th a t we 
g ive  to  a man Is h is  p rice , namely what we are prepared to  pay fo r  
the  use o f  h is  a b i l i t ie s  o r powers, and th a t, as such. I t  is  not 
abso lu te  but depends on our needs which In tu rn  depend on our 
judgments :
The value, o r WORTH o f  a man. Is  as o f a l l  o th e r th ing s , h is  p rice ; 
th a t Is to  say, so much as would be given fo r  the  use o f  h is  
power: and th e re fo re  is  no t abso lu te ; but a th in g  dependant on the 
need and jugdgment o f  another. (9)
As the needs and judgments o f  people vary w ith  the  circum stances, so 
va ry  the  va lue  and honour o f  Ind iv idu a ls :
An able conductor o f  s o ld ie rs , Is o f g rea t p r ic e  In tim e o f  war 
present, o r Imminent; bu t In peace not so. A learned and unco rrup t
judge. Is much w orth  In tim e o f  peace; but not so much In war. And
as In o th e r th ing s , so In men not the s e lle r ,  bu t the  buyer
determ ines the  p rice . For le t  a man, as most men do, ra te  
themselves a t the  h ighes t va lue  they can; ye t th e ir  tru e  va lue  Is 
no more than I t  Is esteemed by o the rs . (10)
As In Elements o f  Law every form  o f  power Is honourable, so Is In 
Levia than:
dominion and v ic to ry , honourable ». good fo r tu n e  ». r ich e s  are
honourable; fo r  they are power ». magnanimity, l ib e r a l i t y ,  hope, 
courage, confidence, a re  honourable; fo r  they proceed from  the
(6) Elements o f  Law, M. Goldsm ith, “ In tro d u c tio n ” , p. x x l.
(7) Leviathan, p. 80.
(8) **To value a man .» is  to  honour him^\ ib id ., p. 76.
(9) Ib id .
(10) Ib id .
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conscience o f  power ». t im e ly  re so lu tio n s  ». honourable ». experience, 
science, d is c re t io n  o r w it  ». g ra v ity  ». honourable ». to  be known fo r  
w ealth, o ff ic e ,  g re a t ac tions , o r any eminent good ». honourable ». 
conspicuous paren ts  ». honourable ». covetousness ». am b ition  o f  
g re a t honours are honourable ». p riva te  due ls ». honourable». Nor 
does I t  a l te r  the  case o f  honour whether an a c tion , so I t  be g rea t 
and d i f f i c u l t ,  and consequently a sign o f  much power, be ju s t  o r 
u n ju s t: fo r  honour co n s ls te th  on ly  In the op in ion  o f  power (11)
In th is  respect th e re fo re  Hobbes does not compress In Levia than  what 
he had sa id  p re v io u s ly  bu t on the  co n tra ry  on the  one hand he 
re ite ra te s  the  v iew  expressed In De Give th a t honour Is based on 
op in ion  m a in ta in ing , as In Elements o f  Law, th a t  a l l  form s o f  power 
are honourable, on the  o th e r hand he analyses In more d e ta il the 
chain th a t lin k s  a man to  so c ie ty . In fa c t, whereas In Elements o f  
Law we found a honour-va lu e -power chain (see Ch. I l l ,  sec. 111.2.6), In 
Levia than  the  f u l l  chain Is from  honour to  value, from  va lue to  p rice , 
from  p rice  to  power, from  power to  need and, f in a l ly ,  from  need to  
judgment. However, th e re  Is In Leviathan  a "compression" o f  one 
aspect o f  the  concept o f  honour explained In some d e ta il In Elements 
o f  Law: I am re fe r r in g  to  the fa c t  th a t w h ile  In h is  p rev ious works 
Hobbes exp la ins  th a t honour de rives  fromexcess o f  power o f  a man 
above another and says :
“ to  honour a man ». Is to  conceive or acknowledge, th a t th a t man 
hath the odds o r excess o f  power above him th a t  contendeth o r 
compareth h im s e lf"  (12)
(11) Ib id ., pp. 79-81.
(12) Elements o f  Law, p. 34.
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in Levia than  Instead he s im p ly  no tice s  th a t honour Is g iven to  people 
w ith  power, w ith o u t e x p l ic i t ly  In troduc ing  the n o tio n  o f  “ excess o f  
power” :
Honourable Is whatsoever possession, ac tion , o r q u a lity .  Is an 
argument and s ign  o f  power (13)
T h is  n o tw ith s tan d in g . I t  emerges from Book IV o f  Levia than  th a t 
honour does Imply comparison, as I t  had been argued In Elements o f  
Law and De Clve:
to  honour. Is to  va lue  h ig h ly  the power o f  any person: and th a t 
such value Is measured , by our comparing him w ith  o the rs  (14)
I t  Is c le a r from  Hobbes's l i s t  o f  the  ways In which people honour
o th e rs  (Chapter X o f  Book I) th a t he has not changed h is  view th a t 
fo r  a person to  honour ano ther Is an admission o f  I n fe r io r i t y  :
Ways o f  honouring «. to  prey to  another to  obey to  g ive  g reat 
g i f t s  (15)
to  f la t t e r  to  g ive  way ~ to  show love (or fe a r)  to  p ra ise  «.
h u m ility  to  b e lie ve  ^ to  t r u s t  ^ to  harken to  a man's c o u n c il(16)
In conclusion, a lthough  In Leviathan — u n like  In Elements o f  Law and 
De Cive — Hobbes, when speaking o f  honour, never s p e lls  ou t th a t 
people honour In d iv id u a ls  more pow erfu l than themselves, he s t i l l  
m a in ta ins  th a t comparison and excess o f  power are the  necessary
in g re d ie n ts  o f  honour. A lthough In th is  con tex t th is  example o f  a 
“ compression" o f  an argument may appear unim portan t. I t s  s ig n ific a n c e  
w i l l  become apparent la te r  on when the d iffe re n c e s  between the
(13) Leviathan^ p. 79.
(14) Ib id ., p. 647.
(15) Ib id ., p. 76.
(16) Ib id ., p. 77.
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concept o f  power In Elements o f  Law and Leviathan w i l l  be examined.
V.2.2 D e f in it io n  o f  G lory, Vain G lory, Desire o f  Fame, and Desire o f  
P ra ise
In Chapter 6 o f  Levia than  we read:
"Joy, a r is in g  from  Im agination  o f  a man's own power and a b i l i t y .  Is 
the  e x u lta t io n  o f  the  mind which Is ca lle d  GLORYING (17)
U n like  the d e ta ile d  d e s c r ip tio n s  o f  g lo ry  In Elements o f  Law and De 
Cive, the  above d e f in it io n  does not make Immediate re ference  to  o the r
In d iv id u a ls  and thus m ight convey the  Impression th a t  g lo ry in g  Is a
p leasure  o f  the  mind which the  Hobbes Ian In d iv id u a l can experience 
a b s tra c tin g  h im s e lf com plete ly from  a l l  o thers.
Th is  Impression, however, would be Inco rrec t, because In Leviathan  
Hobbes o fte n  uses g lo ry in g  as synonymous o f  trium ph o f  a man over 
another. (18) Moreover In h is  T rea tise  on Human Nature, w r it te n  
a f te r  Levia than  and considered by some as h is  la s t word on human
na tu re  (19), the  Idea th a t o the rs  are e sse n tia l fo r  one's g lo ry in g  Is 
s ta te d  again:
Sometimes the  animal s p i r i t s  are In concert tra n sp o rte d  by a 
c e rta in  jo y  th a t  a r ls e th  from  th e ir  th in k in g  themselves to  be
honoured «. th is  e la tio n  o f  the  mind Is ca lled  g lo ry  (20)
The fa c t  th a t In Elements o f  Law Hobbes says e x p l ic i t ly  th a t g lo ry  Is 
the  p leasure  o f  comparing ourse lves w ith  o the rs  and o f  n o tic in g  our
(17) Ib id., p. 45,
(18) "[R]evenge ... Is  a trium ph, o r g lo ry in g  In the h u r t o f  another", 
ib id ., p. 140.
(19) See, fo r  example, Bernard G ert, c it .
(20) Human Nature, p. 58.
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s u p e r io r ity ,  whereas In Levia than  he s ta te s  s im p ly  th a t g lo ry  Is the 
p leasure  o f  power, Is m erely a compression o f  an Idea and no t a 
change o f  philosophy. As In the  case o f  honour d iscussed above, th is  
compression should no t be overlooked fo r  I t  Is re le va n t fo r  the 
assessment o f  the d iffe re n c e s  between Elements o f  Law, De Cive and 
Levia than  on the concept o f  power (see next sec tion ).
Another obvious, bu t perhaps less In te re s tin g , compression o f  an Idea 
Is Hobbes’s d e f in it io n  o f  va in  g lo ry , which Is s h o r te r  and less 
p rec ise  than In Elements o f  Law:
GLORYING «. i f  grounded upon the  experience o f  h is  own form er 
ac tions, Is the same w ith  confidence: but I f  grounded on the 
f la t t e r y  o f  o the rs ; o r on ly  supposed by h im se lf, fo r  d e lig h t In the 
consequences o f  I t ,  Is ca lle d  VA IN-GLORY: which name Is p rope rly
given; because a w e ll grounded confidence  b eg e tte th  attem pt: 
whereas the supposing o f  power does not, and Is th e re fo re  r ig h t ly  
ca I led va in. <21 )
v a ln -g lo r lo u s  men ~ are Inc lin ed  on ly  to  o s te n ta tio n , bu t not to
a ttem pt (22)
I f  we compare the above d e f in it io n  w ith  th a t g iven In Elements o f
Law and examined in Ch. I l l ,  we may n o tice  th a t In Levia than  vain 
g lo ry  Incorpora tes the  concepts o f  fa ls e  g lo ry  and va in  g lo ry
d iscussed se pa ra te ly  In the  p revious work. However, Hobbes's view on 
va in  g lo ry  shows no change; as In Elements o f  Law va in  g lo ry  Is 
d is tin g u is h e d  from  g lo ry  In so fa r  Is no t grounded on a c tio n s  but on 
fanc ies , and In so fa r  as I t  generates w is h fu l th in k in g  ra th e r than
(21) Leviathan, p. 45.
(22) Ib id ., p. 88.
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a ttem pts; “ the  language o f  va in  g lo ry  [ Is ]  o p ta tiv e " . (23)
The term  “ a s p ir in g "  used In Elements o f  Law as a c r i te r io n  to  
d is t in g u is h  between va in  g lo ry  and g lo ry  Is replaced by 'a ttem p t' and 
the  choice o f  a term  more Imm ediately re la te d  to  a c tion s  can 
be seen perhaps as a s ign  o f  the  general s h i f t  In Leviathan (to  be 
examined below) from  the  ana lys is  o f  the Inner though ts  o f  people to  
the  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  th e ir  ac tion s  and behaviour.
A lthough In Levia than  g lo ry  Is de fined  In some respect less p re c ise ly  
than In Elements o f  Law, fo r  our purposes I t  Is In te re s tin g  to  note 
th a t In Levia than  Hobbes adds a q u a lif ic a t io n  on the  meaning o f  g lo ry  
th a t was m issing In h is  p rev ious works. In sec I I I . 2.7 I t  was noticed 
th a t whereas In c u rre n t language I t  makes sense to  speak o f  g lo rio u s  
deaths and to  consider death as a poss ib le  ro u te  to  g lo ry , the 
com bination o f  g lo ry  and death Is a lo g ic a l Im p o s s ib il ity  In Hobbes's 
te rm in o lo g ic a l w orld. In fa c t  as g lo ry  Is the  p leasure  o f  supe rio r 
power and dominion, I t  fo llo w s  th a t no Hobbes Ian man can experience 
tru e  g lo ry  (as opposed to  va in  g lo ry  based on fa n c ie s ) un less he Is 
a liv e . L ike power, p leasure  In g lo ry  vanishes a t one's death. In 
Leviathan  Hobbes s p e lls  ou t th is  po in t, d is t in g u is h in g  c le a r ly  the 
des ire  o f  honour, g lo ry , and power on the  one hand and the  des ire  o f 
fame a f te r  death and des ire  o f  p ra ise  on the  o the r. The form er 
des ires , he argues In the  chapter on the  manners o f  men, lead people 
to  com petition , s e d it io n  and war. Desire o f  fame a f te r  death and 
d es ire  o f  p ra ise . Instead, d r iv e  people to  obey to  the  common power 
and to  avoid  c o n f l ic t :
(23) Ib id ,  p. 50.
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C om petition o f  riches, honour, command, o r o th e r power, in c lin e th  to  
con ten tion , enm ity, and war (24)
Desire  o f  p ra ise , d ispose th  to  laudable actions, such as please them 
whose judgement they va lue-D esire  o f  fame a f te r  death does the 
same. (25)
A lthough Hobbes does no t go as fa r  as suggesting  th a t the des ire  o f  
fame a f te r  death may lead people to  lose th e ir  liv e s  fo r  fame, th is  
form  o f  des ire  could  in p r in c ip le  be com patib le w ith  r is k in g  one's 
l i f e .  For g lo ry -  o r power-seekers, instead, death would n u l l i f y  th e ir  
chances o f  ach ieving  th e ir  u lt im a te  end, namely the  dominion over 
o the rs .
V.2.3 D e f in it io n  o f  Power
In Levia than  we f in d  the  fo llo w in g  d e f in it io n  o f  power ;
THE POWER o f  a man, to  take i t  u n iv e rs a lly , is  h is  presen t means;
to  ob ta in  some fu tu re  apparent good; and is  e ith e r  o r ig in a l o r
ins trum enta i. (26)
On the ground o f  the  above q uo ta tio n  some o f  Hobbes's readers (e.g. 
M cN e illy ) have concluded th a t in Leviathan  power is  no longer a 
re la t io n a l concept (as i t  was in Elements o f  Law and De C ive) but on
the co n tra ry  has become a human c h a ra c te r is t ic  th a t can be defined
in abso lu te  terms. However, one can p o in t to  a w ea lth  o f  passages in 
Levia than  showing th a t th is  in te rp ré tâ t ion is  in co rre c t and th a t over
(24) fb id ,  p. 86.
(25) Ib id ,  p. 87.
(26) Ib id ,  p. 74.
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the  years Hobbes had no t changed h is  view th a t the  power o f  a man Is 
never abso lu te  bu t dependent on the  power o f  o the rs.
F ir s t  o f  a l l  we may n o tice  th a t a few lin e s  below the above
q u o ta tio n  Hobbes d e fin e s  "n a tu ra l power" as “ eminence o f  the fa c u lty  
o f  body and mind", thus  suggesting  th a t the  Idea o f  a comparison 
w ith  o th e rs  Is Im p lic it  In the ve ry  term "power" and th a t a man 
cannot be sa id  to  have n a tu ra l powers such as s tre n g th , form, 
prudence, eloquence, e tc  I f  the re  are no o th e r men around him who 
are weaker, u g lie r ,  less prudent, less a r t ic u la te  :
n a tu ra l power eminence o f  the fa c u lty  o f  body o r mind -  
s tre n g th , form , prudence, a r ts , eloquence, l ib e r a l i t y  , n o b il i ty  (27)
In the  same passage Hobbes n o tice s  th a t "re p u ta tio n  o f  power. Is 
power". Th is  view, which was te n ta t iv e ly  Introduced fo r  the f i r s t  tim e
In De Cive In the  con tex t o f  the  ana lys is  o f  honour (see supra sec.
IV.2.2), and Is c o n s is te n tly  m aintained throughout Levia than  Im plies 
th a t In Hobbes’s view  the  power o f  a man, as h is  va lue, p rice , and 
honour (see supra  sec. V.2.1) Is not abso lu te , bu t depends on the 
op in ion  o f  h is  fe llo w s :
re p u ta tio n  o f  power. Is power- re p u ta tio n  o f  love o f  a man's 
coun try  -C ls power!., what q u a lity  soever maketh a man beloved, or 
fea red  by many; o r the  re p u ta tio n  o f  such q u a lity .  Is power-good 
success Is power,; because I t  maketh re p u ta tio n  o f  wlsdom- 
re p u ta tlo n  o f  prudence In the  conduct o f  peace o r war. Is power- 
eloquence Is power, because I t  Is seeming prudence.«form Is power; 
because being a promise o f  good (28)
(27) Ib id
(28) Ib id ,  pp. 74-75.
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Moreover In the  opening sentence o f  Chapter V I I I  o f  the  F ir s t  Book o f  
Leviathan, where the  In te lle c tu a l powers o f  men are  lis te d  and 
discussed, Hobbes makes the reader aware th a t a man can be sa id  to  
have w it ,  judgment, fancy, e tc . on ly  I f  he excels as compared w ith  
o the rs :
VIRTUE gen e ra lly . In a l l  s o r ts  o f  sub jects. Is somewhat th a t Is 
va lued fo r  eminence; and co n s ls te th  In comparison. For I f  a l l  th ing s  
were equal In a l l  men, no th ing  would be prized. (29)
F in a lly , we may re c a ll from  the  d iscuss ion  o f  honour and g lo ry  o f  the 
p rev ious sec tions  th a t In Levia than  Hobbes, a lthough  a t t r ib u t in g  to  
those terms the  ve ry  same meaning given In h is  p rev ious works, does 
no t s ta te  e x p l ic i t ly  th a t honour and g lo ry  Imply “more power" but 
s im p ly  remarks th a t they e n ta il “ power". Th is Is ano ther Instance o f  
the  p ra c tic e  fo llo w e d  by Hobbes In Leviathan, th a t  I have t r ie d  to  
h ig h lig h t In th is  sec tion , o f  us ing “ power" as an Im p lic it ly  re la t io n a l 
concept.
In conclusion. In the  t ra n s it io n  from Elements o f  Law to  Leviathan  
Hobbes dev ia tes  In some respects from a mechanical d e f in it io n  o f  
power, developing the  In s ig h t f i r s t l y  Introduced In De Clve th a t power 
In human a ssoc ia tio n s  Is not something o b je c tive  lik e  the power o f  
the  wind, bu t depends on people's “ re p u ta tio n ” , “ op in ion", and 
"judgment". However, he s t i l l  holds the view th a t power. In p o l i t ic s  
as w e ll as In mechanics. Is a re la t io n a l concept. W hile In Elements o f  
Law and De Give Hobbes expresses th is  p o in t repea ted ly  and makes 
the  reader aware th a t, lik e  the power o f  a horse running on the
(29) Ibid,, p. 56.
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beach Is g iven by the  d if fe re n c e  w ith  the opposing powers o f  the 
w ind and the su rface , so the power o f  a man is  never abso lu te  but 
g iven by h is  excess o f  power over o the rs , in Leviathan  he fin d s  /  
unnecessary to  make th is  e lu c id a tio n . Thus in Elements o f  Law and De 
Clve the  concept o f  power is  e x p l ic i t ly  a concept o f  re la t io n , whereas 
in Leviathan i t  is  so on ly  im p lic it ly .
As a f in a l remark on power, we may no tice  th a t in  Leviathan  Hobbes 
re s o rts  once again to  an example taken from mechanics to  i l lu s ta te  
the  fa c t  th a t power in  human assoc ia tions  generates new power:
For the na tu re  o f  power, is  in  th is  po in t, lik e  to  fame, increasing 
as i t  proceeds; o r lik e  the  motion o f  heavy bodies, which the 
fu r th e r  they go, make s t i l l  the more haste. (30)
V.2.4- S e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  and R a tio n a lity .
A lthough the re la t io n s h ip  between s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  and ra t io n a li ty  
is  no t expla ined In Levia than  in the  c lea r and unambiguous terms o f  
De Cive, Hobbes repeats here the  view expressed in h is  previous 
works th a t as a ru le  men consider death as the  g re a te s t o f  a l l  e v ils  
and tend to  conserve th e ir  liv e s  by a l l  means :
O f th in g s  «. those th a t are dearest to  a man are h is  own l i fe ,  and 
I imbs <31 )
As in De Cive, so in Leviathan Hobbes considers reason as a method o f  
f in d in g  ou t the  a p p ro p ria te  means fo r  the achievement o f  one's ends. 
Indeed a l l  the  n a tu ra l laws th a t recommend Hobbesian men “ to  fo llo w
(30) Ib id ., p. 74.
(31) Ib id ., p. 329.
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peace” as the  on ly  means a va ila b le  to  them to  preserve th e ir  live s  
are ca lle d  by Hobbes “ theorems o f  reason” ; and the  use o f  the r ig h t  
o f  n a tu re  as the  on ly  means to  defend one's l i f e  when the re  Is no 
hope o f  ach ieving  peace Is a lso  Ind ica ted by reason.
I t  Is a precept, o r genera l ru le  o f  reason, th a t  every man, ought 
to  endeavour peace as fa r  as he has hope o f  o b ta in in g  I t ;  and when 
he cannot o b ta in  I t ,  th a t he may seek, and use, a l l  helps, and
advantages o f  war (32)
V.3 A CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE ?
In th is  se c tion  I t  w i l l  be argued th a t the ro le  p layed by g lo ry  In 
the philosophy o f  man In Leviathan  Is not the same as In previous 
works. More p re c ise ly . I t  w i l l  be shown th a t In the  t ra n s it io n  from 
Elements o f  Law and De Cive to  Leviathan, g lo ry  Is no longer the
genus o f  a l l  m o tiva tio n s  but has become a species among the  va rious
poss ib le  m o tiva tio n s  o f  human actions. Moreover, a number o f
arguments (see sec tions  V.3.1 -4 ) w i l l  be provided to  I l lu s t r a te  the
p o in t th a t In Levia than  Hobbes becomes more In te re s te d  than before  
In the  behaviour o f  people ra th e r than In th e ir  Inner thoughts  and
r
renounces | to  h is  p rev ious a ttem pt to  f in d  a u n ify in g  p r in c ip le  o f  
m o tiva tion , concen tra ting  Instead In s in g lin g  ou t a u n ify in g  p r in c ip le  
o f  ac tion . I t  should  be s tressed , however, th a t a lthough a s h i f t  o f  
In te re s t from  m o tiva tio n  to  behaviour seems to  be the  general trend  
o f  Leviathan, In Hobbes’s argument (and e sp e c ia lly  in the  In troduc t 'o,i
(32) I b i d ,  p. 117.
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to  Levia than) the re  are excep tions th a t weaken the  case fo r  a
d e f in i t iv e  and complete change o f  perspective  .
V.3.1 Human Passions, U ltim a te  M o tiva tion , and Behaviour
In Elements o f  Law Hobbes l is t s  about t h i r t y  human passions and
m a in ta ins  th a t the  “n a tu re ”  o f  a l l  o f  them “ [c o n s ls te th ] In the
p leasure  men have, o r d isp leasu re  from the s igns  o f  honour or
d ishonour done In to  them” . <33) Then he comes to  d e fin e  a l l  these
passions as v a r ia t io n s  o f  g lo ry  and f in a l ly  o f fe rs  “ a view o f  the 
passions represented In a race " (see supra sec. I I I . 3). In Leviathan  
Hobbes's se t o f  human passions Is  la rg e r (about f o r t y  passions are 
m entioned) and con ta ins  a l l  the  passions f i r s t  In troduced In Elements 
o f  Law. The n ove lty , though. Is not In the new a d d itio n s , bu t ra th e r 
In the  new d e f in it io n s  o f  some o f  the passions d iscussed In h is
p rev ious work.
As an example one can compare the  d e f in it io n  o f  m agnanim ity given In 
Elements o f  Law :
MAGNANIMITY Is no more than g lory... but g lo ry  w e ll grounded upon 
c e rta in  experience o f  power s u f f ic ie n t  to  a t ta in  h is  end In open 
manner. (34)
w ith  the  d e f in it io n  o f  the same passion given In Levia than  ;
Contempt o f  l i t t l e  helps and hindrances, [ Is ]  MAGNANIMITY.
Magnanimity, In danger o f  death and wounds, [ Is  c a lle d ] va lour, 
fo r t i tu d e .  Magnanim ity In the use o f  r ich e s  [ Is  ca lle d ]
l ib e ra l i ty .  (35)
(34) Ib id ., p. 47.
(35) Leviathan, p. 44.
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The main d if fe re n c e  between the  two d e f in it io n s  Is th a t In Elements 
o f  Law Hobbes t r ie s  to  describe  the  Inner fe e lin g s  o f  a man who Is 
magnanimous, whereas In Levia than  Instead he s im p ly  describes the 
e x te rn a l behaviour o f  people who are magnanimous. A lthough I t  Is 
c le a r from  the chapter o f  Leviathan  In which he d iscusses honour 
th a t  Hobbes s t i l l  m a in ta ins  th a t magnanimity is  an a t t r ib u te  o f  
In d iv id u a ls  who are  conscious o f  th e ir  power and as such I t  Is 
perceived by a l l  as honourable :
Magnanimity, l ib e r a l i t y ,  hope, courage, confidence, are honourable; 
fo r  they proceed from  the  conscience o f  power (36) 
he never s ta te s  th a t people are magnanimous o r generous fo r  the  sake 
o f  honour. Indeed In the  chapter where human passions are examined, 
Hobbes does no t specu la te , u n lik e  In Elements o f  Law, on what 
u lt im a te  m o tiva tio n  d r iv e s  people to  be magnanimous, covetous, 
am b itious, pus illan im ous, bu t s im p ly  p o in ts  to  the  e x te rn a l ob jec t o f  
d es ire  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  each passion:
Desire o f  riches, COVETOUSNESS;.- Desire o f  o f f ic e ,  o r precedence, 
AMBITION (37)
Th is  s h i f t  o f  emphasis from  the enqu iry  on the  Inner thoughts and 
u lt im a te  m o tiva tio n s  o f  people to  the c a re fu l s tudy  o f  th e ir  
e x te rn a l behaviour and o f  the  e x te rn a l ob jects  o f  th e ir  des ires  Is a 
genera l c h a ra c te r ls t Ic  o f  Leviathan (a lthough by no means a constant 
one) and can he lp  e xp la in in g  the d if fe re n t  ro le  o f  g lo ry  and power In 
the  t ra n s it io n  from  Elem ents o f  Law to  Leviathan.
(36) Ib id ., p. 79.
(37) Ib id ., p. 4-4.
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V.3.2 The Role o f  G lo ry : from  Genus to  Species
In Chapter 6 o f  the  F ir s t  Book o f  Leviathan  Hobbes de fines about 
f o r t y  passions. As we no ticed  above, u n like  In Elements o f  Law, 
Hobbes never says th a t these passions de rive  from  the p leasure o r 
d isp lea su re  th a t a man ob ta in s  from  honouring nor does he suggest, 
as he d id  In De Cive th a t “ a l l  the minds p leasures re fe r  to  g lo ry  In 
the  end". Th is Is a s ig n if ic a n t  change In Hobbes's philosophy o f  man, 
because g lo ry  from  genus, o r u lt im a te  m o tiva tio n  o f  a l l  des ires  
becomes a species, o r an Instance o f  human passions.
To th is  general ru le  the re  are exceptions. In Chapter 6 laughter, 
weeping, shame, em ulation, and envy are s t i l l  de fined  In terms o f  
g lo ry in g  o r d e jec tion :
Sudden g lo ry . Is the  passion which maketh those grimaces c a lle d  
LAUGHTER; «. sudden d e jec tio n . Is the passion th a t causeth WEEPING; _ 
SHAME co n s ls te th  In the apprehension o f  some th in g  dishonourable; 
«. g r ie f ,  fo r  the success o f  a com petito r In w ealth, honour, o r 
o th e r good -. Is ca lle d  EMULATION «. [o r] envy (38)
In Chapter 8 the d e fe c t o f  the mind ca lled  by Hobbes “madness" Is 
once again put down as In Elements o f  Law to  excessive va in  g lo ry  o r 
excessIve de jec t Ion:
The passion, whose v io lence , o r continuance maketh madness. Is 
e ith e r  g rea t va in -g lo ry , w lh lch  Is commonly ca lle d  pride , and s e l f -  
conceit; o r g rea t de je c tio n  o f  mind (39)
Moreover, th roughou t Levia than  and e sp e c ia lly  In Book I I  the re  are
(38) Ib id ., p. 46.
(39) [b id ., p. 62.
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va rio u s  instances in which Hobbes re s ta te s  the  view ty p ic a l o f  h is  
p rev ious w r it in g s  th a t  “ men -  n a tu ra lly  love l ib e r ty ,  and dominion 
over o th e rs ” (40) th a t  “ men are  c o n tin u a lly  in com petition  fo r  honour 
and d ig n ity ” (41) and th a t “man whose joy  c o n s ls te th  in comparing 
h im s e lf w ith  o th e r men, can re lis h  noth ing  bu t what is  em inent” (42). 
However, on the  whole Hobbes seems no longer convinced th a t g lo ry  is  
the  u lt im a te  m o tiva tio n  o f  a l l  men and th is  view is  confirm ed by h is  
tre a tm e n t o f  human passions in  h is  T re a tise  on Human Nature, 
w r i t te n  a f te r  Leviathan, Thus i t  can be s a fe ly  sa id  th a t the ro le  o f  
g lo ry  has changed in Hobbes's philosophy o f  man but, as we s h a ll see 
la te r  in  th is  chapter, no t in h is  p o l i t ic a l  theory.
V.3.3 The Role o f  Power : A U n ify ing  P rin c ip le  o f  Action?
In reading Levia than  one may have the  Impression th a t whereas g lo ry  
has been tu rned  from  a genus in to  a species o f  human passions, the  
d e s ire  o f  power ins tead  has r ise n  from  a species to  a genus o f  a l l  
human m o tiva tion . To suppo rt th is  view one can f in d  a number o f  
s ta tem ents made by Hobbes :
d es ire  o f  power, o f  riches , o f  knowledge, and o f  honour -  a l l  which 
may be reduced to  the  f i r s t ,  th a t is , des ire  o f  power. For riches, 
knowledge, and honour, are but seve ra l s o r ts  o f  power. (43)
I pu t fo r  a genera l in c lin a tio n  o f  a l l  m inkind, a perpe tua l and 
re s t less d e s ire  o f  power a f te r  power, th a t ceaseth only in 
death. (44)
(43) Ib id ., p. 61.
(44) Ib id ., pp. 85-86.
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I t  may be noticed , though, th a t In so fa r  as the d e s ire  o f  power was 
Im p lic it  In the  d e f in it io n  o f  g lo ry  given In p rev ious works (g lo ry . 
I t  may be re ca lle d . Is the  p leasure  o f  power and thus to  seek g lo ry  
Im plies to  seek power) I t  fo llo w s  th a t a lready In Elements o f  Law, 
a lb e it  on ly  Im p lic it ly ,  the  d es ire  o f  power Is the  sp rin g  o f  a l l  
In d iv id u a l ac tions. Thus, the  fa c t  th a t In Levia than  power Is
e x p l ic i t ly  the  genus o f  a l l  human m o tiva tions  does no t seem to  o f fe r  
ground to  suggest th a t  on th is  to p ic  the re  Is a s ig n if ic a n t  change 
between Hobbes's p o l i t ic a l  works. However, on my p a r t I th in k  th a t In 
fa c t  Levia than  does mark a change o f  perspective  from  Hobbes's 
p rev ious works, In as much as power, w h ile  not rep lac ing  g lo ry  as the 
p r in c ip le  o f  m o tiva tio n , p lays a d if fe re n t  ro le  from  the one
p re v io u s ly  perform ed by g lo ry . A lthough on th is  problem the re  Is 
ample room fo r  debate, the  balance o f  evidence seems to  me to  
suggest th a t whereas g lo ry  In Elements o f  Law and De Give was the 
u n ify in g  p r in c ip le  o f  m o tiva tion , power In Leviathan  Is ra th e r a 
u n ify in g  p r in c ip le  o f  a c tio n s  th a t exp la ins the behaviour o f  people 
w ith  d if fe re n t  m o tiva tio n , such as moderates and g lo ry -seeke rs . This 
is  how Hobbes q u a lif ie s  the statem ents quoted a t the beginning o f  
th is  sec tion :
The cause o f  th is  [re s t le s s  des ire  o f  power a f te r  power], Is not
always th a t a man hopes fo r  a more In tens ive  d e lig h t, than he has
a lready a tta in e d  to ; o r th a t he cannot be content w ith  a moderate 
power: bu t because he cannot assure the power and means to  liv e  
w e ll, which he hath present, w ith o u t the a c q u is it io n  o f  more. (45)
(45) Ibid., p. 86.
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In the  above q u o ta tio n  (which, I t  ought to  be noted, Is taken from 
Hobbes's d iscuss ion  o f  the  d if fe re n t  “manners”  o f  men In Chapter XI 
and no t from  h is  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the  dynamics o f  the  s ta te  o f  nature), 
Hobbes remarks th a t a l l  people ac t In such a way as to  augment th e ir  
power, even I f  th e ir  m o tiva tio n  may be d if fe re n t .  Thus power In 
Leviathan, u n lik e  g lo ry  In Elements o f  Law and De Cive, is  not the  
u lt im a te  p leasure  o f  the mind to  which a l l  the  o th e r p leasures re fe r  
In the  end, bu t ra th e r a common p r in c ip le  o f  a c tio n  m otiva ted  by 
d if fe re n t  passions and des ires. Power, In o th e r words, is  the 
concept on the  bas is  o f  which the behaviour o f  a l l  s o r ts  o f  people 
can be compared, re la te d  and In te rp re ted . The s h i f t  o f  emphasis from 
the  s tudy  o f  the  Inner though ts  and des ires o f  men to  the  ana lys is  
o f  the  o b jec ts  o f  th e ir  des ires  and to  th e ir  behaviour (a lready 
mentioned In our d iscuss ion  o f  the  passions, see supra  sec. V.3.1) 
seems to  me to  be a genera l fe a tu re  o f  Leviathan, In s p ite  o f  va rious 
except Ions.
V.3.4- F e lic ity ,  and the  E x te rn a l Observer
Whereas in Leviathan as a general ru le  Hobbes describes passions and 
d es ires  in less d e ta il than In Elements o f  Law, he devotes to  the 
d e f in it io n  o f  “ f e l i c i t y ”  much more a tte n tio n  th a t before. I ts  
meaning Is exp la ined  f i r s t  In Ch 6 where I t  Is sa id  th a t
C ontinua l success In o b ta in in g  those th ing s  which a man from tim e 
to  tim e d e s lre th , th a t  Is to  say, con tin u a l p rospering  Is th a t men 
c a ll FELICITY; I mean the f e l i c i t y  o f  th is  l i f e .  For the re  Is no 
such th in g  as pe rpe tua l t r a n q u i l l i t y  o f  mind, w h ile  we liv e  here;
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because l i f e  I t s e l f  Is bu t motion, and can never be w ith o u t desire , 
nor w ith o u t fe a r, no more than w ith o u t sense. (46) 
and repeated In Chapter 11
the  f e l i c i t y  o f  th is  l i fe ,  co n s ls te th  not In the  repose o f  a mind 
s a t is f ie d  f e l i c i t y  Is a co n tin u a l p rogress o f  the des ire , from  one 
o b jec t to  another; the  a tta in in g  o f  the form er, being s t i l l  but the 
way to  the la t te r .  The cause w hereof Is, th a t the o b jec t o f  man's 
des ire . Is no t to  enjoy once only, and fo r  one In s ta n t o f  tim e; but 
to  assure fo re v e r, the  way o f  h is  fu tu re  des ire . (47)
We may n o tice  th a t both In Elements o f  Law and In Leviathan, what 
cha rac te rizes  f e l i c i t y  Is the  continuous proceeding from  desires
to  achievements and from  achievements to  new des ires. As In Elements
o f  Law, f e l i c i t y  Is no t described In Levia than  as the end, o r
m o tiva tion , o f  the  Hobbes Ian agent but I t  Is ra th e r exp la ined as the 
key fo r  In te rp re tin g  the  way o f  l i f e  o f  the Hobbes Ian people, as seen 
from  an e x te rn a l observer o r from  an agent tak ing  a re f le c t iv e  and 
detached stand-back from  h is  everyday s tru g g le  to  augment h is  power. 
The space and though t devoted by Hobbes In Leviathan  to  the
d e s c r ip tio n  o f  f e l i c i t y  can be In te rp re te d  once again along the  lines 
taken In th is  se c tio n  according to  which Hobbes In h is  la te r  work Is 
more concerned than befo re  to  describe  the behaviour o f  people as 
seen from  an e x te rn a l observer than to  describe  the  Inner thoughts 
o f  each agent.
(46) Ib id ., p. 51.
(47) Ib id ,  p. 85.
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V.1 A REMARK
In Leviathan, as in p rev ious works, g lo ry  Is the  p leasure  o f  su pe rio r 
power o r dom inion over o thers . Here th is  d es ire  Is pu t In sharper 
focus, by d is tin g u is h in g  I t  from  more Innocent des ires  such as des ire  
o f  fame o r o f  p ra ise . A lthough In Leviathan  Hobbes s t i l l  m a in ta ins In 
p laces th a t the  d e s ire  o f  dominion Is common to  each and everyone, 
h is  genera l tendency Is to  u nd e rlin e  th a t g lo ry  Is on ly  one possib le  
m o tiva tio n  o f  people and Is overwhelm ing on ly  In some. Therefore  the 
ex is tence  o f  n on -g lo ry -se e ke rs  Is co ns is te n t w ith  the  genera l tenor 
o f  the  argument o f  Leviathan, u n lik e  In Elements o f  Law and De Cive, 
where th e ir  ex is tence  was puzz ling  and d id  not f i t  In Hobbes's 
genera l d iscourse.
We have argued th a t w h ile  In p revious works Hobbes concentra ted on 
the  m o tiva tio n  o f  people and found In g lo ry  a u n ify in g  p r in c ip le  o f  
th e ir  des ires . In Levia than  Instead he tends to  be more In te re s ted  In 
the  behaviour o f  people and In the  e x te rn a l o b jec ts  o f  th e ir  desires. 
More than ever be fo re  In Leviathan Hobbes be lieves th a t the 
m o tiva tio n  o f  people Is va rious  , Inconstant and o fte n  unknown. 
Passions lik e  l ib e r a l i t y  and magnanimity, th a t  In Elements o f  Law 
had been described In term s o f th e ir  m o tiva tio n  (I.e ., In term s o f 
g lo ry  and honour) In Leviathan are described In terms o f  the 
behaviour th a t they In sp ire  and a lthough re la te d  to  honour, honour Is 
no t sa id  to  be th e ir  u lt im a te  m o tiva tion . In h is  la te r  work Hobbes 
seems to  g ive  up the  quest fo r  the common u lt im a te  d r iv e  o f  a l l  
people, probab ly because he has become unsure o f  I ts  ex is tence  and/or 
because h is  In te re s t as a p o l i t ic a l  ph ilosopher In the  s tudy  o f  the
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Inner n a tu re  o f  man has been superseded by h is  In te re s t as a 
p o l i t ic a l  th e o r is t  In In d iv id u a l a c tion  and behaviour. We have 
suggested th a t d e sp ite  the  exceptions, the  balance o f  evidence seems 
to  suggest th a t  power In Levia than  Is a common p r in c ip le  o f  ac tion  
ra th e r than a p r in c ip le  o f  m o tiva tio n  . We have thus h in te d  th a t 
Hobbes's advice to  the  reader to  know h im se lf g iven In the 
In tro d u c tio n  to  Levia than  would have been more a pp ro p ria te  In the 
opening pages o f  Elements o f  Law.
V. GLORY AMD POLITICS
Whereas we have no tice d  th a t the re  are some s ig n if ic a n t  changes In 
the place occupied by g lo ry  In Hobbes's phllosophv o f  man. In th is  
se c tion  we s h a ll see th a t  the  ro le  played by g lo ry  In Hobbes's 
p o l i t ic a l  the o rv  Is the  same In Leviathan  as In e a r l ie r  works. As 
p re v iou s ly , Hobbes s in g le s  ou t g lo ry , des ire  o f  honour, and am bition 
as the major sources o f  com petition , s e d itio n , and war, and regards as 
one o f  the  main tasks o f  the  sovere ign  power the  channe lling  o f  
g lo ry  not fo r  the  d e trim en t, bu t fo r  the b e n e fit o f  the  community o f  
men.
V.5.1 Men, Bees, and Ants
As In Elements o f  Law and De Give, so In the  opening chapter o f  the 
Book I I  o f  Levia than  Hobbes addresses the problem o f  why men, un like  
bees and ants, cannot liv e  In peace o u ts ide  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te s . In order
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to  app rec ia te  the  e x tra o rd in a ry  s im i la r i ty  between Hobbes's argument 
In Leviathan  w ith  h is  views expressed In h is  e a r l ie r  works, I t  Is
w orth  c it in g  th is  passage In f u l l  :
I t  Is tru e , th a t c e r ta in  liv in g  crea tu res, as bees and ants, liv e  
so c ia b ly  one w ith  another.- and th e re fo re  some man may perhaps 
d es ire  to  know why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer. 
F ir s t ,  th a t men are c o n tin u a lly  In com petition  fo r  honour and 
d ig n ity  ». and consequently amongst men th e re  a r ls e th  on th a t 
ground, envy and hatred, and f in a l ly  war. Secondly, th a t amongst 
these c rea tu res , the  common good d lf fe re th  no t from  the p r iv a te  -  
But man whose jo y  co n s ls te th  In comparing h im s e lf w ith  o th e r men, 
can re lis h  no th ing  bu t what Is eminent. T h ird ly , th a t these
crea tu res , having no t as man, the use o f  reason, do not see, nor 
th in k  they see any fa u lt ,  In the a d m in is tra tio n  o f  th e ir  common 
business; whereas amongst men the re  are ve ry  many, th a t th in k  
themselves w ise r, and ab le r to  govern the p ub lic , b e tte r  than the  
re s t; and these s t r iv e  to  reform  and Innovate, one th is  way, 
another th a t way; and thereby b ring  I t  In to  d is t ra c t io n  and c iv i l  
war. F o u rth ly , th a t  these crea tu res -. want th a t a r t  o f  words, by 
which some men can represent to  o the rs  th a t which Is good. In the
likeness o f  e v i l ;  and e v il.  In the likeness o f  good; and augment, o r
d im in ish  the  apparent greatness o f  good and e v il;  d isco n te n tin g  
men, and tro u b lin g  th e ir  peace a t th e ir  p leasure. F i f th ly ,  I r ra t io n a l 
c rea tu re s  ». as long as they be a t ease they are no t o ffended w ith  
th e ir  fe llo w s : whereas man Is then most troublesom e, when he Is 
most a t ease: fo r  then I t  Is th a t he loves to  shew h is  wisdom, and
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c o n tro l the  a c tio n s  o f  them th a t govern the  commonwealth. (48)
We may n o tice  th a t even more fo r c ib ly  th a t In e a r l ie r  works, a l l  
arguments used by Hobbes In the above passage to  Ind ica te  the causes 
o f  com petition , s e d itio n , and war, are g lo ry - re la te d  : "honour and 
d ig n ity " ,  the  jo y  o f  comparing o n e se lf w ith  o the rs , the  tendency to  
" re l is h  no th ing  but what Is em inent” , the op in ion  o f  being "w ise r", 
"a b le r", "b e t te r "  than the  re s t, the  s t r i f e  " to  re form  and Innovate", 
the  p ro pe n s ity  to  misuse language as to  “ rep resen t to  o the rs  th a t 
which Is good. In the  likeness o f  e v il;  and e v il,  in  the  likeness o f  
good", man's " lo v e - to  shew h is  wisdom and c o n tro l the  ac tions  o f  
them th a t  govern the  commonwealth".
Whereas In Elem ents o f  Law, the  d es ire  o f  possessions was lis te d  
among the causes o f  c o n f l ic t ,  in the  p a ra lle l argument In Leviathan  
no mention Is made o f  man's greed (a lthough d es ire  o f  p r o f i t  Is 
mentioned among the  "reasons o f  q u a rre l"  In the chapter on the s ta te  
o f  na tu re  examined In the  next sec tion ). As In Elements o f  Law and 
De Cive, In Levia than  Hobbes does no t mention fe a r fo r  one's s e l f -  
p re se rva t Ion, nor concern fo r  scarce resources as poss ib le  o r ig in s  
o f  com petition  and war. On the  co n tra ry , he repeats h is  remark th a t 
whereas bees and and ants  "are no t o ffended by th e ir  fe llo w s " as 
long as they are a t ease and th e ir  l i f e  Is safe, "man Is then most 
troublesom e, when he Is most a t ease". As In De Give he m aintained 
th a t he could  prom ise "im m orta l peace" as long as resources were 
s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  the  susta inm ent o f  a l l  popu la tion  so In Leviathan  he 
p o in ts  ou t th a t  I f  resources were to  become In s u f f ic ie n t ,  no p o l i t ic a l
(48) Ibid., pp. 156-157.
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alchemy could  save mankind from  war :
And when a l l  the  w o rld  Is overcharged w ith  Inhab itan ts , then the 
la s t remedy o f  a l l  Is war; which p rov lde th  fo r  every man, by 
v ic to ry ,  o r death (49)
V.5.2 A Thucydldean In te rp re ta t io n  o f  the s ta te  o f  na tu re
Hobbes's p re sen ta tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  na tu re  In Levia than  echoes 
Thucydides's H is to ry  so much more c lo s e ly  than the  corresponding 
passages In Elements o f  Law and De Cive to  make th is  reader wonder 
whether Hobbes, be fo re  w r i t in g  h is  most comprehensive d e s c r ip tio n  o f  
the  n a tu ra l co nd itio n s  o f  mankind, may have not re -re a d  the  “most 
p o l i t ic "  o f  h is to r io g ra p h e rs . There are th ree  main s im i la r i t ie s  
between Hobbes's and Thucydides' argument.
F ir s t ,  In H is to ry  the  th re e  g re a te s t th in g s  th a t move the  human w orld  
are  sa id  to  be honour, fe a r, and p r o f i t  ;
though overcome by th ree  the  g re a te s t th ing s , honour, fea r, and 
p r o f i t  -. we have th e re in  done noth ing to  be wondered a t nor 
besides the  manner o f  men (50) 
and In Levia than  Hobbes s in g le s  ou t the same th re e  passions to  
exp la in  the  In te ra c tio n  between men ou ts ide  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te s  ;
So th a t In the n a tu re  o f  man, we f in d  th ree  p r in c ip a l causes o f  
q u a rre l. F ir s t ,  com petition ; secondly, d iffid e n c e ; th ird ly ,  g lo ry . The 
f i r s t ,  maketh men Invade fo r  gain: the second, fo r  sa fe tv : and the 
th ird ,  fo r  re p u ta tio n . (51)
(49) Ib id ,  p. 335.
(50) H is to ry , I, p. 82.
(51) Leviathan, p. 112.
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Hobbes's gain echoes Thucydides' p r o f i t ,  s a fe ty  fe a r, and re p u ta tio n  
honour.
I t  Is w orth  n o tin g  th a t In Hobbes's argument, as o u tlin e d  In Chapter 
X I I I ,  the  th ree  passions l is te d  as "reasons o f  q u a rre l"  namely gain, 
sa fe ty , and re p u ta tio n  do no t share the same s ta tu s : whereas g lo ry  
and greed are sa id  by Hobbes to  d r iv e  to  v io lence  and c o n f l ic t  
Independently from  the  co ns ide ra tion  o f  whether o r no t o th e r people 
are fe a r fu l:
[ga in  leads men to ]  use v io lence , to  make themselves masters o f 
o th e r men's persons, w ives, ch ild re n , and c a t t le  [re p u ta tio n  leads 
men to ] use v io lence  -  fo r  t r i f le s ,  as a word, a sm ile , a d if fe re n t  
op in ion , and any o th e r s ign  o f  undervalue, e ith e r  d ire c t  In th e ir  
persons, o r by re f le c t io n  In th e ir  kindred, th e ir  fr ie n d s , 
th e ir  na tion , th e ir  p ro fess ion , o r th e ir  name (52) 
fe a r, Instead, Is sa id  by Hobbes to  d r iv e  men " to  use v io lence " and 
" to  q u a rre l"  In o rde r " to  defend them lselves and th e ir  k ind red ]", on 
the  assum ption th a t they they w i l l  be a ttacked  by In d iv id u a ls  seeking 
p r o f i t  o r g lo ry .
In o th e r words. In Hobbes's argument, concern fo r  s u rv iv a l.  I f  not 
combined w ith  the  e xpec ta tion  o f  fu tu re  e v i l  a t the hand o f  g lo ry -  
seekers and greedy people, does no t lead to  com petition  and war. 
Indeed, as I t  has emerged from  the previous sec tion . In Hobbes's 
op in ion  I f  men were m erely concerned w ith  th e ir  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , 
they would liv e  In peace lik e  bees and ants. At th is  p o in t we can see 
th a t th e re  Is a second p a ra lle l between Hobbes's and Thucydides'
(52) Ibid.
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argument, a lready h ig h lig h te d  In two previous chapters. As Thucydides 
though t th a t the  Peloponnesian war had been tr ig g e re d  o f f  by fe a r In 
the  Lacedæmonlans, which In tu rn  had been generated by the  des ire  o f  
power o f  the  A thenians:
The cause why they broke the [peace], and th e ir  q u a rre ls  I have 
th e re fo re  se t down f irs t» , and the  t ru e s t  q u a rre l, though leas t In 
speech, I conceive to  be the  grow th o f  the  A thenian power; which 
p u tt in g  the  Lacedaemonians In to  fe a r necess ita ted  the  war (53) 
so In Hobbes's d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  na tu re  In Levia than  fe a r 
Is the  proxim ate cause o f  c o n f l ic t ,  whereas des ire  o f  p r o f i t  and 
g lo ry  are I ts  u lt im a te  o r ig in s . Fear Induces d iff id e n c e , a n t ic ip a t io n  
and f i r s t  s t r ik e  (54-), bu t the  u lt im a te  causes o f  fe a r (and thence o f  
c o n f l ic t )  are the  g lo ry  and the  greed o f  some men. Hobbes w r ite s : 
because the re  be some, th a t tak ing  p leasure In contem pla ting  th e ir  
own power In the  ac ts  o f  conquest, which they pursue fu r th e r  than 
th e ir  s e c u r ity  re q u ires ; I f  o the rs , th a t o the rw ise  would be g lad to  
be a t ease w ith in  modest bounds, should no t by Invasion Increase 
th e ir  power, they would not be able, long tim e, by s tand ing  on ly  on 
th e ir  defence, to  s u b s is t. (55)
The above q u o ta tio n  reminds us o f  the speech o f  the  C o rin th ians  to  
the  Lacedaemon Ians, In which I t  Is sa id  th a t as long as Lacedaemon Ians 
are surrounded by neighbours as voracious as the  A thenians they 
cannot concern them selves m erely w ith  th e ir  In te rn a l a f fa ir s  bu t must 
take s ides In the  war, fo r  the sake o f  th e ir  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  :
(53) H is to ry , p. 27.
(54) "[F3ear o f  oppression, d lsposeth  a man to  a n tic ip a tio n " . 
Leviathan, p. 88.
(55) Ib id ., pp. 111-112.
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n e ith e r do any harm to  o the rs  nor rece ive  I t  Is a th in g  you hard ly  
could  a tta in ,  though the  s ta te s  around you were o f  the same 
co nd itio n s  (56)
A th ir d  aspect which Chapter X I I I  o f  Leviathan  shares w ith  
Thucydides' H is to ry  Is the  co n tra p o s itio n  between hope and fea r. In 
both arguments hope o f  success d r iv e s  men to  r is k y  e n te rp rise s , w h ile  
fe a r  leads them to  peace and s e lf - r e s t r a in t .
Thus, as In Deodotus* speech repo rted  In the p revious chapter I t  Is 
sa id  th a t hope o f  escaping punishment d rive s  men to  crime, so 
Hobbes, In the  opening paragraphs o f  Chapter X I I I  argues th a t from 
“ e q u a lity  o f  hope In the  a tta in in g  o f  [ th e ir ]  end”  de rives the 
"endeavour [o f  men] to  destroy , o r subdue one ano the r” ; as In 
Deodotus’ speech the  fu n c tio n  o f  fe a r  Is to  re s tra in  men, so In the 
la s t paragraphs o f  the  same chapter Hobbes p o in ts  to  fe a r o f  death 
as the main passion th a t In c lin e s  men to  peace and to  en te r the 
s o c ia l con trac t.
However, the  convergence o f  views between Hobbes and Thucydides on 
hope and fe a r Is  no t complete; as I t  was no ticed  e a r l ie r  In th is  
d is s e r ta t io n  (see supra  Chapters I and IV), Hobbes, In so fa r  as he 
be lieves  th a t fe a r Is s tro n g e r In men than hope o f  success (which he 
c a lls  sometimes va in  g lo ry )(5 7 ), d ls ta n j/ia te s  h im s e lf from the J j. i Lo,''' 
p e s s im is tic  view  th a t emerges from  Thucydides' H is to ry  and can 
promise the reader th a t “ peace” and “ commodious l iv in g ” can be 
e v e n tu a lly  achieved w ith in  the p o l i t ic a l  s ta te .
(56) H is to ry , p. 76.
(57) See Leviathan, pp. 311-312.
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V.5.3 Glory and the P o lit ica l State
A lthough “ commonwealth" Is examined In much more d e ta il In Leviathan  
than In e a r l ie r  works, on the re la t io n s h ip  between g lo ry  and p o l i t ic s  
the re  are no major changes o r new Ideas. Hobbes s im p ly  re ite ra te s  o r 
sometimes e xp la ins  In more d e ta il the  views expressed In De Cive. 
Hobbes In Levia than  does no t depart from  Elements o f  Law and De Cive 
In m a in ta in ing  th a t
The question  who Is the  b e tte r  man, has no place In the  co nd itio n  
o f  mere na tu re ; where, as has been shewn before, a l l  men are equal. 
The In e q u a lity  th a t now Is, has been In troduced by the  laws 
c iv  11. (58)
The exp lana tion  fo r  the  Im p o s s ib il ity  o f  tru e  g lo ry  In the  s ta te  o f  
n a tu re  proceeds, as before . In two steps In Hobbes’s argument: f i r s t  
I t  Is po in ted  ou t th a t In the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  the re  are no common 
measures o f  good and e v i l ,  meum and tuum, Just and u n ju s t, and th a t 
th is  breeds con ten tion  and war (59). Secondly, I t  Is e s ta b lish e d  th a t
(58) Ib id ,  p. 140
(59) "[F3or one man c a lle th  wisdom, what another c a lle th  fe a r; and 
one c ru e lty , what another jus tlce ;o n e  p ro d ig a lity ,  what another 
magnanim ity; and one g ra v ity , what another s tu p id ity ,  &c.", ib id ., 
pp. 28-29; “ fo r  these words o f  good, e v il,  and con tem ptib le , are 
ever used w ith  re la t io n  to  the  person th a t useth  them: the re  
being no th ing  s im p ly  and a b so lu te ly  so. Nor any common ru le  o f  
good and e v il,  to  be taken from  the na tu re  o f  the  ob jec ts  
themselves; bu t from  the person o f  the man, where the re  Is no 
commonwealth; o r. In a commonwealth from the  person th a t 
rep resen te th  I t . " ,  ib id ., p. 41; “ fo r  as amongst m aster less men, 
the re  Is pe rpe tua l war, o f  every man aga ins t h is  neighbour; no 
Inheritance , to  tra n s m it to  the  son, nor to  expect from  the 
fa th e r; no p ro p r ie ty  o f  goods, o r lands; no s e c u r ity ; bu t a f u l l  
and abso lu te  l ib e r ty  In every p a r t ic u la r  man", ib id ., p. 201.
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as long as In d iv id u a ls  compete fo r  s u rv iv a l, s ince they are equa lly  
able  to  k i l l  each o th e r (see supra  Chapter 11),there can be no w inners 
and thus no tru e  g lo ry  can be experienced.
In both De Cive and Levia than  I t  Is argued th a t the  task o f  the
sovere ign  power Is to  c rea te  and enforce  ru le s  o f  good and e v il,  
r ig h t  and wrong, meum and tuum (60) — ca lle d  “ c iv i l  laws’* (61) — th a t
re g u la te  the com pe tition  between men and, thanks to  a system o f
punishment and rewards th a t re l ie s  on the n a tu ra l fe a r and am bition 
o f  men, channel g lo ry  In a way th a t Is b e n e fic ia l Instead than
d e tr im e n ta l to  the  community o f  men. (62)
(60) “ CTlhe c o n s t itu t io n  o f  mine and th in e  and h is ; th a t Is to  say. In 
one word p ro p r ie ty  belongeth In a l l  k inds o f  commonwealth to  
the  sovere ign  power. For where the re  Is no commonwealth there  
Is ». a pe rpe tua l war o f  every man aga ins t h is  neighbour; anr 
th e re fo re  every th in g  Is h is  th a t g e tte th  I t ,  and keepeth I t  by 
fo rce ; which Is n e ith e r p ro p r ie ty , nor community; but 
u n c e rta in ty ’’, ib id ., p. 233; “». Is annexed to  the  sovere ign ty , 
th a t a l l  power o f  p re sc rib in g  the ru le s  whereby every man may 
know, what goods he may enjoy, and what a c tion s  he may do ». and 
th is  Is I t  men c a ll p ro p r ie ty . For before  c o n s t itu t io n  o f  
sovere ign  power, has hath a lready been shown, a l l  men had r ig h t  
to  a l l  th in g s ; which n e ce ssa rily  causeth war: and th e re fo re  th is  
p ro p r ie ty , being necessary to  peace, and depending on sovereign 
power. Is the  ac t o f  th a t power, In o rder to  the  p u b lic  peace. 
These ru le s  o f  p ro p r ie ty , o r meum and tuum, and o f  good, e v il,  
la w fu l, and u n la w fu l In the ac tions  o f  sub jec ts  are the c iv i l  
laws,’’, ib id ., p. 165; “ cons ide ring  what va lue men are n a tu ra lly  
ap t to  se t upon themselves; what respect they look fo r  from 
o the rs ; and how l i t t l e  they value o the r men; from  whence 
c o n tin u a lly  a r is e  among them, em ulation, qua rre ls , fa c tio n s , and 
a t la s t war, to  the  des tro y in g  o f  one another, and d im inu tion  o f  
th e ir  s tre n g th  a ga in s t the common enemy; I t  Is necessary th a t 
the re  be laws o f  honour, and a p ub lic  ra te  o f  the  w orth  o f  such 
men as have deserved, o r are able to  deserve w e ll o f  the 
commonwealth; and the re  be fo rce  In the hands o f  some or o the r, 
to  put those laws In execu tion .’’, ib id ., p. 167.
(61) “ C C llv ll law Is to  every sub jec t those ru le s  which the 
commonwealth hath commanded him ». to  make use o f  fo r  the 
d is t in c t io n  o f  r ig h t  and wrong’’, ib id ., p. 251.
(62) “ CR]eward and punishment, by which », every jo in t  and member Is 
moved to  perform  h is  d u ty ’’, ib id ., p, x; “For In the  d iffe re n c e s  
between p r iv a te  men, to  declare , what Is e qu ity , what Is ju s t ic e
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remarkable dua l s ta tu s  In the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te : on the  one hand I t  
poses a l im it  to  com petition  In so fa r  as a p p ro p ria tio n  v ia  th e f t  
becomes an unacceptable mechanism fo r  the  tra n s fe r  o f  w ea lth ; on the 
o th e r hand, I t  opens up new and en larged f ie ld s  to  com petition  I ts e lf .  
Because o f  the  In tro d u c tio n  o f  p r iv a te  p ro p e rty  r ig h ts ,  the 
com pe tition  fo r  r ich e s  can take the  form  o f  “ In d u s try ” , I.e. men can 
compete by producing th ing s . U n like  com petition  on e x is t in g  th in g s  
which Is h ig h ly  c o n f l ic tu e l (so much so th a t I t  leads to  com petition  
fo r  s u rv iv a l) ,  co m pe tition  through Ind u s try  has a s o c ia lly  s ta b il iz in g  
ro le  : thanks to  the  p roduction  o f  goods, s o c ie ty  becomes a non­
zero-sum-game, I.e. gains by some do not n e ce ssa rily  Imply 
corresponding losses by o the rs , fo r  the dimensions o f  w ea lth  are no 
longer fix e d , but have become augmentable. Moreover the  In tro d u c tio n  
o f  p r iv a te  p ro p e rty  b rin gs  about even more Im portant changes. In 
fa c t.  I f  the estab lishm ent o f  common values (o f good and e v il,  b e tte r  
and worse, more and less) Im plies th a t In the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  th in g s  
and people can be eva lua ted  according to  shared c r i te r ia .  I t  Is the 
ex is tence  o f  exc lu s ive  p ro p e rty  r ig h ts  th a t enables In d iv id u a ls  to  
compete In f ie ld s  o th e r than w ea lth  accum ulation. People In te re s te d  
In the  “a r ts  upon words” , In “ science” , In “a r ts  o f  p u b lic  use", and.
and what Is moral v ir tu e  and to  make them b ind ing , the re  Is need 
o f  the  ordinances o f  sovere ign  power, and punishment to  be 
ordained fo r  such as s h a ll break them” , ib id ., p. 253; “ to  the 
sovere ign  Is committed a power o f  rewarding w ith  riches, o f  
honour, and o f  pun ish ing w ith  co rpora l o r pecun iary punishment, 
o r w ith  Ignominy, every su b jec t according to  the  law he hath 
fo rm a lly  made; o r I f  the re  be no law made, according as he s h a ll 
judge most to  conduce to  the  encouraging o f  men to  serve the 
commonwealth, o r d e te rr in g  o f  them from doing d is s e rv ic e  to  the 
same.” , ib id ., p. 166; “ to  [the  sovereign power) I t  belongeth to  
determ ine o f  rewards, and punishments, honour, and o rd e r” , ib id .,
p. 186.
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we may add, in b u t te r f ly  c o lle c tio n , In sp o rt o r In any a c t iv i t y  
o th e r than the  accum ulation o f  w ealth, can compete In th e ir  chosen 
f ie ld s ,  because th e ir  means o f  s u rv iv a l are no longer threatened.
In conclusion, whereas the  u n re s tr ic te d  com petition  o f  the  Hobbes Ian 
s ta te  o f  na tu re  (which because o f  I ts  very u n re s tr  le t  Iveness 
co llapsed  to  com pe tition  on a s in g le  leve l, namely th a t o f  s u rv iv a l)  
a llow ed the  emergence o f  In d iv id u a ls  whose on ly  c h a ra c te r is t ic  was to  
be a liv e , the  re g u la te d  com pe tition  w ith in  the p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  Is
m u ltl-d lm e n s lo n a l — I t  can take place a t a l l  le ve ls  and In a l l  
spheres, thus a llo w in g  the  emergence o f  d if fe re n t  and so p h is tica te d  
p e rs o n a lit ie s .
V.5.4- Am bition and C iv i l  war
In Chapter XXIX o f  Book I I  o f  Leviathan, Hobbes examines “ those 
th in g s  th a t weaken, o r tend to  the  d is s o lu t io n  o f  a 
commonwealth” (63). A f te r  having no ticed  th a t “ no th ing  can be Immortal, 
which m o rta ls  make” he remarks th a t commonwealths “ m ight be secured, 
a t leas t from p e rish in g  by In te rn a l d iseases” . Among the “ diseases” 
th a t can a f f l i c t  a commonwealth, he l is t s  In second place “ s e d itio u s  
d o c tr in e s ” , the  f i r s t  o f  which Is " th a t every p r iv a te  man Is judge o f  
good and e v i l  a c tio n s ” . Th is theme was a lready d iscussed by Hobbes In 
d e ta il In De Clve; In Levia than we f in d  no new Ins igh ts :
That every p r iv a te  man Is judge o f  good and e v i l  a c tio n s  «. Is tru e
(63) Ibid., p. 308.
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In the  co nd itio n s  o f  mere natu re , where the re  are no c iv i l  laws; 
and a lso  under c i v i l  government, In such cases as are no determ ined 
by the law. But o the rw ise . I t  Is m an ifest, th a t the  measure o f  good 
and e v i l  a c tions . Is the  c iv i l  law (64)
The next two d o c tr in e s  “ repugnant to  c iv i l  s o c ie ty ”  c o n s is tin g  In the 
b e l ie f  th a t a man cannot go aga in s t h is  conscience and th a t some men 
are s u p e rn a tu ra lly  Insp ired , are a lso  ascribed by Hobbes to  “ the 
presum ption” and “ fa u l t  o f  ta k in g  upon us to  judge o f  good and 
e v i l ” . In Chapter XX, where he re ite ra te s  h is  view th a t
I t  belongeth to  the  sovere ign  .« to  p rescribe  the  ru le s  o f
d isce rn ing  good and e v i l :  which ru le s  are laws (65)
Hobbes c ite s  Genesis as he d id  In De Cive as a u th o ra tlv e  evidence 
th a t the  p rid e  o f  Adam In ea tin g  “ the  f r u i t  o f  the tre e  o f  knowledge” 
o f  good and e v il,  the reby cha lleng ing  God, ru ined  mankind (66). In
Chapter X V III where he d iscusses “ the  r ig h ts  o f  sovere igns by 
In s t i tu t io n ” , a f te r  having remarked th a t “ the end o f  th is  In s t itu t io n ,  
Is the peace and defend o f  them a l l ” and th a t “ whosoever has r ig h t  
to  the end, has r ig h ts  to  the  means” , he q u ite  c o n s is te n tly  proclaim s 
th a t
I t  Is annexed to  the  sove re ign ty , to  be judge o f  what op in ions and 
d o c tr in e s  are averse, and what conducive to  peace; and consequently 
.. who s h a ll examine the  d o c tr in e s  o f  a l l  books befo re  they be
published. For the a c tio n s  o f  men proceed from th e ir  opin ion; and 
In the  w e ll-g o ve rn in g  o f  op in ion , co ns ls te th  the w e ll-g o ve rn in g  o f
(64) Ib id ,  p. 310.
(65) Ib id ,  p. 192.
(66) Ib id ., p. 194.
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governing o f  mens' ac tions , In o rder to  th e ir  peace and concord. (67) 
As In Elements o f  Law and De Cive, In Leviathan  too  Hobbes fo llo w s  
Thucydides (68) In s in g lin g  ou t am bition  as the  main d rive  to  
s e d itio n  and c iv i l  w a r(69); as In De Cive he fo llo w s  Thucydides In 
p o in tin g  to  "hope o f  success" as the d is p o s it io n  o f  mind th a t 
In c lin e s  men to  r is k y  e n te rp ris e s  and to  c rim e (70) (see previous 
chapter).
U nlike Thucydides, who In the  p o r t r a i t  o f  P e ric les  presents to  the 
reader a p e rfe c t m arriage o f  eloquence and wisdom, Hobbes In 
Leviathan, as In De Cive, tends to  consider eloquence a se d itio u s  
fa c u lty  and never f a l ls  to  remark th a t "e loquent speakers are 
Inc lin ed  to  am bition ; fo r  eloquence seemeth wisdom, both to  
themselves and o th e rs ". (71)
U nlike Thucydides, who seems sym pathetic to  democracy — desp ite  
Hobbes's c la im s to  the  c o n tra ry  — Hobbes p o in ts  ou t th a t on ly 
am bition  and the  hope to  p a r t ic ip a te  In the government d r iv e  men to  
p re fe r  democracy to  o th e r form s o f  government, and he argues th a t 
f ru s tra te d  am bition  and d es ire  to  excel one upon the o th e r make th is
(67) Ib id ,  p. 164. Th is view Is repeated th roughout Leviathan: " IH t  
belongeth «. to  him th a t hath the  sovereign power, to  be jugde, 
o r c o n s t itu te  a l l  judges o f  opin ions and doc trine s , as a th ing  
necessary to  peace; thereby to  prevent d isco rd  and c iv i l  war.", 
ib id .,, p. 165; "he Is judge o f  what Is necessary fo r  peace; and 
judge o f  d o c tr in e s ", ib id ., p. 186.
(68) H is to ry , 1, p. 350.
(69) Leviathan, p. 156.
(70) "o f  the passions th a t most fre q u e n tly  are the  causes o f  crime, 
one. Is va in g lo ry , o r a fo o lis h  o ve rra tin g  o f  th e ir  own w orth _ 
hope o f  escaping punishment ». hope o f  oppressing the power .. 
hope o f  no t being observed", ib id ., p. 283. see a lso  H isto ry , I, 
pp. 311 -2 .
(71) Leviathan, p. 89; see a lso  p. 248.
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form  o f  government more vu ln e ra b le  than monarchy and more prone to  
d is s o lu t io n . (72)
(72) “ CA]mbltlon o f  some -  k inder to  the government o f  an assembly, 
whereof they may hope to  p a r tic ip a te  than o f  a monarchy, which
they despa ir to  en joy” , ib id ,, p. 162; “ the  monarch cannot
d isagree  w ith  h im s e lf ou t o f  envy o r In te re s t, bu t an assembly
may; and th a t to  such a he igh t, as may produce a c iv i l  war” ,
ib id ., p. 175.
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R A F R " r  I I I
GLORY-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR AND PRIVATE DOMAIN
The p u b lic a tio n  o f  G a u th ie r’s The Log ic o f  Leviathan  (1969) (1) and 
o f  W atkins’ ‘ Im perfect R a t io n a lity ’ (1970) (2) marked the beginning 
o f  a whole Ind u s try  o f  papers and books th a t app ly c r i t e r ia  and 
concepts drawn from  the  armoury o f  game theo ry  to  Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan. A lthough th is  in d u s try  has grown fa s t  over the  years and 
has found In Kavka (3) and Hampton (4) p r o l i f ic  producers, I t  has not 
taken over the e n t ire  Hobbes Ian market. Many consumers have found 
the product unpa la tab le  and f e l t  th a t they could gain a b e tte r 
In s ig h t In to  Hobbes’s the o ry  by looking through Oakeshott’s 
kale idoscope than by wearing the p e r fe c t ly  graded non -scra tch  lenses 
m anufactured by G auth ier. In a passionate a tta ck  aga in s t Gauthier, 
T ay lo r, McLean, Laver, Kavka, Brams, and Hampton, P a tric k  Neal has 
re c e n tly  argued th a t “ ra t io n a l choice theory reaps a good less than 
Hobbes a ttem pted to  sow and serves to  obscure more than Illu m in a te  
h is  teach ing ’’. (5)
(1) David G auth ier, The Log ic  o f  Leviathan: The M oral and P o l it ic a l  
Theory o f  Thomas Hobbes, O xford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
(2) John Watkins, ‘ Im perfect R a t io n a lity ’ , in R. Borger and F. C lo f f l  
(eds). E xp lana tion  in the Behavioural Sciences, Cambridge: 
Cambridge U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1970.
(3) Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and P o l i t ic a l Theory, P rinceton, 
N.J.: P rinceton U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1986.
(4) Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the S ocia l Contract T ra d itio n , Cambridge: 
Cambridge U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1986.
(5) P a tr lk  Neal, ‘Hobbes and R a tiona l Choice Theory’ , Western P o l it ic a l 
Q uarte rly , Sept. 1988, pp. 635-652.
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Although an assessment o f  the  c o n tr ib u tio n  o f  game theory to  the 
understanding o f  Hobbes f a l ls  o u ts id e  the scope o f  th is  d is s e rta t io n , 
as In the next chapter I s h a ll put fo rw ard  an In te rp re ta t io n  o f  
Hobbes’s p o l i t ic a l  theo ry  as a model re s tin g  on a w e ll-d e fin e d  se t o f  
assumptions, I fe e l I should s p e ll out what the purpose o f  the model 
is, so as to  avoid  m isuderstandlngs.
I unashamedly belong to  the camp o f  those who be lieve  th a t the re  is  
no b e tte r  way o f  understand ing Hobbes than by reading what he wrote, 
the way he w ro te  i t .  A l l  models, both those construc ted  according to  
the s t r i c t  ru le s  o f  game theo ry  (e.g. G authier, Kavka, Hampton) o r 
fo llo w in g  one’s im ag ination  and In tu it io n  (e.g. M cNeilly, Brown) 
In e v ita b ly  p a r t i t io n  Hobbes’s complex argument In to  sub-argum ents and 
may make the reader lose s ig h t o f  the whole co ns tru c t. They o fte n  
Illu m in a te  h is  theo ry  to  the  ex te n t to  which they t r iv ia l iz e  I t .
W ith th is  premise I t  should be c le a r th a t I am w e ll aware th a t my 
own a ttem pt a t a x iom a tls ing  Hobbes's thought (In  Chapter V I) makes 
no ju s t ic e  to  the  w ea lth  o f  Ideas th a t can be found in h is  w r it in g s . 
The reason why I have neverthe less  attem pted to  axlom atlze  Hobbes’s 
argument Is th a t I be lieve  th a t the re s u lt in g  model can be p ro f i ta b ly  
used to  address the main question  th a t u nd e rlie s  the present 
d is s e r ta t io n  o u tlin e d  in the Preface, namely whether c it iz e n s  can 
cla im  a r ig h t  to  a guaranteed p r iv a te  sphere aga ins t the  State. I 
s h a ll suggest th a t my Hobbes Ian model, by denying the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  
a p r iv a te  domain w ith in  p o l i t ic a l  S ta tes poses a challenge to  those 
lib e ra l th e o r is ts  who accept the s ta te -o f-n a tu re  approach fo r the 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  r ig h ts  and are no t prepared to  r e s t r ic t  In d iv id u a l 
p references so to  exclude th a t some people may fe e l su pe rio r and
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d es ire  g lo ry .
As a f in a l In tro d u c to ry  remark, I should s tre s s  th a t In o u tlin in g  my 
model I s h a ll re ly  on In tu it io n  ra th e r than form a l log ic , p rov id ing  In 
the Appendix a d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the games th a t can be used to  support 
my main p o in t fo r  the b e n e fit o f  those readers who have no 
ob jec tio n s  to  reading Hobbes Ian arguments couched In game theory 
terms.
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OMARTER \/ I
GLORY-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR, STATE OF NATURE, 
AND POLITICAL STATE
VI. 1 AN OUTLINE OF HOBBES'S ARGUMENT; V I.2 HOBBES’S CONCLUSION OF 
REASON; V I.3 UNI-CONDITIONAL OBEDIENCE; V I.4 HOBBES’S REDUCED MODEL;
V I.5 HOBBES’S CHALLENGE
VI.1 AN OUTLINE OF HOBBES’S ARGUMENT
In the  fo llo w in g  pages the  a n a lys is  o f  the s ta te  o f  na tu re  w i l l  be 
c a rr ie d  ou t by In te rp re t in g  the la t te r  as a hypothesis, a thought 
experim ent. O f course, the  exerc ise  o f  Imagining a b s tra c t Ind iv idu a ls  
In a b s tra c t circum stances is  not a lie n  to  the s p i r i t  o f  Hobbes’s 
philosophy. In De Cive  Hobbes suggests unambiguously th a t the s ta te  
o f  n a tu re  Is a mental exerc ise:
Let us re tu rn  again to  the s ta te  o f  na tu re  and Imagine men as I f  
bu t even now sprung ou t o f  the earth , and sudda ln ly  (.like  
Mushromes) come to  f u l l  m a tu r ity , w ith o u t a l l  k ind  o f  engagement to  
each o the r <1 )
To ch a ra c te rise  w ith  a modicum o f  p rec is ion  th is  w orld  o f  a b s tra c t
r" '7
men, I suggest ’ to  bestow the s ta tu s  o f assum ption onto some o f
(1 ) De Cive, p. 117.
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Hobbes’s many Ideas on human n a tu re  and the s ta te  o f  n a tu re  th a t we 
found to  be common to  Elements o f  Law, De Cive, and Leviathan  and 
d iscussed in some d e ta il in Chapters II, I I I ,  IV, and V.
Assumption R (R a tio n a lity )
Reason is  the  same In a l l  men and s in g le s  ou t the  most e ffe c t iv e  
means fo r  the  a tta in m e n t o f  any given end (2).
Assumption S (S e lf-p re s e rv a tio n )
A ll  men t r y  to  avo id  th e ir  death by a l l  a v a ila b le  means (3). 
Assumption E (E q u a lity )
In d iv id u a ls  are equal In th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  k i l l  each o th e r In the sense 
th a t “ the  weakest has s tre n g th  enough to  k i l l  the s tro n g e s t” (4).
Assumption LR (L im ite d  Resources)
In n a tu ra l co nd itio n s  resources are very lim ite d  but s u f f ic ie n t  to  
su s ta in  the  e n t ire  p opu la tion  (5).
Assumption UL (U n re s tr ic te d  L ib e r ty )
In n a tu ra l co n d itio n s  th e re  Is no power su pe rio r to  In d iv id u a ls
(2) ’L  fo r  every man by reasoning seeks ou t the  meanes to  the  end
which he propound to  h lm se lfe ” . De Give, p. 177; on how reason
works, see Leviathan, Chapter V; on ra t io n a l i t y  as p a rt o f  man, 
see Elements o f  Law, Chapter 1.
(3) See, fo r  example. De Cive, p. 47, Elements o f  Law, pp. 71-72,
Leviathan, p. 129 and a lso  p. 329.
(4) Leviathan, p. 110; see a lso  De Cive, p. 45, Elements o f  Law, 70.
(5) On “ necessaries”  and “ s u p e r f lu it ie s ” , see De Cive, p. 66 and
Leviathan, p. 139; on lim ite d  resources, see De Cive, p. 46, 
Leviathan, p. I l l ,  Elements o f  Law, p. 71; see a lso  Leviathan, p. 
335.
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capable o f  en fo rc in g  common ru le s  o f  behaviour (6).
Assumption G (Glory)
Some men lik e  g lo ry , o r the  p leasure  o f  s u p e r io r ity .
Prima fa c ie  assum ption G m ight seem to  c o n tra d ic t assum ption S fo r
In the  common use o f  language we speak o f  noble and g lo r io u s  deaths 
and dying seems sometimes the o n ly  a va ila b le  means fo r  achieving 
g lo ry . However, as I t  has been argued In prev ious chapters, thanks to  
h is  s p e c if ic  d e f in it io n  o f  g lo ry  Hobbes can c o n s is te n tly  hold both 
views; Indeed, as g lo ry  Is de fined  as the p leasure o f  su p e rio r power 
and dominion over o the rs , i t  fo llo w s  th a t s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  Is the 
p re con d ition  fo r  I ts  a tta in m e n t and enjoyment.
Our assumptions th e re fo re  are s ix  In number and can be grouped In 
p a irs  : R a tio n a lity  (R) and S e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  (S) re fe r  to  the nature  
o f  each person; E q u a lity  (E) and G lory (G) concern the  re la tio n s h ip s  
between people; L im ite d  Resources (LR) and U n re s tr ic te d  L ib e rty  (UL) 
ch a rac te rize  the  n a tu ra l (I.e ., n o n -p o llt lc a l)  environm ent In which 
In d iv id u a ls  live .
VI.2 HOBBES’S "CONCLUSION OF REASON"
Having In troduced a s e le c tio n  o f  Hobbes’s Ideas as assum ptions o f  a
model, the  next s tep  Is to  de rive  th e ir  Im p lica tions.
(6) On the absence o f  an a rb it ra to r ,  see De Cive, p. 70, Elements o f  
Law, p. 90, Leviathan, p. 143. On the  " r ig h t  to  a l l  th in g s ’’, see De 
Cive, p. 47, Elements o f  Law, p. 72, Leviathan, p. 116.
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F ir s t ,  consider a l l  assum ptions except g lo ry  <G) and thus Imagine 
equal people (E) a l l  preoccupied w ith  th e ir  own s u rv iv a l (S), liv in g  
In a w orld  where resources are lim ite d  but not In s u f f ic ie n t  to  
su s ta in  the e n t ire  p opu la tion  (LR) (7). I t  can be seen th a t, as they 
could  have a b e tte r  chance o f  augmenting n a tu ra l resources (and thus 
o f  ensuring  th e ir  fu tu re  s a fe ty )  through cooperation, then I t  would 
be ra t io n a l fo r  each and everyone to  engage In jo in t  a c t iv i t ie s  to  
th e ir  m utual b e n e fit  and liv e  peace fu lly , lik e  bees and ants.
However, as soon as the  rem aining assumption on g lo ry -seek ing  
behaviour (6) Is In troduced, the  Id y l l ic  p ic tu re  described above Is 
suddenly sh a tte re d  — as Hobbes h im se lf does not f a l l  to  p o in t ou t In
Elements o f  Law, De Cive  and Leviathan:
I t  Is tru e , th a t c e r ta in  l iv in g  c rea tu res , as bees, and ants, liv e  
so c ia b ly  one w ith  another ... and th e re fo re  some man may perhaps 
d es ire  to  know, why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer. 
F ir s t ,  th a t men are c o n tin u a lly  In com petition  fo r  honour and 
d ign ity ... and consequently amongst men the re  a r ls e th  on th a t 
ground, envy and hatred , and f in a l ly  w ar- Secondly -  man, whose joy  
co n s ls te th  In comparing h im se lf w ith  o the r men, can re lis h  noth ing  
but what Is em inent. (8)
In o rder to  see how G a lte rs  the  e q u ilib r iu m  th a t o the rw ise  would
have emerged from  the o th e r assumptions o f  the  model, a tte n tio n
should be focused on the  courses o f  ac tion  a va ila b le  to  g lo ry -seeke rs  
In the s ta te  o f  na tu re . I t  may be no ticed  th a t these are determined.
(7) O f course. I f  the  e a r th ’s resources were In s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  the
s u rv iv a l o f  the  e n t ire  popu la tion , no p o l i t ic a l  alchemy could 
ensure the  p re se rva tio n  o f  a l l  “ In h a b ita n ts ” , as Hobbes Is w e ll
aware (.De Cive, p. 25; see a lso  Leviathan, p. 335)
(8) Leviathan, p. 156, see a lso  Elements o f  Law, p. 102, De Cive, p. 87.
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among o th e r th in g s , by UL, I.e. by the  assumption th a t  In n a tu ra l
co nd itio n s  the re  Is no su p e rio r power to  In d iv id u a ls  to  enforce
common ru le s  o f  behaviour and thus to  r e s t r ic t  th e ir  lib e r ty .
On the  one hand, UL ru le s  o u t a large c lass  o f  a c t iv i t ie s  th a t In
c iv i l  so c ie ty  p rov ide  g lo ry -se e ke rs  w ith  paths to  power and g lo ry  In
so fa r  as I t  e n ta ils ,  fo r  example, the lack o f  p r iv a te  p rope rty
r ig h ts (9); on the o th e r hand. I t  a llow s form s o f  s u p e r io r i ty  and 
dominion th a t In c i v i l  s o c ie ty  no g lo ry -se eke r can hope to  pursue 
unpunished, such as the  s u p e r io r i ty  th a t a person can acqu ire  over 
o th e rs  by d ep riv ing  them o f  access to  th e ir  means o f  s u rv iv a l (w ells, 
land, e tc .) and by p reda ting  them o f  what they have saved fo r  th e ir  
subsistence.
Thus, because o f  UL, people 's means o f  s u rv iv a l a re  an a va ilab le
ta rg e t fo r  g lo ry -se e ke rs . A t th is  p o in t I t  Is easy to  see why the 
assumption on g lo ry -se e k in g  behaviour has a d e s ta b ilis in g  e ffe c t  on 
the  model.
In fa c t.  In a w o rld  where resources are s t r i c t l y  lim ite d  (LR), the
presence o f  p reda to rs  pu ts  everybody's s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  a t r is k .
Assumption S s ta te s  th a t  th is  danger must be removed by a l l  people 
(g lo ry -se e ke rs  and n o n -g lo ry -se e ke rs  a lik e ) and R p rescribes  the  use 
o f  the  most a pp ro p ria te  means to  th is  e ffe c t.  As k i l l in g  o the rs  Is 
both fe a s ib le  (because o f  UL) and a more e ffe c t iv e  way o f  p ro te c tin g  
one's l i f e  than any tem porary measures (e.g., the enslavement o f  
o the rs ), assumption R p o in ts  unambiguously to  the s e le c tio n  o f  th a t 
s tra te g y .
(9) Leviathan, p. 115, De Cive, p. 49.
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To summarize the argument so fa r ,  we can say th a t the combined 
e f fe c t  o f  UL, R, LR, G and S Is th a t g lo ry -seekers  In the  s ta te  o f 
n a tu re  can be expected to  be p reda to rs  and th a t everyone's ra t io n a l 
response to  th is  expe c ta tio n  cannot but be the dec is ion  to  k i l l .
I f  we were to  Imagine people In a c tion  a t th is  p o in t, the re s u lt in g  
p ic tu re  would be a s ta te  o f  war:
I dem onstrate In the  f i r s t  p lace th a t the  s ta te  o f  men w ith o u t 
c i v i l I  s o c ie ty  (which s ta te  we may p rope rly  c a ll the  s ta te  o f  
n a tu re ) Is no th ing  e lse  but a meere warre o f  a l l  a ga ins t a l l .  (10)
The drama reaches I ts  c lim ax when we focus our a tte n tio n  on
assumption E. As soon as I t  Is recognized th a t a l l  contenders are 
equal In th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  k i l l .  In the sense th a t the  weakest has 
s tre n g th  enough to  e lim in a te  the  s tro ng e s t. I t  Is e a s ily  understood 
th a t from  the ensuing war no w inner can emerge:
[w ar] Is perpétua 11 In I ts  own nature, because In regard  o f  the 
e q u a lity  o f  those th a t  s t r iv e .  I t  cannot be ended by V ic to ry . (11)
In a war between equals no t on ly  no la s tin g  g lo ry  Is poss ib le  but
a lso  nobody's l i f e  Is sa fe  “ fo r  equal powers opposed destroy
one ano ther" (12).
The c o n tra d ic tio n  Inheren t In Hobbes's s ta te  o f  na tu re  should now be 
ev iden t: on the  bas is  o f  assumptions UL, LR, R, 6, and S I t  Is 
ra t io n a l to  decide to  k i l l  o the rs , which decis ion , because o f  the 
rem aining assum ption on e q u a lity  (E) Is aga ins t reason (~R).
(10) De Cive, p. 34.
(11) De Cive, p. 49.
(12) Elements o f  Law, p. 34.
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V I.3 UNI-CONDITIONAL OBEDIENCE
There Is no doubt th a t  Hobbes was aware o f  the  c o n tra d ic tio n
Inherent In h is  ch a ra c te rIza tIo n  o f  the  s ta te  o f  na tu re :
He th e re fo re  th a t  des I re  th  to  l iv e  In such an e s ta te , as Is the
s ta te  o f  l ib e r ty  and r ig h t  o f  a l l  to  a l l ,  c o n tra d lc te th  h im se lf. For 
every man by n a tu ra l nece ss ity  d e s lre th  h is  own good, to  which th is  
e s ta te  Is co n tra ry , wherein we suppose con ten tion  between men by 
na tu re  equal, and able  to  d es tro y  one another. (13)
The purpose o f  th is  se c tio n  Is to  examine how the  assum ption(s) o f
the  model (R, S, E, G, LR, UL) shou ld  be a lte re d  in o rde r to  avoid the
c o n tra d ic tio n  h ig h lig h te d  above.
I t  w i l l  be shown th a t th e re  is  on ly  one form u la  o f  escape and th a t I t  
co inc ides w ith  the co n d itio n s  o f  peace Ind ica ted  by Hobbes. Any o ther 
(more lib e ra l)  fo rm u la  would not p rov ide  a s o lu tio n  to  the problem.
At th is  stage a q u a lif ic a t io n  should be made regard ing  the 
assum ptions In troduced In sec. VI. 1 , namely th a t according to  Hobbes 
a l l  o f  them bu t one d e fin e  u n a lte ra b le  c h a ra c te r ls t les e ith e r  o f 
human na tu re  (R, S, G, E) o r o f  the  n a tu ra l environm ent (LR).
Thus, I f  the re  Is a way ou t o f  the  c o n tra d ic tio n . I t  must be through 
re la x in g  the s ix th  assum ption. I.e. U n re s tr ic te d  L ib e rty .
In Hobbes’s words:
I dem onstrate «. th a t a l l  men as soone as they a rr iv e  to
(13) Elements o f  Law, p. 73 (emphasis added); "Whosoever th e re fo re  
holds, th a t I t  had been best to  have continued In th a t s ta te  In 
which a l l  th in g s  were la w fu l I fo r  a l l  men, he co n tra d ic ts  
h im se lf". De Cive, p. 49 (emphasis added).
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understanding o f  th is  h a te fu l l  cond ition , doe des ire  (even natu re  I t  
s e lfe  com pelling them) to  be fre e d  from th is  m isery. But th a t th is  
cannot be done except by compact, they a l l  q u l t t  th a t r ig h t  they 
have unto  a l l  th in g s . (14)
Having e s ta b lish e d  th a t UL has to  be a lte re d , the  problem a rise s  how 
to  change I t  so to  avo id  the above co n tra d ic tio n .
I t  may be re c a lle d  th a t UL s ta te s  th a t In n a tu ra l co nd itio n s  there  
e x is ts  no power s u p e rio r to  In d iv id u a ls  to  r e s t r ic t  th e ir  l ib e r ty .  I t  
fo llo w s  th a t any m o d if ic a tio n  o f  th is  assumption n ece ssa rily  e n ta ils  
the  ex is tence  o f  some such power. Hence we can re fo rm u la te  our 
problem as th a t o f  d e fin in g  what the  fu n c tio n  o f  th is  s u p e rio r power 
( th a t we can c a l l  the  S ta te ) shou ld  be In o rder to  prevent the 
occurrence o f  the  c o n tra d ic tio n .
As the  tens ion  w ith in  Hobbes’s “ conclusion o f  reason’’ d isappears I f  
and on ly  I f  people fe e l sa fe  and thus no t m o tiva ted  to  k i l l ,  the 
fu n c tio n  o f  the  S ta te  Is obvious: I t  must be In charge o f  the
p ro te c tio n  o f  everybody's s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n .
What Is e xa c tly  the  “ s e lf "  th a t the  S ta te  has the task  to  “ preserve" 
can be e s ta b lish e d  as fo llo w s .
I f  s e lf-p re s e rv a tIo n  were de fined  In a broad way as the  p reserva tion  
o f  one's l i fe ,  p ro pe rty , and lib e r ty ,  the S ta te  would f in d  I t s e l f  
encumbered w ith  a v a r ie ty  o f  ends th a t could  conce ivab ly en te r In 
m utual c o n f l ic t .  No Hobbes Ian In d iv id u a l, who by assum ption seeks 
u n c o n d itio n a lly  to  avo id  death a t the hands o f  o th e rs  (S), could 
ra t io n a lly  e n te r (R) In to  such a S ta te , fo r  circum stances could  a rise
(14) De Cive, p. 34; see a lso. Elements o f  Law, p. 75, Leviathan, p. 
118.
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In which the  S ta te  would decide aga ins t the  uncond itiona l 
p rese rva tion  o f  I ts  sub jects* phys ica l live s . Thus, In our model, 
because o f  assum ptions S and R, the  unambiguous fu n c tio n  o f  the 
S ta te  must be the  s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  o f  I ts  sub jec ts  In a s t r ic t  
sense, namely the p ro te c tio n  o f  th e ir  phys ica l In te g r ity .
Having thus de fined  the  task o f  the  S tate , we can e s ta b lis h  the 
necessary means to  c a rry  I t  ou t, I.e. the  e x te n t o f  the  re s t ra in ts  to  
be Imposed on In d iv id u a l l ib e r t ie s .
As Hobbes h im s e lf pu ts  I t :
... the  o b lig a tio n , and l ib e r ty  o f  the  sub ject, Is to  be derived 
from  the end o f  the  In s t i tu t io n  o f  sovere ign ty , namely, the peace 
o f  the  su b jec ts  w ith in  themselves, and th e ir  defence aga inst a 
common enemy. (15)
In e s ta b lis h in g  the  c it iz e n s ' o b lig a tio n  to  the S ta te , assumptions S 
and R are again c ru c ia l In so fa r  as they jo in t ly  Imply th a t as In 
the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  I t  was ra t io n a l fo r  Hobbes Ian In d iv id u a ls  to  make 
f u l l  use o f  th e ir  u n re s tr ic te d  l ib e r ty  fo r  th e ir  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , so 
I t  Is ra t io n a l fo r  them to  acknowledge the same u n re s tr ic te d  lib e r ty  
to  the  S ta te  to  which they e n tru s t th e ir  live s . Any re s tr ic t io n ,  
however m ild, to  the  S ta te 's  a c t iv i t ie s  would Impose l im its  a lso  to  
I ts  a b i l i t y  to  defend them.
I t  fo llo w s  th a t as long as the  S ta te  m ain ta ins peace. I ts  c it iz e n s  
owe obedience to  I t  even I f  I t  Invades th e ir  p r iv a te  sphere o r denies 
them the  a tta in m e n t o f  p ro s p e rity , g lo ry , o r any o th e r aim they may 
have. O f course. In o rde r to  p ro te c t I ts  su b je c ts ’ s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n
(15) Leviathan, p. 203.
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the  S ta te  Is l ik e ly  to  In troduce ru le s  o f  good and bad, r ig h t  and 
wrong, meum e t tuum, thus In d ire c t ly  enabling I ts  c it iz e n s , fo r  
example, to  surpass each o th e r and th e re fo re  a t ta in  g lo ry .
As Hobbes n o tice s  :
The question  who Is the  b e tte r  man, has no place In the  cond ition  
o f  mere na tu re ; where «. a l l  men are equal. The In e q u a lity  th a t now 
Is, has been In troduced by the  laws c iv i l .  (16)
However, the  p u rs u its  o f  g lo ry , p rope rty , e tc. are no t r ig h ts , but 
m erely In c id e n ta l by -p ro du c ts  o f  the  measures Introduced by the 
S ta te  to  Implement I ts  s e c u r ity  task  and th e re fo re  can be taken away 
from  people a t any tim e, w ith o u t the la t te r  being ever e n t it le d  to  
re s is t .
In Hobbes's model, because o f  S and R, I f  and on ly  I f  the S tate  
a ttem p ts  to  dep rive  I t s  c it iz e n s  o f  th e ir  l i f e ,  a re  the la t te r  
e n t i t le d  to  re fuse  obedience; In o th e r words, the  c it iz e n s ’ obedience 
to  the  S ta te  Is c o n d it io n a l e x c lu s iv e ly  on the p ro te c tio n  o f  th e ir  
phys ica l In te g r ity  (Un l-c o n d lt  Iona I Obedience. DO).
When th e re fo re  ou r re fu s a l to  obey, f ru s t ra te s  the  end fo r  which 
the  so ve re ig n ty  was ordained [namely, the  peace o f  the  sub jec ts  
w ith in  themselves, and th e ir  defence aga ins t a common enemy]; then 
th e re  Is no l ib e r ty  to  re fuse : o the rw ise  the re  Is. (17)
To summarise the  argument o f  th is  se c tion  -  the  on ly  way o f  so lv in g  
the  c o n tra d ic tio n  Inheren t In Hobbes's s ta te  o f  n a tu re  and th e re fo re  
o f  ensuring  th a t I t  Is never ra t io n a l fo r  anyone to  decide to  k i l l  Is
(16) Leviathan, p. 140; see a lso  Elements o f  Law, p. 87, De Cive,
p. 68.
(17) Leviathan, p. 205.
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by rep lac ing  the  u n re s tr ic te d  l ib e r ty  (UL) o f  n a tu ra l people w ith  
th e ir  U n l-c o n d ltlo n a l Obedience <U0) to  a S ta te  w ith  the  so le  task o f 
p ro te c tin g  everybody^; phys ica l existence.
V I.4 HOBBES’S REDUCED MODEL
As I t  stands, Hobbes’s model sketched above Is open to  the  se rious 
charge o f  being o f  lim ite d  relevance, fo r  I t  Is based on a se t o f  
axioms th a t Includes a h ig h ly  questionab le  assumption. I am re fe r r in g , 
o f  course, to  what was d e fined  In sec. VI. 1 as assum ption S, namely 
the  c o n tro v e rs ia l and r e s t r ic t iv e  HobbesIan Idea th a t a l l  people 
regard  th e ir  death a t the  hand o f  o the rs  as the g re a te s t m isch ie f 
poss ib le  and are w i l l in g  to  defend themselves by a l l  a v a ila b le  means. 
In th is  sec tion , I s h a ll t r y  to  argue th a t Hobbes’s b e l ie f  In the
u n iv e rs a l va lue  o f  s e lf-p re s e rv a tIo n , however s tro n g ly  f e l t  by him. Is 
In fa c t  redundant to  suppo rt h is  p o l i t ic a l  argument.
F ir s t ly ,  suppose th a t  S be replaced w ith  a fa r  less demanding
p ro po s itio n :
M inim al S e lf-p re s e rv a tIo n  (MS): I f  not everyone, a t le a s t g lo ry -
seekers t r y  to  avo id  th e ir  death by a l l  a va ila b le  means.
I t  Is w orthy o f  note  th a t, u n lik e  S. MS Is not an assumption In I ts  
own r ig h t ,  bu t a mere Im p lica tio n  o f  assumptions R and G. Indeed, In 
view o f  Hobbes’s d e f in it io n  o f  g lo ry  as the p leasure  o f  su pe rio r 
power and dominion. I t  Is ra t io n a l fo r  g lo ry -se eke rs  to  consider th e ir  
s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  as the  unrenounceable p recond ition  o r c o n s tra in t 
fo r  the  a tta in m e n t and enjoyment o f  th e ir  end and thus to  avoid 
death by a l l  a v a ila b le  means (MS).
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Next, I t  may be re c a lle d  th a t In the  s ta te  o f  na tu re , as presented In 
sec. VI.2, what endangers everyone's s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  Is the 
ex is tence  o f  p reda to ry  g lo ry -seeke rs  (G). S u b s titu tin g  MS fo r  S 
s im p ly  Im plies th a t I f  no t everyone a t leas t g lo ry -se e ke rs  w i l l  react 
to  th is  s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s  by k i l l in g  o thers. The obvious re s u lt  Is th a t 
n o n -s e If-p re se rva tIo n -co n sc io u s  people w i l l  drop (dead) out o f  the 
game and Hobbes’s conclusion  o f  reason and DO w i l l  s t i l l  haunt a l l  
the  rem aining s e lf-p re s e rv a tlo n -c o n s c lo u s  p layers.
In conclusion, even a f te r  having removed assumption S, the  remaining 
assum ptions o f  what we can c a ll Hobbes’s reduced model (based on 
Hobbes’s Ideas as de fin e d  by R, G, LR, UL, and E) are s t i l l  s u f f ic ie n t  
to  generate both the  c o n tra d ic to ry  s itu a t io n  o u tlin e d  In sec. VI.2 and 
the  escape from  I t  o u tlin e d  In sec. V I.3.
V I.5 HOBBES’S CHALLENGE
F in a lly , Hobbes’s reduced model can now be used to  expose a problem
o f  consistency th a t lie s  a t the ro o t o f  some l ib e ra l the o rie s .
L ib e ra l th e o rie s  (from  Locke to  Nozick) In d ire c t ly  re je c t the
co nd itio n s  o f  peace described by Hobbes (UO) In so fa r  as they 
m a in ta in  th a t c it iz e n s ’ obedience to  the S tate  ought to  be co nd itio n a l 
on the  n on -in frin g em en t o f  e ith e r  m u lt ip le  r ig h ts  o r a s in g le  r ig h t  
de fined  more com prehensively than the p rese rva tion  o f  one's phys ica l 
in te g r ity .
However, as the on ly  s o lu tio n  to  Hobbes’s “ conclusion o f  reason’’ has 
been shown to  be U n l-c o n d lt lona l Obedience, L ib e ra lism  can ju s t i f ia b ly  
re je c t I t  on ly  by denying the  a c c e p ta b il ity  o f  one o r more o f  the
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assum ptions on which I t  re s ts . Having removed from  the h i t  l i s t  as 
redundant to  Hobbes's argument the  conspicuous ta rg e t fu rn ishe d  by 
h is  r e s t r ic t iv e  Idea o f  gene ra lized  o v e r-r ld ln g  concern fo r  s e l f -  
p rese rva tion  <S), the  re s u lt in g  reduced model does no t appear to  be 
obv iou s ly  vu lnerab le .
I t  could  be s a fe ly  argued th a t fo u r  o f  I ts  f iv e  assum ptions are most 
undemanding and shou ld  be e a s ily  acceptable to  anyone who ( lik e  Locke 
o r Nozick) Is w i l l in g  to  deploy the  s ta te -o f-n a tu re  approach fo r  the 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  r ig h ts :  I re fe r  to  the assum ptions on L im ited
Resources (the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  as a s ta te  o f  non-abundance), 
U n re s tr ic te d  L ib e r ty  (the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  as one charac te rized  by the 
lack o f  enforced ru le s  o f  behaviour), R a tio n a lity  (In  pursu ing one's 
end) and E q u a lity  (In  the  weak form  th a t even the  weakest person can 
be a le th a l danger fo r  the  s tro n g e s t).
Therefore , I f  U n l-co n d lt lona l Obedience Is unacceptable to  L ibe ra lism  
I t  must be because the assum ption on g lo ry -se ek ing  behaviour (G) Is 
deemed to  be unreasonable.
Indeed, G lory p lays a c ru c ia l ro le  In Hobbes’s model as presented In 
th is  d is s e r ta t io n  : In sec. VI.2 I t  was shown th a t w ith o u t G lory a l l  
the rem aining assum ptions would not have produced a s ta te  o f  war and 
In sec. V I.4 we have ju s t  seen th a t, even by re la x in g  the  assumption 
on s e lf-p re s e rv a t io n  (S), G lo ry  (In  con junction  w ith  the remaining 
axioms) p re c ip ita te s  the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  In to  a s ta te  o f  war and 
w arran ts  U n l-co n d lt lona l Obedience as the on ly  escape from the 
la t te r .
O f course. I f  one could  re je c t the  idea th a t the re  e x is t  people who 
seek the  p leasure  o f  s u p e rio r power (G), then the spark fo r  c o n f l ic t
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would d isappear from  the  model and n e ith e r Hobbes’s “ conclusion o f  
reason" nor the  need fo r  Un I c o n d it io n a l Obedience could  be derived. 
However, In o rder to  re je c t the  assumption th a t some in d iv id u a ls  are 
g lo ry -seeke rs  <6), L ib e ra lism  would have to  Impose a most severe 
re s t r ic t io n  on In d iv id u a l pre ferences.
But then, I f  none o f  the  f iv e  assumptions o f  the  reduced model Is
ob jec tionab le  from  a lib e ra l perspective , how can L ib e ra lism  re je c t 
the Im p lica tion  o f  these assum ptions. I.e., u n l-c o n d lt lona l obedience? 
W hile Hobbes’s reduced model has been Ins trum en ta l In ra is in g  th is  
question, I t  o f fe rs  no c lues as to  the a pp rop ria te  answer. Nor,
Indeed, does th is  d is s e r ta t io n .
One could specu la te  th a t  the  paradox ju s t  described a rise s  because 
the  s ta te -o f-n a tu re  approach Is fa r  from Innocuous and In fa c t Is 
u n su ita b le  as a b u ild in g  block fo r  the  foundation  o f  m u lt ip le  r ig h ts  
unless severe re s t r ic t io n s  are Imposed on In d iv id u a l p references so 
th a t the  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  c o n f l ic t  Is assumed away.
A lte rn a t iv e ly ,  I t  cou ld  be surm ised th a t the  s ta te -o f-n a tu re
hypothesis Is not the  cause o f  the  paradox but ra th e r h ig h lig h ts  a 
deeper problem. I t  cou ld  be argued th a t the con junction  o f  the s ta te -  
o f-n a tu re  approach and the  assumption o f  g lo ry -se e k in g  behaviour 
g ives r is e  to  an exem plary case o f  genera lized  and perenn ia l c o n f l ic t  
and th a t I t  Is the  la t te r  th a t L ibe ra lism  Is th e o re t ic a l ly  unable to  
accommodate w ith in  I ts  framework. According to  th is  a lte rn a t iv e
In te rp re ta t io n , to  je t t is o n  the  s ta te -o f-n a tu re  hypothesis would no t 
so lve  but m erely d isg u ise  an Inherent problem o f  l ib e ra l theo ries . 
A lthough th is  d is s e r ta t io n  Is unable to  suggest an unambiguous 
In te rp re ta t io n  o f  the  problem posed to  L ibe ra lism  by Hobbes’ model.
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I t  Is undeniable th a t such a problem e x is ts  and th a t Is not so 
t r i v i a l  to  be Ignored.
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A R R E h s ID  I X
A Game—Theoret Ic In te rp re ta t io n  
of Hobbes* s model
A.I In tro d u c tio n
In th is  Appendix I s h a ll p rov ide  a complementary exp lana tion  o f  the  
In te rp re ta t io n  o f  the  Hobbes Ian s ta te  o f  na tu re  as a c o n tra d ic to ry  
w o rld  put fo rw a rd  In Chapter VI by re s o rtin g  to  a gam e-theore tic  
argument. A lthough the  games Invo lved are  presented In a non­
te ch n ica l fash ion , the  u nd e rly in g  reasoning could  be fo rm a lized  
r ig o ro u s ly  — so I am Informed.
By choosing two p a r t ia l ly  overlapp ing  se ts  o f  Ideas, 1 s h a ll analyse 
two ve ry  d if fe re n t  s ta te s  o f  a f fa ir s ,  one o f  which bears a s trong  
resemblance to  Hobbes's d e s c r ip tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  na tu re .
A.2 A Non-Hobbes Ian World
In th is  se c tion  I s h a ll bestow the  s ta tu s  o f  assum ption onto the  
fo llo w in g  Hobbes's Ideas th a t we found to  be common to  Elements o f  
Law, De Cive and Levia than :
Assumption R (R a t lo n a llty )  : Reason Is the  same In a l l  men and
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s in g le s  ou t the  most e f fe c t iv e  means fo r  the  a tta in m e n t o f  any given 
end.
Assumption S (S e lf-p re s e rv a tio n )  : A l l  men t r y  to  avo id  th e ir  death 
by a l l  a va ila b le  means.
Assumption E (E q u a lity ) : In d iv id u a ls  are equal In th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  
k i l l  each o th e r In the  sense th a t  “ the  weakest has s tre n g th  enough to  
k i l l  the  s tro n g e s t".
Assumption LR (L im ite d  Resources) : In n a tu ra l co nd itio n s  resources 
are  ve ry  lim ite d  bu t s u f f ic ie n t  to  su s ta in  the  e n t ire  popu la tion . 
Assumption UL (U n re s tr ic te d  L ib e r ty )  : In n a tu ra l co nd itio n s  the re  Is 
no power su p e rio r to  In d iv id u a ls  capable o f  en fo rc in g  common ru le s  o f  
behaviour.
The a na lys is  proceeds In Increasing o rder o f  com plex ity ; f i r s t ,  I t  
w i l l  be shown th a t  the  f iv e  above assumptions do no t generate a 
Hobbes Ian s ta te  o f  war. T h is  Is ha rd ly  s u rp r is in g , fo r  they convey 
l i t t l e  In fo rm a tion  about the  range o f  behaviour by Ind iv idu a ls : the 
f iv e  assumptions s im p ly  ensure th a t a ve ry  h igh nega tive  value Is 
a ttached  by a l l  In d iv id u a ls  to  loss o f  l i f e  (S), th a t  a l l  men are 
equal In th e ir  k i l l in g - r e la te d  s k i l l s  (E), th a t the  most app rop ria te  
means fo r  the  a tta in m e n t o f  any given end w i l l  be chosen (R), th a t 
resources are lim ite d  bu t no t In s u f f ic ie n t  to  s u s ta in  a l l  (LR), and 
th a t  the re  are no enforced ru le s  o f  behaviour (UL). As the  aim Is to  
a sce rta in  whether In d iv id u a l behaviour would generate the  s ta te  o f  
c o n f l ic t  described by Hobbes, I suggest a l l  poss ib le  ac tions  be 
p a r t it io n e d  In two broad ca te g o rie s  :
( I )  a c tion s  th a t lead to  open c o n f l ic t  (and th a t we can group under
-  190 -
the  heading "seek f ig h t "). Inc lud ing  a c t iv i t ie s  such as 
d ispossessing, a tta c k in g , scorn ing , and provoking o th e rs  "by deeds 
o r words", e tc .;
( I I )  ac tions  intended to  avo id  c o n f l ic t  (“avo id  f ig h t " ) th a t include 
a c t iv i t ie s  such as h id ing , running away, b lrdw a thch lng, etc.
Since each In d iv id u a l In the  w o rld  th a t we are d e sc rib in g  knows th a t 
he Is equal to  o th e rs  In h is  a b i l i t y  to  k i l l ,  and ra t io n a lly  
understands th a t “ equal powers opposed d es tro y  each o th e r", he Is 
aware th a t I f  he were to  a tta c k  h is  neighbour and the  la t te r  fough t 
back, they both would d ie ; i f  he sought f ig h t  and h is  neighbour 
managed to  escape, they  both would su rv ive , as they would I f  th e ir  
a c tio n s  were reversed; f in a l ly  I f  n e ith e r sought f ig h t ,  they both 
would su rv ive . Th is s itu a t io n  can be I l lu s t ra te d  as fo llo w s :
In d iv id u a l B
In d iv id u a l A
seek f ig h t a v o id  f i g h t
seek f ig h t dead, dead a 11 ve. a l iv e
a v o id  f i g h t a 11ve, a l iv e a l iv e . a l iv e
Under the c ircum stances described by the above m a tr ix  I t  Is c le a r 
th a t  each and every In d iv id u a l would decide to  avo id  f ig h t in g  ("avo id  
f ig h t "  Is a dominant s tra te g y ). In fa c t, th is  s tra te g y  can preserve 
th e ir  l i f e  whatever the  o th e rs  do, whereas I f  they  decided to  f ig h t .
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no a d d it io n a l b e n e fits  would fo llo w  and the  p o s s ib i l i t y  would a rise  
th a t  they would lose what most m a tte rs  to  them, namely th e ir  l i fe .  
The re s u lt in g  s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s  Is one where everybody avoids f ig h t in g  
and c o n fro n ta tio n  and knows th a t everybody e lse  does the same. In 
Hobbes’s view th is  m utua l “ d is p o s it io n ” to  avo id  f ig h t in g  Is what 
ch a rac te rise s  a s ta te  o f  peace:
the na tu re  o f  war, c o n s ls te th  no t In a c tu a l f ig h t in g ;  but In the 
known d is p o s it io n  th e re to , d u ring  a l l  the tim e  the re  Is no
assurance o f  the  co n tra ry . A l l  o th e r tim e Is PEACE. <1 )
The fa c t  th a t the  jo in t  outcome o f  the  f iv e  assum ptions on
ra t io n a li ty ,  s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , lim ite d  resources, e q u a lity  to  k i l l ,  and 
u n re s tr ic te d  l ib e r ty  Is to  generate  the  oppos ite  o f  the  Hobbes Ian
s ta te  o f  na tu re  Is re le va n t to  assess the  Importance o f  the  s ix th  and
f in a l  assumption. In troduced In the  next section .
A.3 The Hobbes Ian World
In th is  se c tion  I s h a ll g ive  the  s ta tu s  o f  assumption to  the ce n tra l
Idea discussed In th is  d is s e r ta t io n , namely g lo ry , so as to  ascerta in  
w hether g lo ry -se e k in g  behaviour can s h a tte r  the  peacefu l s ta te  o f  
a f f a i r s  described above, as m ainta ined by Hobbes In th ree  p a ra lle l
passages o f  Elements o f  Law, De Cive and Levia than  c ite d  In Chapter 
VI. A lthough In many passages o f  Elements o f  Law and De Cive and In 
Book I I  o f  Levia than  Hobbes a sse rts  th a t a l l  men want dominion over 
o the rs . In o th e r p laces he suggests th a t on ly  some men are g lo ry -
(1 ) Leviathan, p. 113.
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seekers. I s h a ll take  th is  la t te r  view, which Is predominant In
Leviathan, as my f in a l  assum ption :
G lo ry  (G): Some men seek g lo ry , namely the p leasure  o f  s u p e r io r ity .
The example examined here Is based on s ix  assumptions. R a tio n a lity  
(R), S e lf-p re s e rv a tio n  (S), E q u a lity  (E), G lo ry  (G), L im ite d  Resources 
(LR) and U n re s tr ic te d  L ib e r ty  (UL). Let the p a r t i t io n  o f  a l l  a va ilab le  
a c tio n s  be as above.
The re le van t case to  analyse Is the  ra t io n a l course o f  a c tion  to  be 
taken by a g lo ry -se e ke r when faced by a s im i la r ly  disposed
In d iv id u a l: would he choose to  seek o r avo id  f ig h t in g ?  Because
“ reason Is the  same In a l l  men", a g lo ry -se e ke r cannot exp>ect a 
fe llo w  g lo ry -se eke r to  take  (abs ta in  from ) a course o f  a c tion  th a t he 
h im s e lf would abs ta in  from  (take) In Id e n tic a l c ircum stances.
Each g lo ry -se eke r knows th a t  a l l  o th e r g lo ry -se eke rs  d e rive  p leasure 
from  seeking f ig h ts  a g a in s t people who f le e  In te r ro r ;  he Is aware 
th a t. I f  faced by someone who provokes, scorns, o r a tta cks  him, h is  
ra t io n a l response should  be to  avo id  f ig h t in g ,  fo r  a c o ll is io n  between 
e q u a lly  e f f ic ie n t  k i l l in g  machines would y ie ld  no presen t g lo ry  fo r  
e ith e r  and would dep rive  both o f  th e ir  live s , thus p reven ting  the 
a tta inm en t o f  fu tu re  g lo ry . The same argument app lies . In reverse,
when a g lo ry -se eke r d isposed to  seek f ig h ts  considers the  ra t io n a l 
response by fe llo w  g lo ry -se e ke rs  to  h is  aggression.
T h is  e s tab lishes  th a t a g lo ry -se e ke r w i l l  always choose to  seek 
(avo id) f ig h t  on the  su p p o s itio n  th a t h is  r iv a l  avoids (seeks) f ig h t .  
T h is  Is because anyth ing  Is p re fe ra b le  to  c e r ta in  death and f ig h t in g  
aga in s t an 'avo ide r' Is p re fe ra b le  to  m utual acquiescence.
-  193 -
The und e rly in g  game can be described as fo llo w s :
G lo ry -s e e k e r
G lo ry -s e e k e r
Seek f ig h t Avo I d f ig h t
Seek f ig h t dead, dead proud. d e je c te d
A vo id  f i g h t d e je c te d , proud a 11 ve. a l iv e
I t  Is s im ple to  con firm  th a t  the  above game has two asymmetric Nash 
e q u il ib r ia :  (avo id  f ig h t ,  seek f ig h t )  and (seek f ig h t ,  avo id  f ig h t ) .  The 
fa c t  th a t reason suggests two d if fe re n t  courses o f  a c tion , depending 
on the  expected behaviour o f  your opponent, does no t mean, o f  course, 
th a t  people should renounce ra t io n a l i t y  In th e ir  choices.
The way o u t o f  the  above Impasse has to  Invo lve a random choice 
between the two a v a ila b le  op tions  o f  ‘seek f ig h t*  and ‘avoid  f ig h t* . 
Suppose to  the  c o n tra ry  th a t  ra t io n a l c a lc u la tio n s  suggested th a t a 
g iven s tra te g y  A be s t r i c t l y  p re fe ra b le  to  s tra te g y  B and thus ought 
to  be pursued; In view  o f  the  Id e n tic a l psycho log ica l make-up o f  the  
two In d iv id u a ls , one's opponent would a lso  have to  be assumed to  have 
se le c te d  the  same s tra te g y . But then a p layer would have an Incen tive  
to  sw itch  to  s tra te g y  B (I.e . avoid  f ig h t  I f  aggressed, seek f ig h t  I f  
unaggressed), thus showing th a t s tra te g y  A could  no t have been 
se le c te d  as ‘best* In the  f i r s t  place. Therefore, In genera l, the  on ly  
s o lu tio n  Is never to  choose any one s tra te g y  w ith  c e r ta in ty .
I t  Is ca rd in a l to  re a liz e  th a t  whereas In general th e re  w i l l  always 
e x is t  (a t le a s t) one Nash e q u ilib r iu m  I f  p laye rs  use mixed s tra te g ie s , 
randomized s tra te g ie s  o f fe r  no way ou t o f  the  above dilemma. Because
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s e lf-p re s e rv a t Ion Is the  p re co n d itio n  fo r  experiencing g lo ry  and thus 
must be u n c o n d itio n a lly  guaranteed by a ra t io n a l g lo ry -se eke r, any
s tra te g y  th a t envisages a however sm a ll chance o f  seeking f ig h t  has
to  be re je c ted  as u n fe a s ib le , fo r  I t  e n ta ils  a p o s it iv e  chance o f  
s e lf-d e s tru c t io n . But th is  would leave as the  on ly  candidate the
‘avo id  f ig h t*  s tra te g y , which w i l l  never be adhered to  by g lo ry -  
seekers: I f  a g lo ry -s e e k e r knew th a t  h is  opponent would always
re f ra in  from seeking f ig h t ,  he would always a tta ck , fo r  th is  would 
y ie ld  the p leasure o f  (va in ) g lo ry . The fa c t  th a t r a t io n a l i t y  demands 
th a t g lo ry -se eke rs  cou ld  never contem plate the  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f 
endangering th e ir  s e lf -p re s e rv a t io n  (seen as the  p recond ition  fo r  
g lo ry )  destroys  the  argum ent fo r  randomized choice and produces an 
unbreakable c ir c u la r i ty :  I f  I t  Is ra t io n a l to  avo id  f ig h t in g  then I t  Is 
ra t io n a l to  seek f ig h t ,  e tc . The usua l argument deployed to  prove the 
ex is tence  o f  m lx e d -s tra te g les e q u il ib r ia  does no t app ly here, fo r  the 
p ayo ffs  are no t bounded from  be low. I.e. ‘death* has a p a y o ff o f  minus 
In f in i ty .
As g lo ry -se eke rs  must take an a c tio n  ( fo r  Inaction  I t s e l f  Is an 
a c tio n ) and th e ir  reason Is mute, they can on ly  re s o rt to  th e ir  
I r ra t io n a l na tu re  as the  In s p ira t io n  fo r  ac tion . T h is  conclusion 
supports  Hobbes*s v iew  th a t  the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  Is the  realm o f  
passions and th a t o n ly  the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te  Is  the  realm o f  reason :
Out o f  [th e  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te ],  the re  Is a Dominion o f  Passions .- In 
[th e  p o l i t ic a l  s ta te ],  the  Dominion o f  reason (2)
(2) De Cive, p. 130.
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The above In te rp re ta t io n  o f  the  Hobbes Ian s ta te  o f  n a tu re  has a lso  
ano ther advantage: I t  can account fo r  Hobbes's cla im  th a t  the war In 
the  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  Is “ pe renn ia l". Our argument suggests th a t In the 
ve ry  same way In which the  s ta te  o f  na tu re  Is a though t experim ent, 
so the  perenn ia l war th a t  according to  Hobbes cha rac te rizes  I t  should 
no t be taken l i t e r a l ly ,  as some o f  Hobbes's readers have seemed to  
suggest: as men are  e q u a lly  e f f ic ie n t  a t m urdering each o the r, an 
open c o n f l ic t  would soon end w ith  the  e x tin c t io n  o f  the  combatants. 
In ou r la s t example g lo ry -se e ke rs  can never be expected not to  seek 
f ig h t  — th e ir  ve ry  ex is tence  generates the  constant menace. I f  no t 
the  ra t io n a l expec ta tion , o f  imminent c o n f l ic t :
The na tu re  o f  war, co n s ls te th  no t In a c tu a l f ig h t in g ;  but in the  
known d is p o s it io n  th e re to , d u ring  a l l  the  tim e the re  Is no 
assurance to  the  co n tra ry . (3)
The m ental s ta te  o f  war Is pe renn ia l (“ [war] Is perpétua 11 In I ts  own 
n a tu re ” ) because the  c o n tra d ic tio n  between the  ra t io n a l i t y  and the  
i r r a t io n a l i t y  o f  f ig h t in g  cannot be ended as long as one o r more o f  
the  assum ptions o f  the  model are re laxed.
And th is  con firm s the  re s u lt  ob ta ined  In Chapter 6.
(3) Leviathan, p. 113.
-  196 -
B  I B l _  I O O F R A R M Y
Aubrey, John, B r ie f  L ives, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898.
Baumgold, Deborah, Hobbes's P o l i t ic a i  Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge
U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1988.
Brandt, F., Thomas Hobbes' Mechanical Conception o f  Nature, 
Copenhagen: Levin  & Munksgaard, 1928.
Brown, C li f fo rd ,  ‘Thucydides, Hobbes, and the  D e riva tio n  o f  Anarchy', 
H is to ry  o f  P o l i t ic a l  Thought, 8, 1987, pp. 33-62.
Brown, C li f fo rd ,  Thucydides, Hobbes, and the  L inear Causal 
Perspective*, H is to ry  o f  P o l i t ic a l Thought, 10, 1989, pp. 215- 
256.
Brown, K e ith ., (ed.), Hobbes S tud ies, Oxford: B lackw ell, 1965.
Cat I In, G., Thomas Hobbes, as Philosopher, P u b lic is t  and Man o f  
L e tte rs ,  O xford: B lackw ell, 1922.
Cranston, M., and Peters, R., (eds), Hobbes and Rousseau, New York: 
Doubleday, 1965.
Forsyth , Murray, ‘Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan ', In A G t ( I c: s to  the
P o l i t ic a l C lassics, e d ite d  by Forsyth  M. and Keens-Soper, M., 
198 , pp. 120-146.
G auth ier, David, The L og ic  o f  Levia than: The M oral and P o l i t ic a l  
Theory o f  Thomas Hobbes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
G auth ier, David, The S ocia l C on tract as Ideology*, Philosophy and
-  197 -
P u b lic  A ffa irs ^  6, 1977, pp. 130-164.
G auth ier, David, ‘Thomas Hobbes and the  C on trac ta rian  Theory o f  Law', 
paper d e liv e re d  a t the  1989 Meeting o f  the  APSA, A tlan ta , 
Georgia, 31 Aug-3 Sept 1989.
G ert, Bernard, ‘Hobbes and Psycho log ical Egoism’, Journa l o f  the  
H is to ry  o f  Ideas, 28, 1967, pp. 503-520.
G ert, Bernard, ‘ In tro d u c tio n ’, Thomas Hobbes, Man and C itizen , B. G ert 
(ed.). New York: Doubleday, 1972.
Goldsm ith, M., ‘Hobbes's M o rta ll God: Is There a F a llacy  In Hobbes's 
Theory o f  S ove re ign ty .’ , H is to ry  o f  P o l i t ic a l  Thought, 1, 
1980, pp. 33-50.
Goldsm ith, M., Hobbeses Science o f  P o lit ic s ,  New York: Columbia
U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1966.
Goldsm ith, M., ‘ In tro d u c tio n ’ , Behemoth o r the Long Parliam ent, by 
Thomas Hobbes, e d ite d  by Ferdinand Tônnles, 2nd e d itio n , 
London: Frank Cass, 1969, pp. v -x lv .
G oldsm ith, M., ‘Hobbes's Ambiguous P o l i t ic s ’ , paper d e live re d  a t the  
1989 M eeting o f  the  APSA, A tlan ta , Georgia, 31 Aug-3 Sept 
1989.
Gough, J., The S oc ia l C on trac t: A C r i t ic a l S tudy o f  I t s  Development, 
2nd ed. 1957, re p r in te d  W estport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978.
Hampton, Jean, Hobbes and the S ocia l C ontract T ra d itio n , Cambridge: 
Cambridge U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1986.
H erbert, Gary, ‘Thomas Hobbes's c o u n te r fe it  e q u a lity ’ . Southern
— 1 98 —
Journa l o f  Philosophy, 14, 1976, pp. 269-282.
Heyed, David, ‘The Place o f  Laughter In Hobbes's Theory o f  Emotions', 
Journa l o f  the  H is to ry  o f  Ideas, 43, 1982, pp. 285-295.
H i l l ,  C hris topher, P uritan ism  and R evo lution , London: Seeker & Warburg, 
1958.
Hlnnant, Charles, Thomas Hobbes: a Reference Guide, Boston, Mass.: H all, 
1980.
Hood, F., The D iv ine  P o l i t ic s  o f  Thomas Hobbes, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1964.
James, D.6., The L ife  o f  Reason: Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke, London: 
Longmans, 1949.
Johnston, David, The R h e to ric  o f  Leviathan, P rinceton, N.J.: P rinceton 
U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1986.
Kavka, Gregory, ‘Hobbes's War o f  A l l  aga ins t A l l ’, E th ics , 93, 1983, 
pp. 291-310.
Kavka, Gregory, Hobbesian M oral and P o l i t ic a l Theory, P rinceton, N.J.: 
P rinceton U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1986.
Kidder, Joel, ‘Acknowledgements o f  equals: Hobbes's n in th  law o f
n a tu re ’ . P h ilosoph ica l Q ua rte rly , 33, no. 131, pp. 133-146.
Ignat le f f ,  M ichael, The Needs o f  S trangers, London: Chat to  & W Indus, 
1984.
La ird , J, Hobbes, London: Benn, 1934.
von Leyden, Wolfgang, Hobbes and Locke: The P o l i t ic s  o f  Freedom and
-  199 -
ObLigatIon, London, 1981
M cN eilly , F.S., The Anathomy o f  Leviathan, London: Macmillan, 1968.
Macpherson, C.B., The P o l i t ic a l  Theory o f  Possessive Ind iv idua lism : 
Hobbes to  Locke, Oxford: Oxford U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1962.
Mlnogue, Kenneth, ‘Hobbes and P o l i t ic a l Language*, paper d e live red  a t 
the 1989 Meeting o f  the  APSA, A tla n ta , Georgia, 31 Aug-3 
Sept 1989.
Minogue, Kenneth, ‘ In trod u c tion *, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London: 
Dent, 1973.
M in tz, Samuel, The H unting  o f  Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge
U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1962.
Neal, P a trick , 'Hobbes and R a tiona l Choice Theory*, Western P o l i t ic a l  
Q uarte rly , Sept. 1988, pp. 635-652.
Oakeshott, M ichael, ‘ In tro d u c tio n  to  Levia than^  in Hobbes on C iv il
A ssoc ia tion , Berkeley: U n iv e rs ity  o f  C a lifo rn ia  Press, 1975, 
pp. 1-74.
O rr, Robert, ‘Hobbes on the  R egula tion  o f  V o lun ta ry  Motion*, in Reaver
G. and Rosen F. (eds). Lives, L ib e r t ie s  and the P ub lic  Good,
London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 45-60.
Orwin, C li f fo rd ,  ‘S ta s is  and Plague: Thucydides on the  D isso lu tio n  o f  
Society*, Journa l o f  P o lit ic s ,  50, 1988, pp. 831-847.
Orwin, C li f fo rd ,  ‘The Jus t and the  Advantageous in Thucydides: The 
Case o f  the  M y tllle n a ia n  Debate*, American P o l i t ic a l  Science
Review, 78, 1984, pp. 485-494.
— 200 —
Peters, Richard, Hobbes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956.
Plamenatz, John, Man and S ociety, Vol. I, P o L ltlc a l and Socia l Theory: 
M a ch la ve lll through Rousseau, New York: M cGraw-H ill, 1963.
Raphael, D., Hobbes: M ora ls and P o lit ic s ,  London: A lle n  & Unwin, 1977.
Relk, M iriam, The Golden Lands o f  Thomas Hobbes, D e tro it :  Wayne S ta te  
U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1977.
Robertson, G.C., Hobbes, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1886.
Rogow, Arnold, Thomas Hobbes. Radical In the se rv ice  o f  Reaction, New 
York: Norton, 1986.
Skinner, Quentin, The Foundation o f  Modem P o l i t ic a l Thought, Vol. II, 
The Age o f  Reform ation, Cambridge: Cambridge U n ive rs ity
Press, 1978.
Skinner, Quentin, ‘Hobbes's "Lev ia than"’ , H is to r ic a l Journa l, 7, 1964, 
pp. 321-333.
Skinner, Quentin, ‘The Ide o lo g ica l Context o f  Hobbes's P o l it ic a l 
Thought’ , H is to r ic a l Journa l, 9, 1966, pp. 286-317.
S ch la tte r, Richard, ‘ In tro d u c tio n ’, Hobbes's Thucydides, R. S ch la tte r 
(ed.), New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1975.
Stephen, L es lie , Hobbes, London: Macmillan, 1904.
Spragens, Thomas, The P o l i t ic s  o f  Motion. The World o f  Thomas Hobbes, 
London: Croom Helm, 1973.
S trauss, Leo, The P o l i t ic a l  Philosophy o f  Hobbes, O xford: Clarendon 
Press, 1936.
— 201 —
Strauss, Leo, N a tu ra l R igh t and H is to ry , Chicago; U n iv e rs ity  o f
Chicago Press, 1953.
S trauss, Leo, The c i t y  and man, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.
T ay lo r, A.E., ‘The E th ic a l D octrine  o f  Hobbes’ , Philosophy, 13, 1938,
pp. 406-424.
T ro n tl,  M ario (ed.), S ta to  e R lvo luz ione  in In g h llte r ra ,  M ilano: I I
Saggla tore, 1977.
Tuck, Richard, N a tu ra l R ig h ts  Theories: T he ir O rig in  and Development, 
Cambridge: Cambridge U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1979.
Warrender, Howard, The P o l i t ic a l  Philosophy o f  Hobbes: H is  Theory o f  
O bliga tion , O xford: Clarendon Press, 1957.
W atkins, John, Hobbes's System o f  Ideas: A S tudy in  the P o l i t ic a l  
S ig n ific a n c e  o f  P h ilosoph ica l Theories, 2nd ed., London: 
Hutchinson, 1973.
W atkins, John, ‘Philosophy and P o lit ic s  In Hobbes’ , P hilosoph ica l 
Q uarte rly , 5, 1955, pp. 125-146.
W atkins, John, ‘ Im perfect R a t io n a lity ’ , in R, Borger and F. C io f f i  
(eds). E xp lana tion  in the Behavioura l Sciences, Cambridge: 
Cambridge U n iv e rs ity  Press, 1970.
Wolln, Sheldon, P o l i t ic s  and V ision, Boston: L i t t le ,  Brown, 1960.
